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
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
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
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Preface.

Our purpose, in the following pages, is, to discover the features of Locke's Ethical Philosophy. Although his writings abound in ethical observation, and severally took their rise from ethical considerations, he has nowhere given a systematic statement of his moral doctrines. His proposed treatise on Ethics was probably never written, certainly no trace of it has been discovered. We are credibly informed that among Locke's unpublished papers, in the British Museum and in private hands, there is nothing of ethical importance. So far as we can learn, no monograph on Locke's ethical philosophy has yet appeared. The histories of Ethics, for the most part, refer to Locke, but make no attempt to give a complete view of his system. Mackintosh, in his celebrated "Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy" gives Locke no place. We cannot suppose that the most Roman, as well as the most practical of modern philosophers, has left barren the great field in which Stoicism worked with such great and valuable results. Locke adopted the Stoic division of Philosophy into Physics, Ethics, and Logic. "Ethics", says Locke, "is the seeking out of those rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means to practise them. The end of this, is not bare speculation, and the knowledge of truth: but *right*, and a conduct suitable to it." (Essay, IV. 21. 3.) It is important to ascertain

an author's views before one begins to criticise them. The reverse of this principle has often been practised upon Locke, and he has been sharply assailed on doctrines that he not only does not hold, but vigorously combats. Especially is this true with reference to his ethical views. We have endeavored to discover Locke's position by considering his entire works in connection with the circumstances under which they were produced. This, with the prescribed limits of our task, has excluded for the most part what is ordinarily called criticism. We have used what Lowndes and Fraser regard as the best edition of Locke's works, viz, that edited by Bishop Edmund Law, 4 vols. Folio, London, 1777. Among Locke's works, the most important for our enquiry, are; "An Essay concerning Human Understanding", 1690; "Two Treatises of Government", 1690; "Some Thoughts concerning Education", 1693; Locke's Replies to the Bishop of Worcester, Works I. 458—775; "Of the Conduct of the Understanding", (posthumous, 1706); Four "Letters concerning Toleration", 1685, 1690, 1692, 1704, and, finally, "The Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures", 1695. The most important aids to our study have been, Lord King's Life of Locke. Ueberweg-Heinze's "Gesch. der Philos.", 3 Bände, 7te Auflage. Fox Bourne's Life of Locke, 2 vols. Hallam's "Intro. to the Literature of Europe", 4 vols., and "Marginalia, Locke-a-na". Ed. by Noah Porter, in "New Englander and Yale Review", July 1887. Perhaps too much attention has been given to Hobbes. But it is to be remembered that Hobbes furnished employment to English moralists for about a century. He cast a spell over the English mind that was difficult to resist; a spell which Locke did not fully succeed in breaking, except in its political bearing. As Hobbes did not believe in ghosts, but was afraid of them,

so, after the time of Locke, Hobbes was not believed in, although there was much anxiety because of him. Again, Locke's views have carried us into fields that are not generally regarded as belonging to ethics. Locke maintains that the institutions of government, religion and education are, in essence, ethical and that all are parts of a system which must be based upon, and be in harmony, with the fundamental physiological and psychological principles of human nature. In so far as Locke has succeeded in relating and connecting these institutions with his first principles, he presents a general scheme of sociology.

April 15th 1890.

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Chapter I.

A Sketch of Moral Philosophy in England from 1650—1690.

I. *Chaotic Condition.* The England of the seventeenth century is unique both in its men and events. The civil wars which began in 1642, and brought on revolution after revolution until the settlements in 1689, mark the most turbulent period in England's history. In this period were born the parties and policies, constitutional and commercial forms, which have played the leading part in the political movements of the last two centuries. This period is not less significant in its influence upon religious and philosophic thought. Perhaps never, before or since, has a single nation in one century known so many illustrious men. Such were, Shakespeare, Milton, and Dryden; Bacon, Hobbes and Locke; Newton, Boyle, Harvey and Huygens; Baxter, Bunyan, Taylor and Tillotson. Yet, however brilliant this century may appear as we look back upon it, and think of its vast fruitage for later times, it appeared to its great men as dark, chaotic, and disheartening. Milton thought that 'all the winds of heaven were let loose to play upon the earth'. The better part of the clergy recognised 'an age wherein men talked of religion most, and lived it least'. In 1660 Locke wrote, "I no sooner perceived myself in the world, but I found myself in a storm which has lasted almost hitherto." After the Restoration, Locke seriously contemplated joining his countrymen in America. Later, he was compelled by the Stuart to seek refuge in Holland. It was the open, flagrant immorality of the age that caused the deepest concern for the nation. This moral havoc was, in part, the natural

accompaniment of the political revolutions; in part a result of the writings of Hobbes. Speaking of the condition of society in this period, Macaulay says, "Ethical philosophy had recently taken a form well suited to please a generation equally devoted to monarchy and to vice. Thos. Hobbes had, in language more precise and luminous than has ever been employed by any other metaphysical writer maintained, that the will of the Prince was the standard of right and wrong, and that every subject ought to be ready to profess Popery, Mohammedanism, or Paganism at the royal command. Thousands who were really incompetent to appreciate what was really valuable in his speculations eagerly welcomed a theory which, while it exalted the kingly office, relaxed the obligations of morality, and degraded religion into a mere affair of state. Hobbism soon became an almost essential part of the character of the fine gentleman. Scarcely any rank or profession escaped the infection of the prevailing immorality, but those persons who made politics their business were perhaps the most corrupt part of the corrupt society."¹⁾

II. *Hobbes. 1588—1679.* In the summer of 1651 appeared the "*Leviathan*". It bore a striking frontispiece. Towering above the mountains, and overlooking the country with its cities and villages, is a crowned giant, grasping a sword in his right hand, and a crozier in his left. His vast body is made up of miniature people, representing the different professions and classes of men, all bending the knee, and facing the crowned head. Above all is the inscription "*Non est potestas Super Terram, quae Comparetur ei.*" This is the *Civitas* of Hobbes. We may regard it as one man, or as an assembly of men. What is strictly demanded is one crowned head, governing all. Here is the formal philosophy of Hobbes; here is the political philosophy of the houses of Stuart and Bourbon in the Seventeenth Century. "*L'Etat, c'est moi.*" The *Leviathan* comprehends

¹⁾ Hist. of England. Vol. I. ch. 2.

the substance of the entire philosophy of Hobbes.¹⁾ In center and circumference his work is political. It is in part a result of his convictions, in part of his devotion to absolute monarchy. Even his translation of Thucydides was designed to show the evils of popular government. His aim in the *Leviathan* is to crystallize the prevailing politico-religious dogmas into a consistent and popular philosophy. These dogmas were ready at hand. They lay close to the hearts of the Stuarts; they were woven into the polity of the Church. The Clergy had always been the only authorised teachers of public morality. But from the time of Henry VIII the Church was more and more identified with the interests of the Crown. As early as 1530, the Bishop of Chichester wrote a work defending Henry VIII, and exhorting all to reverence the King as the "Supreme head of the Church and the nation." One year later Henry imposed his supremacy on the Clergy. James I was able to proclaim the divinity of his office, and define the duties of his subjects. The thought of the politic Bacon was the conviction of many. "Kings are mortal Gods on earth, unto whom the living God has lent his own name as a great honour." For more than a century the Church had been rendering unto Caesar the things that were God's, and had come upon many of the elements of Hobbism. The view of the natural man was not better than that of Hobbes, while some of the consequences of this view had been put into dogmatic form. If the Church held that all government

¹⁾ *Leviathan, or, the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil.* By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, London. Printed for Andrew Clarke, 1651. The dedication is dated Paris, Apr. 15. 1651. Early in 1640 Hobbes had sketched his political system on paper. Hobbes, in his dedication to the King of the "Seven Philosophical Problems", 1662, indicates the purpose of his *Leviathan*. He declares; "There is nothing in it against Episcopacy. Why am I called an Atheist, or a man of no religion, unless it is for making the authority of the Church depend wholly upon the royal power, which I hope your Majesty will think neither atheism nor heresy, . . . snatching up all the weapons to fight against your enernies."

is of divine origin and appointment, as against Hobbes, it held with him that the King is the Viceregent of God, with divine right of administering government, and that the duties of subjects are comprehended in passive obedience and non-resistance. The Church sanctioned Cranmer's Homily, which declared it to be "the calling of God's people to render obedience to governors, although they were wicked and wrongdoers, and in no case to resist." Throughout the stormy times of this period such doctrines were promulgated in sermons, pamphlets and treatises. Locke speaks of the prevalence of these doctrines in the introduction to his "Two Treatises on Government"; the first of which is a reply to the posthumous work "Patriarcha" by Sir Robert Filmer. The first edition of Filmer's work appeared in 1680, defending the most extreme doctrine of divine rights and absolutism. It was popular enough to come to a new edition in 1685. Preparatory to demolishing the argument of Filmer, Locke remarks, "I should not speak so plainly of a gentleman long since past answering, had not the pulpit of late years publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity of the times. . . . I should not have taken the pains to show his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of proofs, were there not men amongst us, who, by crying up his books, and espousing his doctrine, save me against the reproach of writing against a dead adversary."

That a Church depending on the State, and regarding the Crown as the State, should, in revolutionary times, become a mere political faction, seems to be unavoidable.¹⁾

¹⁾ It has been computed that within the twenty years from 1640—1660, not less than thirty thousand pamphlets and treatises issued from the press on the subject of ecclesiastical and civil government. In the reign of James II there were published one thousand dissertations for and against Popery, and developing the general principles of toleration. For the relations of Church and State during this period, see, Blakey, *History of Political Literature* Vol. II. 141. Makintosh *Hist. of the Revolution in England*. 1688. Vol. II. 43. Dr. Samuel Parker, *Ecclesiastical Polity* 1670. South, *Peculiar Care and Concern of Providence for the Protection and Defence of Kings*, 1675. Hallam, *Literature of Europe*. Vol. III. 206. etc.

This condition of affairs throws some light upon Locke's failure to take orders. It is clear that his father intended him for the Church, that many of his friends expected and urged him to take orders, that he held offices in Christ Church, Oxford, as lecturer on Greek and Rhetoric, and Censor of moral philosophy which were generally assigned to clergymen. It is also clear that by 1666 he had abandoned the idea. In view of Locke's letters and works we suggest that his feeling on the subject was not very different from that of his great contemporary, Milton. "The Church", says Milton, "to whose service, by the intention of my parents and friends, I was destined of a child, and in mine own resolutions, till coming to some maturity of years, and perceiving what tyranny had pervaded in the Church, that he who could take orders must subscribe slave, and take an oath withal, which, unless he took with a conscience that would retch, he must either straight perjure or split his faith, I thought it better to preserve a blameless silence before the sacred office of speaking bought and begun with servitude and foreswearing".¹⁾

The doctrine by which the Leviathan is supported is of the most vigorous and trenchant character. Its fundament is the conception of man as organized material endowed with sense and selfishness.²⁾ No Calvinist ever thought less of the natural man than Hobbes or preached with more power the unalterable decrees. With him, man is by nature selfish, brutal, violent, controlled only by fear and self-interest. Right and might are identical, "homo homini lupus". Thus his state of nature is a state of war, "bellum omnium contra omnes". All men are by nature equal, but this equality is a condition for war. Being equal, in the faculties of the body and mind, insures the general havoc to that point where compact is possible. Natural inequality would insure the survival of the strongest, and instead of compact, we

¹⁾ Milton. "The Reason of Church Government".

²⁾ Human Nature. XI. 5. compare Lev III. 34. and Lev I. 1.

would have conquest. Man has no higher criterion of truth than his senses. To seek pleasure and avoid pain is the only clear rule of his conduct. The picture is dismal in the extreme. "In such a condition", says Hobbes, "there is no place for industry, no culture of the earth, no navigation, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and, which is worse of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". Lev. XIII. This wretched state of nature, this mutual annihilation, gives rise to the social compact. Each man wishing to annihilate every other, yet afraid of being annihilated himself, consents to abide by the prescriptions of a ruler, and forfeit his pleasure in destroying others for the pleasure of not being destroyed himself. It is clear that the ruler to whom this right is surrendered, must be absolute, must be the Leviathan. This is the demand in view of the nature of man, and thus Hobbes holds that the King whose power is limited is no King. All the powers of government must rest in the Leviathan. He is at once law maker, judge, and hangman. The Leviathan is now given sword and crozier, and the advice that a ruler, to govern well, should adopt the Roman maxim, "*Salus populi suprema lex*". The connection of politics, religion, and ethics, is absolute in the person of the Leviathan. What he commands is right, what he prohibits, is wrong. The greatest crime is rebellion, the greatest virtue is passive obedience. None ever proclaimed with greater effect, "the powers that be are ordained of God". Hobbes simply transferred the crown from the head of Hildebrand the Pope, to the head of Leviathan the King. The State, not the Church, is the power ordained of God. Religion is only fear of power invisible, Lev. I. 6, but Leviathan may be seen and heard and felt. Thus the practical philosophy of Hobbes terminates in the Leviathan who furnishes both its standard and sanction. The existence of the Leviathan is a necessity arising from his analysis of human nature. This analysis fails to reveal a social or moral element in man. Every

virtue or moral sentiment is coldly resolved into selfishness, which, in the state of nature and out of it, is the ruling power of the soul. But this ugly skeleton, which is at once the centre and strength of the Leviathan, is clothed with a splendid paraphernalia, which, though having all the appearance of true royalty, has little in common with the wretched framework within. Hobbes formulates a natural law code of nineteen articles. These articles are suggested by the reason, and are regarded as laws of nature. The entire code is comprehended in a positive and a negative form; "whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that you do to them. And that law of all men, „quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris". Lev. XIV. But if all this is of the natural reason, what becomes of his conception of man and the Leviathan; if all this is not of the reason, how is the social contract and the wise Leviathan possible. Although we are told of these laws of nature, "what they forbid can never be lawful", De Cive III. 29, and what they order can never be unlawful, we are always led back to the fundamental position, that the laws of nature are the laws of the Leviathan, that his voice is the supreme authority, that what he commands or forbids is the sole moral imperative. Lev. XXVI. 6. This background of natural law, this prospect of shrubbery and blue sky, is wrought into the picture only for effect, only to give a pleasing perspective and prominence to the man with sword, crozier, and crown. In last analysis his natural law is natural lawlessness.

From the standpoint of the Crown and the Church, and from his abundant quotation of "Holy writ", we may agree with Priestley and Blakey, that Hobbes was a sincere and most orthodox Churchman. But the way in which Hobbes handled his subject, spread consternation among his friends as well as his enemies, and it has come to pass that he has been made the scapegoat for most of the ills of his unhappy age. Charles II. was offended because not enough was made of the divinity of kings, but, on closer inspection, finding Hobbes quite as zealous as Salmasius and

Filmer, he gave him a pension, and hung his portrait in the royal study. The whole Church Established was alarmed at seeing its political dogmas in such abominable nakedness standing on so mean a foundation.¹⁾ Liberal Churchmen and Dissenters hurled their strong anathemas and weak arguments against what they regarded as the subversion of both religion and morality. The friends of constitutional government condemned and burned the Leviathan, and the vicious multitude excused their profligacy at its threshold. The Royal Society, founded in 1662, excluded Hobbes from membership and ignored his methods, to which he replied, "If they are not wise enough to begin where I left off, their work will come to nought". The House of Commons, after the great Fire of 1666, expressed public feeling in a bill against Atheism and Profaneness, wherein the name of Hobbes appeared. He burned his papers, and again declared himself orthodox. Though timid and arrogant, Hobbes was a man of untarnished personal character, and unimpeachable motives. He was the last and most brilliant product of the old order of things. We may denominate the ethical system of Hobbes by what name we please, personal or public utility, fear or respect for a law. Apart from the state, man is the slave of his desires. Here we might find egoistic Hedonism, but Hobbes would condemn it, and demand the Leviathan, without which there is no system, no society at all. He was indeed "the terror of the age". In the words of Mackintosh, his was 'the stroke of a vigorous arm which seemed to shake ethics to its foundation'. It was the philosophy of Hobbes, its seensualism, materialism, and absolutism, that aroused the moral consciousness of England and formed the point of departure of modern ethical speculation.

¹⁾ It is noticeable that the opposition to Hobbes arose not from the party of the Crown and the Church, but from the Constitutional party, the Dissenters, and the Catholic Church which Hobbes had lampooned with great severity in that part of the *Leviathan* which treats 'of the Kingdom of Darkness'.

III. *Nathaniel Culverwel 1615—1651.*¹⁾ One year after the publication of the *Leviathan*, appeared a "Discourse of the Light of Nature", which placed reason on the throne, and supported it by a psychology both rational and semi-critical. The work is of the greatest importance for English ethics, as it anticipates Cumberland's attempt to establish morality upon a basis independent of Revelation; Locke's origin of knowledge and place of reason in ethical theory; Cudworth's "Eternal and Immutable Morality" and Clarke's theory of "Eternal fitness of things." With not less learning than Cudworth, and even more literary brilliancy than Taylor, Culverwel seeks to show the supremacy of reason in matters of religion, and at the same time "chastise those dogmatic, arrogant, rationalists who limit and measure all reason by their own." (Preface XXIII, compare 231.) In the view of Culverwel, "The Light of Nature," "The Candle of the Lord," and "Reason," are synonymous terms. Faith cannot contradict reason: it may be above reason, but not contrary to reason. (229.) "I shall always reverence a greyheaded truth; yet prefer reason, a daughter of eternity, before antiquity, which is the offspring of time." We will notice briefly two features of his philosophy; his theory of knowledge and theory of ethics.

"There are", says Culverwel, "stamped and printed upon the being of man, some clear and indelible principles, some first and alphabetical notions, by putting together of which it can spell out the law of nature." p. 81. These first and radical principles are such as, "Bonum est appe-

¹⁾ "An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature with several other Treatises" etc. By Nathaniel Culverwel, Master of Arts, and lately Fellow of Emanuel College in Cambridge. Imprimatur Edm. Calamy 4to, 1652. The work written about 1646 and passed through four Editions' viz. 1652. 1654. 1661 and 1669. The "Discourse of the Light of Nature" is ably edited by John Brown, D. D. Edinburgh, 1857, to whose edition our references are made. Culverwel has been curiously overlooked by Bibliographers and Historians of English Philosophy. We know of no history of ethics that so much as mentions his name.

tendum, malum est fugiendum." "Beatitudo est quaerenda." "Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris." "Reason, by warming and brooding upon these first and oval principles of her own laying, being itself quickened with a heavenly vigour, does thus hatch the law of nature." (82—83). Bacon's observation, "All morality is nothing but a collecting and building up of natural principles" is quoted with approval. But on the other hand, Culverwel rejects the doctrine of innate ideas and principles with as much vigour as does Locke. "Had you such notions at the first opening of the soul's eye. Had you these connate species in the cradle, and were they rocked to sleep with you, or did you then meditate upon these principles, 'Totum est majus parte, and 'Nihil potest esse, et non esse simul'. Never tell us that you wanted organical dispositions, for you plainly have recourse to the sensitive powers, and must needs subscribe to this, that all knowledge comes flourishing in at these lattices." (125—6)¹). Thus Culverwel prefers Aristotle to

¹) Richard Hooker, 1553—1600, was the first English philosopher who, while assuming *tabula rasa* for the mind, laid great stress on the law of nature. "The soul of man being therefore at the first as a book wherein nothing is, and yet all things may be imprinted, we are to search by what steps and degrees it riseth unto perfection of knowledge" etc. "God is a law, both to Himself, and to all things besides." "Obedience of creatures to the law of nature is the stay of the whole world." "The general and perpetual voice of men is as the sentence of God Himself." "Whether the law is revealed in Scripture, or in the rational constitution of human nature, makes no difference. Its sacredness is the same, as springing out of the same Fountain of light and order. This unity of nature and life and Scripture, as all equally true, if not all equally important revelations of the Divine will, lies at the foundation of Hooker's whole argument". Tulloch, *Rational Theology in England in the XVIIth Century*. Vol. I. pp 51—52. The first two books, "of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity" 1594, treating of the fundamental principles of theology, law, and morality, exercised a remarkable influence upon the thought of the seventeenth century. It anticipated most of the principles which for the next two centuries controlled ethico-political speculation. Locke held this work in high estimation, and frequently speaks of Hooker as "the judicious Hooker", "the learned and judicious Hooker".

Plato. "For Aristotle perceiving the proud emptiness and swelling frothiness of such Platonic bubbles, he was fain to search for certainty somewhere else; and casting his eye upon the ground, he spied the bottom of it laying in sense, and laid there by the wise dispensation of God Himself: from thence he looked up to the highest top and pinnacle of certainty placed in the understanding. Sense is but the gate of certainty; the understanding is the throne of it. First principles and common notions, with those demonstrations that stream from them, only remain as the basis of certainty, and he that will not cast anchor upon these, condemns himself to perpetual scepticism." (202—203). Here is not only an anticipation of Locke, but a formal statement of the fundamental principle of the Scottish philosophy. Culverwel thinks the Platonists were right in regarding the spirit of a man as the "Candle of the Lord" "though they were deceived in the time when it was lighted". (132). Culverwel holds that without sensation the mind could never rise to any knowledge at all, as the soul is endowed with "no other innate light but only the power and principle of knowing and reasoning". (128). This power of knowing and reasoning comes, through experience, upon knowledge and common principles of morality.

Culverwel's theory of ethics is but an extension of his theory of knowledge. It shows many points in common with Aristotle and the Stoics as well as with modern intuitionism. His conception of law and liberty is striking. "Law is founded in intellectuals, in the reason, not in the sensitive principle. It supposes a noble and free-born creature, for where there is no liberty there is no law, a law being nothing else but a rational restraint and limitation of absolute liberty. Now all liberty is radically in the intellect; and such creatures as have no light, have no choice, no moral variety." (62). To him a natural law was as real as to any seventeenth century writer. This law is grasped by the reason, or revealed in the reason. It is common and universal among men. Culverwel lays great stress upon

universal consent, and declaims with warmth against those who attribute universal agreement to a revelation to the Jews, which spread itself into Greece. "Surely, Aristotle never thought that his sheet of blank paper could have nothing printed upon it, till a Jew gave it an imprimatur." (95). He holds that common notions are the common property of man, as man. 'Should new nations or worlds appear, every rational nature in them would comply with and embrace the several branches of this law; and as they would not differ in those things that are intrinsical to sense, so neither in those that are essential to the understanding'. (116. 113. 93.) Culverwel makes use of the inductive method, both in his theology and ethics. "As we ascend to the first and Supreme Being by the steps of second causes, we may climb up to a sight of this eternal law by these fruitful branches of secondary laws, which seem to have their root in earth, when, in reality, it is in heaven." (51.) Basing certainty of moral truth upon universal reason, he founds its nature and sanction in the Divine Will. "Now this eternal law is not distinguished from God himself, for nothing exists from eternity but God himself." "God being truth itself, eternal immutable truth. Wisdom and power which are the chief ingredients of law, can only dwell in Deity." Here Culverwel distinguishes between law and its obligation. Natural law has its seat in the understanding of God, and is made known to man by the voice of reason. But it is only the will of God, willing natural law to be moral law, that gives it life, vigor, sanction, and places men under obligation. "Not the understanding, but the will of a lawgiver makes a law." (45—55). Culverwel argues with great force that reason cannot bind in its own name, but only in the name of its supreme Lord and Sovereign. No naked essence though never so pure and noble can lay a moral engagement upon its own self, or bind its own being; for this would make the very same being superior to itself as it gives a law, and inferior to itself, as it must obey it. In the commonwealth of human

nature that proportion which actions bear to reason is indeed a sufficient foundation for a law to build upon, but it is not the law itself, nor a formal obligation. For the perfection of a law "there must come a command from some superior power, from whence will spring a moral obligation also, and make up the formality of a law." (74—77). Thus Culverwel holds that natural law, which the reason recognises, is imposed by God as a revelation in the reason, and as such, has its source, obligation, and sanction in the Supreme Being. Culverwel also holds it to be express blasphemy to say that either God, or the word of God, ever did or ever will, oppose right reason. (218). If Hobbes represents the stationary point of departure, Culverwel represents and indicates the line of departure which has guided the course of the most influential schools of English ethics till our own day. Although Culverwel's treatise was not a professed reply to Hobbes, it yet attacks the Leviathan in its chief strongholds, not only in affirming the rational, social, and moral nature of man, but also by maintaining that moral "law is born from the brain of Jove, and it is not the secular arm, but the heavenly, that must maintain it." (52).

IV. *Cumberland. 1632—1718.*¹⁾ The „Light of Nature” had inaugurated a new movement in ethical philosophy, alongside of the Leviathan. The work of Culverwel was carried on by Cumberland, Cudworth, and Locke, open an-

¹⁾ De legibus naturae disquisitis philosophica contra Hobbium instituta. London. 1672. Done into English by T. Maxwell. London 1727 French by Barbeyrac, Amst. 1744. The work consists of a Prolegomena and nine chapters. Appended to the treatise are two dissertations: a) The City of God, or the Defects of Heathen Deism, b) The Imperfections of Heathen Morality, which is an interesting discussion of the ethical doctrines of the Stoics and Epicureans. Sidgwick; 'History of Ethics'. p. 172, remarks that Cumberland "has furnished material to more than one better known moralist"; while Remusat, in his "Philosophie en Angleterre", II. 56, regards Cumberland's work as "le premier traité philosophique, qui, en Angleterre, ait été dicté purement par l'esprit moderne". These judgments may be equally true of Culverwel.

tagonists of the philosophy of Hobbes. Cumberland, like Culverwel repudiated the doctrine of innate ideas, insisted upon the harmony of faith and knowledge, declared moral principles eternal and unchangeable in their nature, and endeavoured to establish ethical philosophy on a psychological basis, independent of Revelation. But Cumberland went far beyond Culverwel in anticipating modern ethical theory, as well as in prescribing the method of philosophical investigation. Cumberland promises "to avoid the sure and easy expedient of the Platonists . . . not being so fortunate as to possess innate ideas." He hopes to show against Hobbes that man is a rational, social, and benevolent being, capable of disinterested action, and that morality is not a mere matter of conventionalism and the State, but inherent in human nature. The Prolegomena gives the outline of his system. He defines the law of nature to be; "Certain propositions of unchangeable truth which direct our voluntary actions about choosing good and refusing evil; and impose an obligation to external actions even without civil laws, and laying aside all considerations of those compacts which constitute civil government. That some such truths are, from the nature of things and of men, necessarily suggested to the minds of men, and by them understood and remembered whilst the faculties of their minds continue unhurt, and that therefore they really exist there. This is what we affirm, and our said adversaries as expressly deny." But how do we know that there are any such laws or truths? The answer to this question shows the advance which was made by Cumberland. He agrees with Grotius and Culverwel that there is much force in an appeal to history and literature, as showing the universality of these laws, but this is not his method. He would show that man is constituted in harmony with the laws of nature, which are the universal laws of right reason. He announces an experimental method. We must prosecute moral science as we do natural science, "by direct and well conducted observations and experiments." He makes a study of the intel-

lectual, moral, and religious capacities of man, views him in his different relations, and seeks to analyze the nature and constitution of both man and the world. Natural good is defined to be that which preserves, enlarges, or perfects the powers of an intelligent being. He maintains that the growth and existence of the institutions of property, with its rights in labor and things, and of the family with love and benevolence between parent and child, not only prove the social nature of man, but insure its perpetuity. The reason is the faculty which apprehends moral distinctions. In his system, conscience is the reason concerned about right and wrong. It is sometimes called the practical reason. "The dictates of practical reason are propositions which point out the end, or means thereto, in every man's power." Again, it means right reason, "whoever determines his judgment and his will by right reason must agree with all others who judge according to right reason in the same matter." (II. 8.) We come to moral knowledge just as we come to any other kind of knowledge. Some actions have evil results, others good results. By experience we come to a knowledge of these two classes. Virtue carries with it true happiness, and vice, misery. Morality is capable of mathematical certainty. (Proleg. XII. II, 9.) Cumberland, from his analysis of human nature, seeks one general law of nature from which all other particular laws are deduced. This is found in the law of benevolence. "The greatest possible benevolence of every rational agent toward all the rest, constitutes the happiest state of each and all, so far as depends on their own power, and is necessarily required for their happiness; therefore the common good is the supreme law." (Proleg. IX. cf. I. 4—12.) In his second chapter Cumberland defends the law of benevolence, as a law of human nature and right reason, and shows that the highest good of one and all can only be realized in the living energetic benevolence of each and all. No action is "morally good that does not in its own nature contribute somewhat to the happiness of men." On such grounds

Cumberland holds the identity of general and individual interests. The greatest good of the individual cannot, by the nature of things, be in conflict with the common good. Here he carries out more fully his remark (I. 22.) "One's own happiness is an extremely small part of the end which a truly rational man pursues; and bears only that proportion to the whole end . . . which one man bears to the collective body of all rational beings." This remark was of great importance in the hands of Bentham and Mills. About the liberty of each one to act according to right reason, Cumberland finds no serious difficulty; "we have the same proof of liberty that we have of our own consciousness." This position was taken up by Locke and Reid. In treating of the sanctions of morality Cumberland makes use both of reason and revelation. In the third chapter his definition of natural law embraces both the ground and sanction of morality. The will of the First Cause of all, points out through human experience the consequences of conduct on happiness, and makes known rewards and punishments. The sanction is twofold, punishment within and punishment without. It is a striking feature of his work that, unlike Hobbes, he makes no appeal to "Scripture" as authority, but on the other hand, holds with Culverwel that reason must support and defend revelation, and that it is by reason only that we can be convinced of the veracity of God. He holds with Descartes that the certainty of all that we rationally possess is grounded on God's veracity. God is, to him, the maximum of all excellency and power, the author of every true proposition, and has ever in view the happiness and perfection of his creatures. (Proleg. XII, comp. V, 19.) We are assured both by reason and experience that happiness flows from obedience, and misery from disobedience to these natural laws, not only in this world, but probably in the next. Cumberland's reply to Hobbes is restricted almost entirely to his psychology. While the importance of Cumberland's work is great, both as a rebuff to the sensualism and materialism of Hobbes, and as an

anticipation of the more thorough exposition of Locke, we must recognise that he has only indirectly weakened the power of the Leviathan. When Cumberland comes to the relations of politics and ethics, he leaves Leviathan with as much authority as Hobbes had endowed him. He holds with Hobbes that the laws of nature are prior to civil laws, and that the monarch should govern in harmony with natural laws, but he offers no redress against the despotism of the Leviathan. Culverwel and Cumberland, although strong in battle, and fruitful sources of subsequent speculation, had little effect upon the bold dogmatism of Hobbes which allied itself with selfishness. ✓

V. *The Cambridge School*, though it falls within our period, is, for our purpose, of little importance. More's *Enchiridion Ethicum*, 1669, is the single exception. The most striking features of his system are his declaration of a special ethical faculty, in *boniformi animae facultate*; his argument for the existence of God from the moral nature of man, and his theory of virtue and happiness as identical, morality being with him, as with Locke, "the art of living well and happily." Shaftesbury significantly remarks that More's work "is a right good piece of sound morals." (Letters to a Student. No. IX.)

Cudworth's "Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality", although written in this period, was first published in 1731. The essence of his theory is given in his own words; "Now all that we have hitherto said amounts to no more than this, that it is impossible that anything should be by will only, that is, without a nature or entity, or that the nature and essence of anything should be arbitrary." The effective check which Cudworth put upon the theory of Hobbes is expressed in language more precise than is furnished by Locke. "Suppose such a law to be established, it must be either right to obey it, and wrong to disobey it, or, indifferent whether we obey it or disobey it. But a law which it is indifferent whether we obey or not, cannot, it is evident, be the source

of moral distinctions; and on the contrary supposition, if it is right to obey the law, and wrong to disobey it, these distinctions must have had an existence antecedent to the law."¹) The points of agreement between Locke and Cudworth are many and striking, so much so that we may suppose them to have exchanged thought on the general subject of ethics. Cudworth's 'Intellectual System' is noticed by Locke in complimentary terms, in "Thoughts concerning Education." (§ 193.) Certainly there is no ground for seeing with Professor Jodl "eine eigenthümliche Ironie des Schicksals"²), in the fact that, for twelve years Locke made his home in the family of Sir Francis Masham, and that Lady Masham, the daughter of Cudworth, a woman of remarkable talents, should have been a most earnest disciple of Locke's views.

VI. *Locke, 1632—1704.* The year 1632 is marked by the birth of illustrious men, Locke, Spinoza, Cumberland, Pufendorf, Bourdaloue, Mabillon, Pepys, and Sir Christopher Wren. Of these, Locke and Bourdaloue died in 1704. It remained for Locke to review the entire philosophy of Hobbes, and assail it in each of its ethico-political strongholds. In this task the way had been prepared for him on the one hand by Culverwel and Cumberland, and on the other by the Revolution of 1688. Hobbes is the philosopher of the Restoration, Locke of the Revolution. They represent two distinct and opposing lines of thought not only in politics, but in morality and religion. The judgment of Professor Blackie, by no means partial to Locke, may represent the general judgment of the historical significance of these two widely divergent systems. In introducing his study on Utilitarianism, he remarks, "we must therefore start from Mr. Locke, the acknowledged father of whatever school of British thinking deserves the name of a philosophy. No doubt

¹) "Immutable Morality". Book I. ch. I. compare Maine: Early Law and Custom. p. 388.

²) "Geschichte der Ethik". Band I. 127.

before him came Hobbes, but this man stands alone, like a huge trap rock bolt up in a flat country".¹⁾ Locke entered the lists against all dogmatism and mechanism in philosophy, religion and politics. In each of these departments he opposes the teaching of Hobbes. He saw clearly where the strength of the Leviathan lay, and thus he wrote his essays on Government, and his works on Toleration, and the Reasonableness of Christianity, to supplement his "Essay concerning Human Understanding" Hobbes had formed a consistent philosophy of persecution, and Locke was logically correct in attacking its two phases, the political and ecclesiastical. We are aware that our general position, that Hobbes and Locke represent opposing systems of thought, is contested, but, we think, on inadequate grounds. No one has associated Locke more intimately with Hobbes than has Professor Paulsen.²⁾ He remarks, "Wenn aus der Ähnlichkeit der Gedanken eines jüngeren Schriftstellers mit denen eines älteren, die Abhängigkeit jenes von diesem gefolgert werden darf, so muss Locke den erheblichsten Einfluss von Hobbes erfahren haben. Dass er ihn, so viel ich weiss, nie und nirgend nennt, steht dieser Annahme nicht im Wege" (587). It is clear that Locke had no intercourse with Hobbes although they were contemporaries for about forty years. There is, however, in the works of Locke, no lack of reference to Hobbes. Generally, his name is coupled with that of Spinoza, and both are spoken of as "those justly decried names". (Works I, 760.) Locke's indignation is never more aroused against Stillington, than when the latter suggests a flavor of Hobbes and Spinoza in Locke's treatment of spirit and

¹⁾ Four Phases of Morals, Second Edition, p. 272. Essentially the same view must be maintained from the political side. "Wie Hobbes mehr der letzte edle Ausdruck eines im Verschwinden begriffenen Systems, so ist Locke der erhabenste erste Träger des neuen Princip, welches in England längst vorbereitet, durch ihn erst recht zu nationalem Bewusstsein gebracht worden ist." (Das Staats-Lexicon von Rotteck und Welcher. 3. Aufl. Bd. IX.)

²⁾ Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. Erster Band. Pp. 580—587.

matter. Locke regards this imputation as bordering upon insult, and charges the Bishop with bringing them into the discussion irrelevantly, and "by their names skillfully to give that character to my book with which you would recommend it to the world". (Works I. 757.) Again Locke repudiates the foundations of the religion of Hobbes and Spinoza, and declares that it resolves all, even the thoughts and will of men, into an irresistible, fatal necessity. (Works IV. 577.) Once again, Locke repudiates the ethical doctrines of Hobbes. "An Hobbist, with his principle of self preservation, whereof himself is to be judge, will not easily admit a great many plain duties of morality." (King. Life of Locke. p. 103.) Professor Fraser is certainly correct in saying, "Hobbes did not, like Descartes and Locke, make consciousness his starting point and deepest fact, but treated 'minds' as visible organisms" etc, ("Selections from Berkeley." Intro. XVI.) It is clear from Locke's inference and classification that he had a general idea, at least, of the systems of Hobbes and Spinoza, and that he considered himself out of harmony with their doctrines. In the copious lists of books which Locke recommends for study, no work of Hobbes is mentioned. The names most in favour with Locke, are, Cicero, Hooker, Aristotle, Bacon, Tillotson, Chillingworth and Pufendorf. After remarking that Hobbes "ist ein unendlich viel bedeutender Denker als Bacon", and declaring that the foundations of Locke's ethics are essentially the same with those of Hobbes, Professor Paulsen remarks, "Das Dogma von der freien Kirche im freien Staat würde Locke keineswegs unterschrieben haben Er giebt mit Hobbes dem Staat die höchste Autorität in Sachen des Kultus und der Predigt; sein Ideal ist offenbar eine Nationale- oder Staatskirche". (591.) This, certainly, is the reverse of Locke's view. In his first letter on Toleration in speaking of church and state, he says; "The church itself is a thing absolutely separte and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles Heaven and earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes

these societies, which are in their original, end, business, and in everything, perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other." (Works II. 326.) There can be no doubt of Locke's position on this question, Article 96 of the Constitution of Carolina, 1669, which provides that the Church of England is to be regarded as the Church of State and be supported by the State as a national institution, was inserted against the protest of Locke.¹⁾ Professor Paulsen continues, "Als Denker hat er weder grosse Originalität noch Tiefe; mit Hobbes oder Spinoza ist er nicht zu vergleichen. Aber er steht dem Common Seuse am nächsten, und dieser versteht ihn". (596.) To the first sentence we have nothing to remark; but the last sentence is suggestive. It is a serious reflection upon two centuries of Locke's critics. Perhaps no modern system has met with more various and conflicting judgments than that of Locke. What is his theory of knowledge? Bald sensationalism, says Cousin; intellectualism, like that of Kant, says Webb; Locke is a disciple of Hobbes, says Paulsen; "he roots in Bacon", says Kuno Fischer; he "relies exclusively on Gassendi" says Sir Wm. Hamilton; he builds on Descartes, thinks Reid; "My theories are spun out of my own thoughts and are not derived from any other original", says Locke, and Lewes remarks, "there is scarcely a writer we could name whose works bear such an indisputable impress of his having raised himself above the alms basket, and, not content to live lazily on the scraps of begged opinions set his own thoughts to work to find out and follow truth." This diversity of opinion extends itself to the particulars of Locke's philosophy. What is his doctrine of freedom? Green and Kirchmann place him with the libertarians; Professor Webb and Dr. Münz with the determinists or necessitarians; Priestly and Hamilton think that while opposing necessity verbally, he adopted it substantially without being aware of it, while Henry Rogers thinks that he left

¹⁾ Bourne's Life of Locke, Vol. I. p. 240. King. Life of Locke. p. 300—306. "On the difference between civil and ecclesiastical power."

no verdict on the question. Locke has been called realist, nominalist, conceptualist, but it is useless to carry the reproach further. We are reminded of the exclamation of Socrates when he heard Plato read the *Lysis*. "O Hercules, what a number of lies the young man has told about me". (Diog. Laert. III. 24.) In estimating the influence of one writer upon another, one should either follow the main lines of thought, or confine one's-self to such particulars in the writings of the latter as had their inception in the writings of the former, and are not derived by both, the earlier and the later writer, from a common source. Observing this rule, we may say that in neither instance is there a trace of indebtedness of Locke to Hobbes. On the main lines Locke opposes Hobbes throughout, while agreements in particulars are the agreements of both with others who went before. Notwithstanding the difficulties of Locke's system, and they are many, his works still remain the most important source of a knowledge of his doctrines. Although we do not subscribe to the Lockian scheme we take advantage of the diversity of opinion to excuse ourselves for drawing our views of Locke's ethics solely from Locke's writings, for quoting his own language somewhat fully, and as an appeal for charity from those who differ from our judgment of his ethical doctrines.

Chapter II.

Ethical Faculty or Criterion.

The purpose of this chapter is to discover the ethical faculty, and the ground of certainty. It is in no respect a discussion of Locke's work, other than to make clear these two important factors of his ethical theory.

I. *The Motive and Method of Locke's "Essay concerning Human Understanding"*. Locke, in his controversies with the critics of his essay, often refers to the Epistle to the Reader

as a thorough explanation of the occasion and design of his book. (Works I. 749.) It is therefore of primary importance that we give attention to this letter. We may also consider in this connection the first chapter of his Essay, as it is included in the general introduction.

The occasion of the Essay was threefold, firstly, a discussion held in his chamber, with five or six friends "discoursing on a subject very remote from this". One of Locke's friends, James Tyrell, remarks, "I remember, myself, being one of the number that met there when the discussion began about the principles of morality and revealed religion".¹⁾ The Essay, then, is not to be regarded as fully representing Lockes ethical views. Secondly, the conviction that philosophical enquiry "begins at the wrong end, takes a wrong course; that instead of letting loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being to wander in those depths where they can find no sure footing, we should take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they are adapted. Till this is done we seek in vain for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths." Thirdly, the chaotic condition of the thought of his age led him to think "either there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it." Locke thinks this is refusing to walk because we have no wings to fly, or neglecting duties because we have not the full blaze of the sun. He hopes to show that "the candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes". Locke would distinguish, with the Stoics, things within our reach, τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, from those beyond our reach, τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. (Intro. sec. 4, 6.) The practical writings of Locke bear a practical and ethical import. It is not our business to know all things, but only those which concern our conduct. "Whatsoever is necessary for the necessities of life and the information of virtue is

¹⁾ See at bottom of p. 749.

²⁾ Bourne. *Life of Locke*. I. 248.

within our reach." "It is rational to conclude that our proper employment lies in those enquiries, and in that sort of knowledge which is most suited to our natural capacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, i.e., the condition of our eternal estate; hence I think I may conclude that morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general, who are both concerned and fitted to search out their *summa bonum*." ¹⁾ Added to this, was the great attraction of the subject itself. "Since it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion that he has over them, it is certainly a subject even for its nobleness worth our labour to enquire into." (I. I; 1.) This is significant, in the beginning, as indicating Locke's concept of man as a rational being, and as distinguishing his view from that of Hobbes and Spinoza. This is further seen in his remark, "God having designed man for a social creature, made him not only with an inclination and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with language which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society." (III. 1; 1.) Thus, in the two parts of the Essay we have placed in the foreground a strong optimistic concept of man as a rational and social being.

The purpose of the essay, is, "to enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent."

¹⁾ Introduction. Sec. 7. 5. H. U. IV. 12; 11. King, p. 310.

²⁾ The title of Locke's essay is not concerning knowledge, but concerning the Human *Understanding*, *νοῦς*, *mens*, *verstand*. Locke here uses Understanding for "the discerning faculties of a man," all the faculties which have to do with knowledge. Again, the term is equivalent to *reason*, *λόγος*, *ratio*, *raison*, *Vernunft*. The terms understanding, mind, and reason, are not clearly discriminated in Locke's writings. In his doctrine of ideas, the understanding or mind, is prominent; in his doctrine of knowledge, the reason is fundamental.

Again, it is, "to clear my way", says Locke, "to those foundations which I conceive are the only true ones, to give an account of the reasons that I had to doubt of innate principles and to raise an edifice uniform and consistent with itself as far as my own observation and experience will assist me". Again, his purpose is indicated as twofold, "to show how our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have, and to set down the measures of the certainty of our knowledge". This last indication of his purpose is perhaps the most significant. It suggests the twofold division of his work.

The features of Locke's method are sufficiently clear. They are psychological, empirical, critical. The human understanding is objectified for analysis. The conscious mind is at once the observing subject and the object observed. The extensive force of this introspective method is indicated in Locke's remark about his book, "It is a copy of my own mind in its several ways of operation. And all I can say for the publishing of it, is, that I think the intellectual faculties are made and operate alike in most men". (Works I. 749.) Locke's method is the opposite to that of Descartes. Descartes postulated existence and ideas, and enquired for knowledge; Locke postulates the same, and enquired into the origin of ideas before discussing the problem of knowledge. From the same position the one takes a deductive, the other an inductive course. Locke also calls his method an "historical plain method". This he proposes to follow, and at the end of his enquiry concerning ideas he declares; "I have given a short, and, I think, true history of the first beginnings of human knowledge, whence the mind has its first objects, and by what steps it makes its progress." What are called the comparative and historical methods are strongly suggested by Locke, and much used in the first book of his Essay, as well as in his political writings. With such data, including his frequent appeals to observation and experience, and the absence of dogmatism from his work, Locke may be justly called the father of the

- ✓ modern inductive and critical methods in philosophy.¹⁾ Yet his failure to adhere strictly to his purpose of limiting the investigation to the discerning faculties of a man as they are employed about the objects with which they have to do, carefully excluding ontological and physiological considerations of the mind, has involved his system in some confusion, and afforded opportunity to hostile criticism.

The division of Locke's work is not to be overlooked, especially in reference to his theory of ideas and knowledge. The first book is no part of his constructive theory. (I. 4; 25.) It does not appear in the abstract of his Essay, which was prepared for University use, under Locke's supervision. It is a refutation of innate ideas and principles, which Locke represents as an "established opinion", and "received doctrine" in his day. The second book inquires into the origin of our ideas, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them. The third book was no part of the original plan, but was afterward introduced as a preliminary treatise to the fourth book, on discovering that a treatise on the nature, use, and signification of language was necessary before proceeding to make enquiries respecting our knowledge. The fourth book shows what knowledge the understanding has by its ideas; the certainty, evidence, and extent of such knowledge, as well as the nature and grounds of faith and opinion. Thus, the second book contains the theory of ideas; the fourth, the theory of knowledge. The one shows how the materials of knowledge are furnished to the mind; the other, how the mind orders or arranges this material into knowledge. This is evidently Locke's view in the following passage; "I must confess then, that when I first began this discourse of the understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. *But*

¹⁾ H. U. I. 1; 2. 8. II. 11; 15. II. 1; 4. I. 4; 25. II. 1; I. II. 11; 15. I. 1; 2. Locke's method and spirit is well shwn in his fragment "De Arte Medica" 1668. Fox Bourne. Life of Locke. I. 222. etc.

when, having passed over the original and composition of our ideas, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connection with words, that unless the force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge; which, being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions." (III. 9; 21. III. 5; 16.) This is a clear statement that Locke's doctrine of knowledge is not his doctrine of ideas. It is from this point of view that the apparent contradiction between the second and fourth books of the Essay is to be explained. In II. 1; 2, Locke says, "in experience all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself, but in IV. 2; 1., we read", it is on intuition that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge." The distinction between knowledge as material or ideas, and knowledge as form or proposition we shall find maintained by Locke in treating of the origin of ideas and of knowledge, and again in the last division of the present chapter in speaking of ideas and propositions. One of the chief sources of confusion concerning Locke's theory of knowledge is in supposing it to be contained in the first and second books of his Essay.

Locke also calls attention to the fact that the Essay, "begun by chance, was continued by entreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as humor or occasions permitted". (Epistle to the Reader.) This will explain much of the confusion, both in arrangement and in the use of terms in the four books.

II. *The Significance of Tabula Rasa.* Locke assumes the existence of ideas in men's minds. "I presume", he says, "it will be granted me that there are such ideas in men's minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others. Our first enquiry shall be, how they come into the mind". (I. 1. 8.) It is clear that Locke is here speaking, not of the mind, but of the ideas in the mind, ideas which the mind

is conscious of possessing, and that his enquiry is *not* concerning the origin of either mind or knowledge, but of the origin of ideas. But what does Locke mean by the term idea? After apologising for the frequent use of the term and its vagueness, he defines it to be "that which serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks", or, "whatsoever the mind perceives in itself or is the immediate object of perception, thought or understanding". (I. 1; 8. II. 8; 8.)¹⁾ These definitions of the term Idea come nearest to its general use in Locke's system. It is allowed a very broad meaning. It may stand for concepts and propositions, or whatever the mind is conscious of, and uses as material of knowledge. These materials of knowledge are simple or complex, or the result of an empirical and rational process, as in the case of the idea of power. As with Descartes, so with Locke, it is impossible to hold the term to any one meaning.

In answer to the question, how ideas come into the mind, Locke postulates the mind, originally, as "white paper", or "an empty cabinet". (I. 2; 15, I. 3; 22. II. 1; 2.) But these, like Aristotle's *tabula rasa*, are mere figures of speech, and cannot be fixed upon solely as a centre of interpretation. It is evident from the above definitions that the understanding and its ideas are different; that the one is subject with percipient powers, and the others the objects of these powers. When Locke postulates ideas as being in the mind, he postulates capacity for the mind; when he defines his term idea, he gives to the understanding the two powers of perceiving and thinking; and when he postulates a *tabula rasa*, he only declares that before the mind has something to think upon or perceive, it thinks upon and perceives nothing, although

¹⁾ The definition of Idea as "the immediate object of the mind in thinking" is defended by Locke in his controversy with Stillingfleet. Works I. 687. Locke's "idea" appears to be a modification of mental energy which has no existence apart from consciousness. H. U. II. 10; 2 and 7. I. 4; 20. III. 10; 14. III. 9; 18. IV. 44. For the history of this word, see Hamilton's Reid, note G. p. 925.

it has the innate powers of thinking and perceiving. "Truly before ideas are known, there is nothing of them in the mind but the capacity to know them." (II. 28; II. note.) This capacity of the understanding is nowhere denied, but everywhere affirmed by Locke. "The first capacity of the human intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses by outward objects, or by its own operations when it reflects on them." (II. 1; 24.) But this is clearly a receiving or passive power of the mind. Does Locke admit power as passive? This is one of the fundamental positions of his entire theory, yet its significance is generally overlooked. "Power is twofold, viz, as able to make or able to receive any change; the one may be called active, the other, passive power." (II. 21; 2.)¹⁾ The mind in sensation and reflection is receptive, an empty cabinet, fitted to receive the impressions of sensation and reflection, and for the most part passive. But has the mind no active power, or powers? Locke replies, "The mind has powers intrinsic and proper to itself." (II. 1; 24.)

Locke denies with Aristotle, Culverwel, and Cumberland, that moral ideas and principles are innate. His polemic against innate ideas has become classic. The ground of it is threefold. First, the supposition of innate ideas cannot be sustained by observation and history. Here he had been preceded by Aristotle, Montaigne and Pascal. Secondly, if certain ideas and principles were universal, this would not prove them innate, but only support a law of the mind. (I. 2; 3, 14.) This was essentially the ground of Culverwel and Cumberland. Thirdly, in his second book, "it is unphilosophical to multiply principles without necessity". (II. 1; 1.)

¹⁾ Sir Wm. Hamilton combats Locke's theory of active and passive powers, holding that there is no pure activity or passivity in creation but that they are always conjoined. *Lectures on Metaphysics*. Vol. I. p. 310. Locke would not insist on the purity of either power, but holds the distinction to be real, as well as necessary for clearness in psychological discussion.

This is the *Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem* of Occam applied to the subject in hand. The general position of Locke on innate ideas and principles is not much removed from that of Aristotle. Leibniz, (*Nouveaux Essais; Avant-Propos*.) was right in placing Locke and Aristotle side by side on this question.¹⁾ The *tabula rasa*, or book in which nothing is written, of Aristotle, is the empty cabinet, or white paper, of Locke. With Aristotle the mind has no *εἶδη νοητά* antecedent to experience. The same position is taken by Locke against the *νοηταί ἐννοιαί*. Neither Aristotle nor Locke denied innate powers or capacities to the mind. Aristotle, in his *Ethics*, argues in the Lockian spirit, "not one of the moral virtues are in us by nature. . . . The virtues come then to be in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature; but we are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving them, and are perfected in them through the influence of habit."²⁾ Aristotle also maintains that "such things as exist by nature cannot be changed by custom". The parallel between Locke and Aristotle extends still further. In the first part of his treatise Aristotle seems to stumble at the great variety and uncertainty of opinions respecting virtue, and is almost led to think virtue a matter of civil law or custom. But in V. 10, he assails the view of the Sophists that virtue is a mere matter of legal enactment, and declares a natural, eternal, and unchangeable law, independent of human conventionality.

The force of Locke's polemic against the theory of innate ideas and principles is not difficult to discover. He held that so called innate ideas are to be accounted for, and that they may be accounted for by giving attention to experience. This theory of innate ideas was a part of the dogmatism of the age, and Locke held that it gave an un-

¹⁾ De Anima III. 4. 11. Compare *Analyt. Post.* II. 15. 2. 5. Heinze: *Zur Erkenntnislehre der Stoiker.* pp. 7. 16. 17.

²⁾ *Nic. Eth.* II. 1 compare I. 3. de Anima III. 7. II, 5. Locke, *H. U.* I. 3; 9 and 17.

fair advantage to religious and political leaders, by taking men from the use of their own reason and judgment. (I. 4; 24-25.) There is not a scrap of direct evidence that Locke had Descartes in mind when he wrote his first book. If we take Descartes expositions of his own theory as given in his remarks on the Programme of Regius (XII—XIV) there is no essential disagreement between Descartes and Locke.¹⁾ What then, did Locke have in mind? He had in mind the empty verbalism and arrogant authority of the Schools; the Deism of Lord Herbert and his disciples, grounded upon innate principles, pretentious as the Athanasian Creed; the dogmatism of Hobbes, crystallizing the principles of politics into commands of God through the Leviathan; the common pulpit and political oratory declaring prejudices in the terms of immutable truth. Well might Locke speak of this theory as an "established opinion" and "received doctrine" in his day. Speaking of the first book of Locke's essay, Professor Fraser says, "It has been criticised as a metaphysical discussion about the existence of transcendental elements in human knowledge, like that at issue at the present day between empiricism and intellectualism. ... It is really to be read as an energetic argumentative protest against anything in human knowledge being supposed to be independent of rational criticism"²⁾ That Locke was fighting the wind in this attack upon Scolasticism, and Dogmatism

¹⁾ The remark of Sir Wm. Hamilton. (Reid. p. 785.) is significant "Had Descartes and Locke expressed themselves on the subject of innate ideas and principles with due precision, both would have been found in harmony with each other, and with truth."

²⁾ Ency. Brit. IX. Ed. Article, Locke. That Locke's emphasis at certain points is misleading is scarcely to be denied. He would probably say of the first book of his Essay what Malthus said of his own work on population, "It is probable that, having, found the bow too much bent one way, I was induced to bend it too much the other in order to make it straight." Professor Webb, "Intellectualism of Locke", p. 33, holds that Locke's "whole polemic against Innate Ideas, in fact, is a polemic against the doctrine that the existence of Ideas can be latent. "This expresses but as small part of the purpose of Locke's polemic.

in their political, ecclesiastical, and philosophical aspects, can only be maintained by those who are unacquainted with the age in which Locke lived. If this polemic had no meaning, it is difficult to explain why the storm of opposition centered upon this one point. But, as we have already remarked, this book is no part of Locke's constructive system to which we now turn.

III. *The Chronological Order of Ideas.* Locke postulates the mind as tabula rasa, in the sense that anterior to experience, or to consciousness, it has no materials of knowledge, no ideas to think upon, (II, 9; 6, II. 1; 20, 1. 4; 20.) "Our first enquiry then shall be, how ideas come into the mind. Whence has the mind all the materials of reason and of knowledge? All the materials of thinking and knowledge? I answer in one word, from experience." (I. 1; 8. II. 1; 2.) But what is experience? This is the difficult term in Locke's philosophy. In respect to the mind it seems to follow the analogy of power as active and passive. The mind is, for the most part, passive in sensation and reflection. It is active "in the natural exercise of our faculties". (Works I. 465.) Viewed as a process in respect to ideas, experience shows three successive stages in time. "The senses first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterward, the mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty."¹) This is rough chronology, but it may serve for an introduction to the three stages in Locke's theory of the origin of ideas.

Sensation is the primary, and most fruitful source of

¹) I, 2, 15, cf. IV, 17. 2. Compare the opening sentence of Kant's "Kritik der reinen Vernunft". Kant here follows Locke but falls into some obscurity by using the term 'Erfahrung' in two senses in the same sentence.

our ideas. It is that primitive capacity, or passive power of the mind, whereby the mind is fitted to receive the ideas or impressions made upon the senses by exterior objects. Such impressions are conducted through the nerves or animal spirits to the brain, and produce ideas. "I think that those things which we call sensible qualities are the simplest ideas we have, and the first objects of our understandings.¹⁾ Through sensation, the mind, receives the ideas of all sensible qualities, such as heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, extension, figure, motion, and rest. Consciousness synchronates with the first sensations, and is ante-natal. In this sense consciousness and sensation are identical and inseparable.²⁾

Reflection is the second distinct source of our ideas; a source which "every man has wholly within himself" and which "furnishes us with another set of ideas that could not be had from things without". Reflection is a capacity of the mind "to receive the impressions made on it by its own operations, when it reflects on them". Such ideas are, perception, thinking, doubting, believing, willing, reasoning, and knowing. This seems to be the extent of reflection in Locke's system. He calls it an inner or internal sense. (II. 1; 4. 24. II. 11; 17.) The ideas of reflection are later than those of sensation; "it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations of their own minds". (II. 1; 8.) In reflection as in sensation the understanding is passive, or, for the most part passive. "Whether or no it will have these ideas or materials of knowledge, is not in its own power; for the objects of our senses do many of them obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds whether we will or no; and the operations of our minds will not let us be without some observed notions of them." (II. 1; 25.) From these two distinct sources, sensation and reflection, the understanding receives all the "materials of thinking" or "the materials

¹⁾ II. 1; 24. II. 8; 12. II. 1; 3. 9. 23. Common place Book. 1671.

²⁾ II. 1; 20. 25, II. 9; 5. II. 27; 9.

about which to exercise its discursive faculty". Sensation and reflection account for all ideas received by the mind. They indicate the receptive power of the mind, which is "for the most part passive". To identify Locke with the sensational school would exclude this second independent source of ideas. This was recognised by Hartley, who followed Hobbes in the sensational theory. Hartley says, "All our most complex ideas arise from sensation, and reflection is not a distinct source, as Mr. Locke makes it."¹⁾ Yet Schwegler credits Locke's system with materialism, declaring also, "Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu", to be the watchword of Locke's position. His English translator, instead of correcting this patent error, only finds an opportunity to defend Hegel against Ueberweg.²⁾ Leibniz, we believe, was the first to foist this scholastic phrase upon Locke, and volunteer its correction by "nisi ipse intellectus". We remark first, the phrase is entirely irrelevant to Locke's doctrine; secondly, were it relevant, the restriction is meaningless. If the restriction be allowed any meaning, it means what Locke maintains, that sensation is not the source of all our ideas. Leibniz, after all, supposes that there is no radical disagreement between Locke and himself. "Ainsi je suis porté à croire que, dans le fond, son sentiment sur ce point n'est pas différent du mien ou plutôt du sentiment commun d'autant qu'il reconnaît deux sources de nos connaissances, les Sens et la Reflexion." (Nouveaux Essais. Avant Propos.) But Leibniz lays the foundation of a new source of error, namely, that of making Reflection, in Locke's system, take the place of the Intellect, which Locke's use of Reflection by no means allows. The attempt to

¹⁾ Observations on Man I. 360. Edition 1749.

²⁾ Schwegler. Hist. of Philosophy transl. and annotated by J. H. Stirling 7th Ed. pp. 181. 144. Kirchner, correctly remarks of Locke; "Es ist nicht seine Schuld, dass die französischen Encyclopädisten seine Lehre zum Ausgangspunkt ihres Materialismus nahmen." Wörterbuch der Philos. Grundbegriffe. p. 321.

make Locke an advocate of sensationalism by resolving Reflection into sensation, as well as the attempt to enlarge the sphere of reflection so as to include the ideas of cause and effect, and all other relations are alike to be resisted.

➤ *Intellect* is the third source of ideas recognised by Locke. The objectification of the ideas furnished by sensation and reflection is complete. The mind is for the most part passive. It observes these ideas, it perceives two distinct classes of ideas, one from without, the other from within. This observing subject having its operations from "powers intrinsical and proper to itself", (II. I; 24) becomes in its activity a source of a new series of ideas which belong neither to sensation nor to reflection, but stand in certain relations to them. Thus Reid observes, "I think Mr. Locke, when he comes to speak of the ideas of relation, does not say that they are ideas of sensation and reflection, but only that they terminate in, and are concerned about, ideas of sensation and reflection." (Reid, Essay. VI.) Of what Reid here thinks, every student of Locke must be persuaded. Locke shows that sensation, reflection and relation stand for three different classes of ideas, and declares against his Critics, "I never denied that the mind could frame to itself ideas of relation, but have showed the quite contrary in my chapters about relation." (Works I. 469.) Again, in replying to the strictures of the Bishop of Worcester, that if the idea of substance be grounded upon plain and evident reason, then we must allow an idea of substance that comes not in by sensation and reflection, Locke remarks; "I never said that the general idea of substance comes in by sensation and reflection, or that it is a simple idea of sensation or reflection, . . . for general ideas come not into the mind by sensation or reflection, but *are the creatures or inventions of the understanding, as I think I have shown.*"¹⁾ Again he asserts, "We must conceive a substratum. . . . The

¹⁾ First Letter to Stillingfleet, Works I. 468. cf. H. U. III, 3. I. 4; 18. II. 23; 2 and 4.

mind frames the idea of a support." (Works I. 469.) Such also are the ideas of unity or oneness, (II. 13; 26) and of finiteness. (II. 17; 2. cf. II. 7; 7. II. 24; 2.) To make clear the general chronology, and to show how the mind of its own native power frames a new yet related idea, we may adduce as an example the idea of power. "The mind being every day informed by the senses of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without; and taking notice how one comes to an end and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will, for the future be made in the same things by like agents, and by like ways, considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that idea which we call power." (II. 21; 1. II. 23; 7.) Here is an idea which can neither be resolved into sensation and reflection, nor be had by sensation and reflection alone. The mind completes the idea by superadding to the materials furnished by sensation and reflection, an idea of its own making, viz, the idea of cause and effect. But Locke regards this idea of power as a simple idea, although it is, *per se*, a complex idea. In regarding it as a simple idea, Locke admits that there is a simple idea which is not furnished by sensation and reflection, although it terminates in ideas of sensation and reflection. The illustration of power may stand in general for all the ideas of relation, such as cause and effect, time and space, identity and diversity, equality and excess, right and wrong.¹⁾ These are by no means pure a priori notions, but contain an intellectual element, independent of both sensation and reflection, without

¹⁾ II. 25; 11, 26; 3—5. 27; 1. 28; 1. 28; 4.

which they could have no existence in the mind. This position involves much of the so called Scottish philosophy. We may quote the words of President Porter, "a more careful study of the doctrines of Locke reveals the fact that in the latter part of the essay, when he came to analyze and account for the ideas of relation, particularly of such primitive relations as of substance, cause, and adaptation, he departs from the doctrines he was supposed to have laid down in the preceding chapters. He certainly did not place that construction upon them which many of his disciples imposed after his time. In accounting for these original ideas, he seems to ascribe them directly to the intellect itself, and to an original power to discern and an original necessity to receive them as true. In short, without asserting in form any new source of ideas, and without in the least abandoning his previous teachings, while in reply to the objections which were brought against him for inconsistency, he earnestly defends his own consistency with himself; he does in fact take the same ground with Reid and the Scottish school."¹)

¹) Noah Porter. *Human Intellect*. 4th Ed. p. 521. Dr. Mc Cosh, 'The Scottish Philosophy', p. 295, 303, finds a strong intellectual element running throughout Locke's entire philosophy. If our judgement of Locke's theory of ideas is correct it would seem that he is no less indebted to Augustine than was Descartes. Augustine laid down the fundamental certainty of both Descartes and Locke, viz "thought, and therefore the existence of the thinker, are the most certain of all things". (*Soliloquia* II. 1.) But more striking is Augustine's recognition of an "inner sense". "When we reflect upon ourselves, we find in ourselves not only sensations, but also an inner sense, which makes the former its objects, for we have knowledge of our sensations, but the external senses are unable to perceive their own sensations, and finally, reason which knows both the internal sense and itself." (*De Lib. Arb.* II. etc.) This as well as Augustine's concept of God as the "unchangeable truth, wisdom, blessedness, justice, and the moral law", is strictly Lockean. (*Überweg-Heinze, Geschichte der Philosophie*. Band II. 105—107. See Barth, *Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels und der Hegelianer*. p. 11. for the same three fold origin of ideas in Hegel's "Phänomenologie des Geistes".)

IV. *The Logical Order of Knowledge.* Locke's theory of ideas is not his theory of knowledge. He speaks of ideas as the materials of knowledge, as only the materials of knowledge. Ideas in themselves no more constitute knowledge than bricks constitute a building, and as the latter might exist for ever without coming into the form of a palace, so ideas are nothing more than so much material, which without the active intellect, would never rise above material, into knowledge. Knowledge presupposes ideas. Ideas do not necessarily imply knowledge. Our knowledge can never exceed our ideas, nor extend to all of them. When Stillingfleet remarked that Locke had founded demonstration on self evident ideas, Locke replied, "Self evident ideas are wholly unknown to me, and are nowhere in my book, nor were ever in my thoughts." (Works. I. 712.) Knowledge is no more to be accounted for by ideas alone, than is the universe by atoms alone. Ideas are the material, knowledge the final form, and the percipient mind the architect and builder. "Ideas", says Locke, "are not moral entities, they are neither true nor false. Truth and error belong, not to ideas, but only to propositions." (II. 32; 26 II. 33; 19.) Burnet complained that Locke demanded propositions for truth or falsehood. Locke answered, "As odd as it is, it is true that there is no truth or falsehood but in a verbal or mental proposition." (Marginalia. p. 41.) Thus, when Locke comes to treat of the origin of knowledge, he reverses the order which he uses in the origin of ideas. Instead of sensation, reflection, and reason, as producing ideas or the material of knowledge, we have intuitive reason, demonstrative reason, and sensation, as representing in order of value, the three phases of knowledge or certainty. The general position of reason in Locke's system with reference to ideas, or the materials of knowledge, may be indicated in his own words. "The understanding has a native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas." (IV. 17. 4.) Stillingfleet objected that Locke had not treated of reason in all the senses which he had assigned to it. Locke answers,

"The understanding as a faculty being the subject of my essay, it carried me to treat directly of reason no otherwise than as a faculty. But yet, reason as standing for true and clear principles, and also as standing for clear and fair deductions from these principles, I have not wholly omitted as is manifest from what I have said of self evident propositions, intuitive knowledge, and demonstration, in other parts of my essay." (Works I. 726.) Here again, Locke announces the fundamental doctrine of the Scottish School.

Intuition furnishes first principles. "It consists in the mind's perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, immediately by themselves without the intervention of any other. In this the mind is at no pains in proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye does the light, only by being directed towards it. This kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of. It is on this intuition that depends the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge. Intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty."¹⁾ Again Locke emphasizes his position, "I make self evident propositions necessary to certainty, and found all certainty only in them. Whether they come into view of the mind earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof, one from another."

¹⁾ Carlyle, in 1827, speaking of the difference of the Kantian and English schools, says, "The Germans take up the matter differently and would assail Hume, not at his outworks, but in his citadel. They deny his first principle, that sense is the only inlet of knowledge, that experience is the primary ground of belief. This pure truth, however, they seek, not historically, and by experiment, in the universal persuasions of men, but by intuition, in the deepest and purest nature of man." *Miscell., State of German Lit.* This is a statement of Locke's position, IV. 2; I. IV. 3; 18. IV. 7; 14. IV. 7; 19. IV. 8; I. IV. 10; I. IV. 17; 14. IV. 12; 7. IV. 7; 10. IV. 3; 31. Works I. 711—712. *Elements of Nat. Philosophy*. Ch. XII. or, Works IV. 578.

The marks of the certainty of our primary knowledge are, according to Locke, self-evidence, necessary relation, the contrary of which is unthinkable, (IV. 3; 29.) and universality, or universal recognition of truth, as soon as presented. "In these only are we capable of certain and universal knowledge". We have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, of the axioms of mathematics, of the principles of contradiction and identity, and of causality. "Everything that has a beginning, must have a cause, is a true principle of reason, or a proposition certainly true." Locke assumes this principle in his demonstrations.¹⁾ Again, Locke declares, "He would be thought void of common sense who asked on the one side, or, on the other, went to give a reason why it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be." (I. 3; 4.) All these are fundamental principles of knowledge, principles of common reason, guaranteed by common sense. To deprive Locke's doctrine of knowledge of intuition, would be as fatal as to deprive his doctrine of ideas of sensation. There can be no ideas prior to sensation; there can be no knowledge at all without intuition. But Locke holds that our knowledge is neither increased by self-evident propositions nor by the use of the syllogism. These can "help no one to an acquaintance with ethics, or instruct him, or others, in the knowledge of morality". The mind may play forever upon self evident propositions, without ever increasing its stock of knowledge. "It is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other; and had he but words might no doubt have said; oyster in right hand is subject, oyster in left hand is predicate; and so might have made a self evident proposition of oyster, i. e. oyster is oyster; and yet with all this, not have been one whit the wiser, or more knowing." (IV. 8; 1—3.) Locke holds that the syllogism cannot increase our knowledge, because we have, in the premises, an implicit knowledge of the conclusion. With

¹⁾ Works III. 60—61, H. U. IV. 10; 1—5. II. 21; 4. I. 4; 10.

him, the syllogism is a true touchstone of right arguing but it can pretend to nothing more than being a test of knowledge. While the intuitive reason, grasping propositions immediately, furnishes the foundation of all knowledge and certainty, it is incapable of building knowledge beyond, or higher than, itself. This function can be performed only by the *Demonstrative Reason which furnishes the next degree of knowledge*. "The mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, not immediately, but by the intervention of other ideas, and this is that which we call reasoning." (IV. 2; 2.) Demonstrative knowledge depends upon intuitive knowledge in every step of correct reasoning. The mind must carry exactly this intuitive certainty, and see that no part of it is left out. (IV. 2. 7.) Thus we have a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of God. Demonstration depends upon proofs, i. e. intermediate ideas introduced by the reason, to show the agreement or disagreement of any couplet of ideas or propositions. This is the sphere of the reason alone, but, says Locke, as if anticipating objections, "if general knowledge consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and the knowledge of the existence of all things without us, be had only by our senses, what room is there for the exercise of any other faculty but outward sense and inward perception? What need is there of reason? Very much; both for the enlargement of our knowledge, and regulating our assent. For it hath to do both in knowledge and opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties, and indeed contains two of them, sagacity and illation, or logical inference. . . . Sense and intuition reach but a very little way. The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deduction and intermediate ideas, . . . the faculty which finds out the means and rightly applies them to discover certainty in the one, and probability in the other, is what we call reason." (IV. 17; 2. cf. IV. 2; 3. 4.)

"*Sensitive knowledge*", says Locke, "is the perception of the mind employed about the particular existence of finite

being without us; which, going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of knowledge." (IV; 2. 14.) Although Locke reduces sensitive knowledge to a minimum, and is inclined to regard it as mere "faith or opinion, but not knowledge, at least in all general truths"; although he holds that "our ideas are not always proof of the existence of things", he yet admits the external world into the sphere of knowledge, on the principles of causality and common sense, and on such considerations as our consciousness of the difference in looking on the sun by day, and thinking on it by night. (II. 17; 4. II. 7; 7. IV. 11; 3—9.) Locke defends his moderate realism, his very moderate realism, (IV. 11; 3—9), with sufficient clearness, and concludes that the reality of the external world is as great as our happiness or misery, and sufficient to enable us to attain the good, and avoid the evil caused by external objects, "which is the important concernment we have in being made acquainted with them". (IV. 2; 8.)¹⁾ Thus, says Locke, "we may allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz, intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive". We have three fundamental certainties corresponding to these three classes, *the existence of self, of God, and of the world*. The illustrative force of Locke's doctrine of knowledge, is this. While sensation is chronologically first in the origin of ideas, and logically the last in the doctrine of knowledge, intuition is logically the origin of all knowledge, and chronologically the last in the formation of ideas. Thus, we have in Locke the maxim, 'what is psychologically last, is first in logic and in reason'.

¹⁾ The grounds of the belief in the existence of the external world, were left by the Scottish School exactly where Locke placed them, and where Hume tacitly recognized them to lay. Brown agreed with Mackintosh, that the difference between Hume and Reid was simply verbal. "Hume," he said, "shouted, we can give no reason for our belief in an external world, but whispered, we cannot help believing; Reid, on the other hand, shouted, we cannot help believing in an external world, but whispered, we can give no reason in support of our belief." Webb. *The Veil of Isis*. p. 161.

V. *Of knowledge and judgment.* Locke's definition of knowledge as "the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas" has been sharply criticised, but his explanation of it in his controversy with the Bishop of Worcester seems to be, on the whole, satisfactory. "Nobody", says Locke, "who reads my essay with that indifferency which is proper to a lover of truth can avoid feeling that what I say of certainty, was not to teach the world a new way of certainty, but to endeavour to show wherein the old, and only true way of certainty consists." (Works I. 749.) "I have said that demonstration consists in the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate idea, with those whose agreement or disagreement it is to show in each step of the demonstration." (Works I. 725.) "And so far as Aristotle goes in his method that what things agree in the third agree among themselves, he and I agree. I presume to say that if Aristotle had gone forth in this matter, he would have placed our knowledge or certainty of the agreement of any two things in the perception of their agreement."¹⁾ Locke thus illustrates his method of certainty. The proposition, "Everything that has a beginning must have a cause, is a true principle of reason". But the proposition "Everything must have a cause, is a false proposition", for while the idea of the existence of something and the idea of eternity do agree, the idea of existence from eternity and having a cause, do not agree, or are inconsistent with the same thing. (Works I. 495.) Throughout Locke's discussion with Stillingfleet he insists there is no difference between the Bishop's certainty of reason and his own by ideas.²⁾ When we take into consideration Locke's position

¹⁾ Works I. 701. Both hold that ideas begin with sensation, without which, thought and knowledge are impossible. Both are also agreed that intuition is the ground of all certainty, and that "reason must be the basis or beginning of science" or of all formal knowledge. *Analyt. Post.* II. 15. I. 3. and 23.

²⁾ Works I. 608. 610. 627. 690. 725. H. U. II. 32; I. IV. 5; 2. IV. 2; I. IV. 4; 5. In Inductive method Locke seems to have advanced

that "the understanding has a native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas", (IV. 17; 4.) that the mind has no other immediate objects but its own ideas, (IV. 1; 1) that by intuition we are furnished with the fundamental principles of all certainty and knowledge, (IV. 7; 19.) that the reason alone by finding intermediate ideas increases our knowledge, (IV. 3; 18), we cannot object that the percipient mind or reason should be regarded as the sole umpire in the field of knowledge and probability. The Reason is, according to Locke, the sole organ of certainty in every department of knowledge, and the assurance we have that the Reason is fitted to be a guide in universal morality, is the conviction grounded on observation and experience that "the intellectual faculties are made, and operate alike in most men". (Works I. 544.)

Locke proceeds from this point to develop a theory of judgment or practical reason, which is distinguished from knowledge by a want of absolute certainty. "Man" says Locke, "is by nature a rational being. God has not made men barely twolegged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational. Reason is natural revelation, and it must be our last guide in everything."¹⁾ "Reason constitutes man a moral being and were not the Candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish, we might despair of any progress in the moral sciences, and look for Egyptian darkness and bondage."²⁾ But in what sense does

beyond Aristotle, and to have anticipated the present logical forms. Prof. J. P. Mahaffy show how Mill's theory of syllogism was „clearly and explicitly laid down by Locke". Mind. Vol. I. 287.

¹⁾ IV. 19; 4 and 14. IV. 17; 4. IV. 17; 23—24. C. U. III. 3.

²⁾ The Candle of the Lord is a phrase taken from Proverbs xx. 27. "The spirit of man is the Candle of the Lord, searching all the inward parts." This was a favourite text of the Cambridge preachers, especially of Culverwel and Whichcote. Culverwel makes the phrase equivalent to the "Light of Reason", and says, "God hath breathed into all the sons of men reasonable souls, which may serve as so many candles to enlighten

Reason constitute man a moral being? "The mind" says Locke, "has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood, first, knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas." Knowledge, as here used, includes the results of the intuitive and demonstrative reason, and, as allowed by Locke, the reality of the external world. Knowledge and certainty are identical, what is less than certain is not knowledge. The truth which we cannot doubt, and the things which we can prove, are the known, the certain.

Secondly, the faculty that God has given to man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, is judgment: whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree, or, which is the same, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs. (IV. 14) Judgment then is common sense, or practical reason. It plays a leading part in Locke's ethical philosophy. It has to do with all those ideas and propositions, the truth of which is not made certain by intuition or demonstration. The moment a proposition cannot be doubted, or can be proved, it becomes a part of knowledge. But the sphere left for judgment or the practical reason, is coextensive with human life. The grounds of probability are twofold, first, the conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experience; secondly, the testimony of others vouching their observation and experience. In the testimony of others are to be considered the number, integrity, and skill of the witnesses; the design of the author, where it is the testimony out of a book cited, the consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation and contrary testimonies. These grounds, as they are the foundation on which our assent is built, so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to

and direct them in searching out their Creator, in discovering of inferior beings and themselves also." (Light of Nature. p. 29.) It is in this sense that Locke uses the expression. IV. 3; 21. IV. 12; 8.

be, regulated. In regard to matters of fact, the concurrent observation and experience of all other men produce an assurance which approaches to knowledge. Concerning matters of opinion or speculation, analogy is the only help we have, and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of probability. After making some striking remarks on analogy Locke concludes: "This sort of probability, which is the best conduct of rational experiments, and the rise of hypotheses, has also its use and influence; and a wary reasoning from analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths and useful productions which would otherwise lie concealed." (IV. Chs. 14. 15. 16.) As knowledge, or certainty, is to be had only by visible and certain truth, so error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true. "There is but probability grounded upon experience or analogical reasoning, but no certain knowledge, or demonstration."¹⁾

But if assent be grounded on probability, how come men to give their assent contrary to probability, and hold so great a variety of opinions? The reasons may be reduced to these four; "want of proofs, want of ability to use them, want of will to use them, and wrong measures of probability". These wants and wrong measures have no foundation or justification in man's rational nature. "Every man", says Locke, "carries about him a touchstone if he will make use of it, to distinguish substantial gold from superficial glittering, truth from appearances. And indeed, this touchstone, which is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assumed prejudices, overweening presumption, and narrowing our minds." (C. U. Sect. III.) The reason, as an ethical faculty, is neither the moral law nor the lawgiver, but simply the faculty which discovers, grasps, and interprets a law. In the following chapter of our essay, we shall see first, an effort on the part of Locke to state the ethics of natural law; secondly, an attempt to bring ethics into the sphere

¹⁾ King, Life of Locke. p. 122.

of knowledge or certainty by a mathematical method, and thirdly, the admission of a transcendental factor to complete the demands of an universal morality. In all this, the reason alone is concerned. Here we need only call attention to the fact that Locke does not allow a special faculty set apart to the particular department of ethical knowledge. As he rejected innate ideas, so he rejects that doctrine of conscience which, in modern moral philosophy is the representative of innate ideas. Locke's whole aim is, to bring all the departments of faith and knowledge within the sphere of reason. When Locke defines conscience as "our own opinion of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions", he is identifying conscience with judgment, making it a part of the practical reason, and to this position he holds throughout. "Conscience" he says, "is the judge, not the law. It is not the law of nature, but judging by that which is taken to be the law, and which acquits or condemns." (Marginalia pp. 38. 40.) Conscience may be used in two senses, first, as standing for judgment passed upon conduct proposed, or accomplished, approving or condemning, as the case may be. This assumes a law, according to which the judgment takes place. This law is grasped by reason, mediately or immediately. That conscience sits in judgment upon our actions, and judges according to a law, Locke most earnestly maintains. Secondly, conscience may be regarded as standing for a law written in the mind, independent of reason, and antecedent to all experience, not only accusing and acquitting, but informing and directing conduct by its own independent authority. Thus it becomes lawgiver, law, and judge. As such, it must be a permanent and an unalterable element in character. This form of doctrine Locke repudiates. Thus he expresses himself; "Natural powers may be improved by exercise, and afterwards weakened by neglect, and so, all the knowledge got by the exercise of those powers. But innate ideas, or propositions imprinted on the mind, I do not see how they can be improved or effaced." (Marginalia. 43. 44.) What

✓✓✓ Locke could not see, is that which is maintained by the consistent defenders of innate ideas. Professor Calderwood, says of conscience, "From its nature it follows that conscience cannot be educated. Education, whether in the sense of instruction or training, is impossible."¹) He who maintains the doctrine of innate ideas which Locke assailed, must also in strict consistency, maintain the autocratic and independent nature of conscience, which he also assailed. They stand on exactly the same basis. Professor Calderwood is the only present day philosopher, so far as we know, who squarely accepts Locke's challenge, and maintains, against him, innate ideas and a moral sense independent of the reason, and incapable either of development or of degeneration. Here the difference between these two theories is clearly defined. But when we come to the authority of conscience, ✓✓✓ Locke takes the highest grounds. The laws about which conscience is conversant are to be obeyed before any human laws.²) The doctrine of conscience, which will be further noticed in considering Natural Law, is the basis of his entire argument against the union of Church and State, and against persecution, while the uniform voice of conscience respecting fundamental moral principles is the foundation of his doctrine of civil society. Neither Clarke, Butler, nor Shaftesbury, although they speak in large sentences of moral sense or conscience, have given it a higher place and a more authoritative voice in ethics. What Locke maintains, is, that conscience does not act without ratiocination, that conscience is the judge, not the law; that conscience does not create distinctions of good and evil, but simply judges by a rule: and that it is to be confounded neither with practical principles, nor with the law of nature. (Margin-
alia. 35—43.)

¹) Handbook of Moral Philosophy, 14th Ed. p. 69.

²) Works II. 340. 341. 406. 407.

Chapter III.

The Foundations of Ethics.

I. *Requisites for a foundation of ethics.* By his psychology Locke commits himself to a purely rational morality which involves a rational theology. To ascertain in what sense morality involves theology, in Locke's view, will reveal the foundations of his ethical system. We have seen that Locke founds all certainty on intuition, on those "propositions that nobody has any doubt about", and that he makes the practical reason the ethical faculty; the faculty which must be employed in establishing an ethical basis. We have also seen that the fundamental certainty of intuition is the knowledge of our own existence, and that the fundamental certainty of the demonstrative reason is the knowledge of the existence of God. These two certainties seem to Locke a sufficient starting point for his ethical speculations, and in these two points his ethical speculations center.

Locke holds that the demands of a constructive morality are for a known or supposed lawmaker, a known law and its sanction. "What duty is cannot be understood without a law, nor a law be known or supposed without a lawmaker, or without reward or punishment." (I. 3; 12.) To establish morality upon its proper basis, we must first prove a law, which always supposes a lawmaker. This sovereign lawmaker, who has set rules and bounds to the actions of men, is God their Maker. (Lord King. *Life of Locke*. 313.) But as any system of morality that involves the notion of God takes its coloring from its conception of God, we must enquire into the nature of this fundamental certainty in Locke's ethical system.

II. *The existence and concept of God.* The existence of God belongs to demonstrative knowledge, because some

who never use their reason, or never turn their thoughts this way, deny His existence. Yet "it is as certain that there is a God as that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight lines are equal, . . . the knowledge of God is the most natural discovery of the human reason." (I. 4; 16. 17.) Locke, with his friend Newton, makes use of the teleological argument, and finds in the structure of the eye "sufficient to convince us of an All-wise Contriver". (Gov. I. 53.) But the proof which he emphasizes most is the psychological. He objects to the proof offered by Descartes, on the ground that "by it senseless matter might be the first Eternal Being and cause of all things, as well as an immaterial intelligent spirit; this, joined to his shutting out the consideration of final causes from his philosophy, and his laboring to invalidate all proofs of a God but his own, does unavoidably draw upon him some suspicion."¹⁾ This dogmatism was quite foreign to Locke's view of the rules of philosophizing. (IV. 10. 7.) Descartes "deduces his proof of a God from the idea of God which we have in us". Locke takes the position; "Real existence can be proved only by real existence; our own existence is real; it is the highest certainty, from whence, therefore, may be drawn, by a train of ideas, the surest and most incontestable proofs of the existence of a God." First, is the intuitive certainty one has of his own personal existence, that he exists, that he is something. Secondly, man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being than it can be equal to two right angles, hence it is clear that from eternity there has been something. Thirdly, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from

¹⁾ Lord King. Life of Locke. 314—316. The relations of Locke and Descartes have recently excited attention in Germany. See Dr. Sommer, Locke's Verhältniss zu Descartes. 1887. Dr. Geil, Ueber die Abh. Locke's von Descartes, 1887. Bruno Erdmann, Descartes und Locke, Archiv für Gesch. d. Philos. Bd. II. 99—122. Dr. Geil, Die Gottesidee bei Locke und dessen Gottesbeweis, Archiv für Gesch. d. Philos. Bd. III. 579—596. 1890.

another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its being, from another too. This eternal source of all being must also be the eternal source and origin of all power; and so this Eternal Being must be also the most powerful. From this point Locke turns the mind upon itself, and finding perception and knowledge, can account for them only by some knowing intelligent Being. "Thus, from a consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an Eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being."¹⁾

With the exception of the teleological, Locke's argument for the existence of God is perhaps as unobjectionable as any. Although Locke recognises the teleological argument, it is not so agreeable to the letter of his system as the psychological, inasmuch as the former rises from the outer world, and gathers its force by impressions through the senses, while the latter is almost completely subjective, taking its rise in reflection, and gathering its force through the reason. This view is also involved in placing the idea of God under the demonstrative reason. The Anthropomorphism which is involved in giving content to the idea of the existence of God, in the psychological proof, is more apparent, but not less real, than that involved in other proofs. "The idea of God", says Max Müller, "comes to us, not as the result of reasoning and generalising, but as an intuition, as irresistible as the impression of our senses."²⁾

¹⁾ IV. 10. 6. Works I. 488. 496. II. 15. 12. King: Life of Locke 124. The following judgment by one of Locke's editors, is clearly erroneous, "Being intent on overthrowing the doctrine of innate ideas, he argues that even the idea of God is obtained through the medium of sensation and reflection." (Locke's works, edited by J. A. St. John. Preliminary discourse. p. 5.) Locke's proof is closely followed throughout by Dr. Samuel Clarke. "Since something now is, it is manifest that something always was; otherwise the things that now are must have arisen out of nothing, absolutely and without cause, which is a plain contradiction in terms." On the Attributes. Prop. I. §. 1.

²⁾ Science of Language. 2d series p. 479. 7th Ed.

This we take to be essentially true. When the light which comes to us is decomposed by the mental prism into its various colours, we find it impossible to discover in the spectrum any one color, or any mechanical combination of colors that corresponds exactly to the light which we intuitively received. Locke's refusal to admit the idea of the existence of God among primary truths, is neither demanded by his constructive system, nor in strict harmony with its spirit.

The concept of God attaches itself to the demonstration of His existence. The mind, finding within itself certain powers and excellences, these are enlarged, perfected, objectified, and attributed to the Deity. "The idea with him", says Professor Greene, "is the idea which each man has of the thinking thing within him, enlarged to infinity." (Int. to Hume, I. 116.) But it is far more than this. Although Locke says "this eternal thinking thing I call God", this does not give the content of his conception of God. "Whatsoever carries any excellency with it, and includes not imperfection" says Locke, "must needs make a part of the idea we have of God. So that with being and the continuation of it, or perpetual duration, power, wisdom and goodness, must be the ingredients of the perfect or super excellent Being which we call God, and that in the utmost or infinite degree. But yet that unlimited power cannot be excellency, without it be regulated by wisdom and goodness. Thus justice is regarded as only a branch of God's goodness, and as extending no further than infinite goodness shall find it necessary for the preservation of His works. We cannot imagine that God has made anything with a design that it should be miserable, or that He inflicts punishment for any other end than the preservation of His creatures."¹)

¹) Lord King. Life of Locke. Pp. 123—124. Comp. H. U. II. 23; 33—35. Works III. 83. IV. 318. Mr. Austin, one of the greatest and most learned of English jurists, who speaks of Locke as "that incomparable man

The concept of God as eternal and infinite wisdom and goodness is supplemented with immutability of will, as against the Absolute Will held by some of the Scholastics, and apparently by Descartes. God cannot act against His own nature, nor can he alter the nature or essence of things which He has established. God is an eternal and unchangeable law unto Himself and to all rational beings. God is not a religious, but a moral Being. "If it were fit", says Locke, "for such poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness can do, I think, I might say that God Himself cannot choose what is not good. The freedom of the Almighty hinders not His being determined by what is best." (II. 21; 49.) This is the freedom of perfection. God cannot act contrary to His own nature. (IV. 3; 6.)¹⁾ But with Locke, this belief in God is not only the fundamental article in religion and morality; it is likewise the foundation stone of political science.

As from a consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, we are led to the knowledge of the existence of God, so in our conception of God, lie the roots, the first principles, of religion, morality,

who emancipated human reason from the yoke of mystery and jargon", voices the sentiments of Locke. "It is enough for us, he says", to know that the Deity is perfectly good; and that since He is perfectly good, He wills the happiness of His creatures. This is a truth of the greatest practical moment. For the cast of the affections which we attribute to the Deity, determines, for the most part, the cast of our moral sentiments." Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Vol. I. 93. 50.

¹⁾ Locke attaches the utmost importance to a belief in the existence of God. "This being so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence, that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon." It is his conviction that confirmation in the belief of God is enough to preserve in man true sentiments of religion and morality. Thus, in his theory of education, while placing virtue as the chief end, he holds that for its foundation there ought very early to be implanted in the mind of the child a true notion of God, as the Independent, Supreme Being, Author and Maker of all things, from whom we receive all our good. Who loves us and gives us all things. (H. U. IV. 10; 7. Works I. 490. Ed. 135—6.)

and politics. It is idle to discuss the question whether religion is founded on morality, or morality, on religion; as both are founded in our belief and conception of God. Eliminate this, and the foundations of morality and religion are removed. Locke would apply the same doctrine to politics. He was, confessedly, the most liberal minded philosopher of the seventeenth century, yet he excludes atheists from toleration. "Those are not at all to be tolerated, who deny the Being of God. Promises and Covenants, and Oathes, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all... Atheism is a crime, which, for its madness as well as guilt, ought to shut a man out of all sober and civil society."¹) Whether this position breaks the force of his argument, in his Letters concerning Toleration, is not the point. It shows the force of his conviction that there can be no permanence and security in practical matters like those of religion, morality, and politics without the recognition of the Being of God. It is, in his view, the only rational basis of toleration. With Locke, atheism is first, mental imbecility, then nihilism. There are physical, mental and moral monstrosities among men, but these do not invalidate the normal laws of life. This introduces us to one of the fundamental questions of ethics, and one upon which Locke's position has been generally misunderstood.

III. *The Nature of Morality.* Locke, as an observer of men and societies, remarks that the "laws to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude

¹) Epistola de Tolerantia. 1685. Works III. 103. Fox Bourne, Life of Locke II. 141. Constitution of Carolina. Art 95. Locke holds with Cudworth "It is not possible that there should be any such thing as morality unless there be a God, — that is, an Infinite Eternal mind that is the first original and source of all things, whose nature is the first rule and exemplar of all morality, for otherwise it is not conceivable whence any such thing should be derived to particular intellectual beings." Immutabile Morality. IV. 6. 13.

or gravity of their actions, seem to be three sorts with their different enforcements, or rewards, and punishments". (II. 28; 6.) These three laws are, the Divine, the Civil, and the law of Opinion. In another place he denominates them the law of God, the law of politic societies, and the law of fashion or private censure. (II. 28; 13.) Again, to distinguish these schools, Locke puts the question. "Why should a man keep his word or contract?" The Christian replies, because God requires it, and will punish the failure; the Hobbist answers, because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish the omission; the Heathen philosopher declares, the violation of it would spoil one's personal character, dignity, and reputation. (I. 3. 5.)

The above remarks have been curiously interpreted. Locke has been identified with Occam and Descartes, who make virtue depend solely on the arbitrary will of God; with Hobbes, who made morality the will of the Leviathan, and again, with "the Heathen" who makes public opinion or fashion the measure of morality. Mr. Lowde and Thomas Burnet were the first to charge Locke with making "virtue vice, and vice virtue". This severe criticism on Locke's view of the nature of virtue has been industriously propagated. Shaftesbury's judgment of Locke, like that of Cousin, represents two extremes; the height of eulogy, and the depth of detraction. On the one hand he acknowledges the greatest obligation to Locke as the manager of his education, and says, "Locke's Essay of human understanding may as well qualify for business and the world, as for the sciences and the university. No one has done more towards the recalling of philosophy from barbarity into use and practise of the world, and into the company of the better and politer sort, who might well be ashamed of it in its other dress. No one has opened a better or a clearer way to reasoning. And, above all, I wonder to hear him censured so much by any Church-of-England men, for advancing reason, and bringing the use of it so much into religion; when it is by this only that we fight against the enthusiasts, and repel

the great enemies of our Church."¹) But Shaftesbury's judgment undergoes a violent change, his moral sentiments are suddenly convulsed with horror. "It was Mr. Locke", he exclaims, "that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world, and made the very ideas of these, which are the same as those of God, unnatural and without foundation in our minds. Thus virtue, according to Mr. Locke, has no other measure, law, or rule, than fashion or custom".²) That this twofold judgment throws more light on Shaftesbury's temperament than on Locke's doctrine will appear presently. Shaftesbury's disciples in criticism, have been numerous. Leslie Stephen, after remarking that Mandeville, in his denial of the real existence of virtue, "simply carried Locke's method one step farther", says, "No conclusion, of course, could be more repulsive to Locke himself, and it is curious that he did not perceive the application which might be made of his doctrine." It would, indeed, have been curious if Locke had perceived such an application of his doctrine. That Locke was mistaken as to his own view of the question we cannot admit. The error so generously attributed to him, may turn out to belong to his critics.

These judgments of Locke's doctrine of the nature of virtue are erroneous. In the first place, he repudiates them with the contempt they deserve; in the second place, he rejects all three of the forms attributed to him, and propounds the doctrine of the eternal and immutable nature of moral distinctions. His reply to Burnet's imputation is sharp with indignation. "A man that insinuates, as he does, as if I held the distinction of virtue and vice was to be picked up by our eyes, or ears, or nostrils; shows so much ignorance or so much malice that he deserves no other answer but pity." (Works I. 576.) To the charge of Lowde,

¹) Characteristics. Vol. I. 316. first letter to a student.

²) Characteristics. Vol. I. 344—347.

³) English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. Vol. II. 83.

Locke replies: "If he had been at pains to reflect on what had said, he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call virtue and vice, and if he had observed that in the place he quotes, I only report as matters of fact what others call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception."¹) In a letter to Tyrell, Aug. 4. 1690, speaking of this matter, Locke says, that in the passages in question he is not treating of the grounds of true morality, but only showing the different ways in which men regard moral law, and the different standards they take, without any reference to whether they are true or not.²) Locke's critics, then, have supposed him to be enunciating his theory of virtue when he is only describing popular phases of morals. Now let us put the same question to Locke which Locke put to the Christian, the Hobbist, and the Heathen. "Why should a man keep his word or contract." Locke answers, "Truth, and keeping of faith belong to men as men, and not as members of society". (Gov. II. 14.) "Truth, whether in, or out, of fashion, is the measure of knowledge and the business of the understanding; whatever is, beside that, however authorized by consent or recommended by rarity, is nothing but ignorance or something worse . . . And it is true that it is every man's duty to be just, whether there is any such thing as a just man in the world or no."³) He appeals to the law of nature as that standing and unalterable rule of moral rectitude and pravity, and declares that human laws are only so far right as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.⁴) Moreover, Locke treats with sarcasm the very theory attributed to him. "This cuts out the dresses for the women, and makes the fashions for the

¹) II. 28; II. note.

²) Lord King, *Life of Locke*. Pp. 200. 20.

³) *Conduct of the Understanding*, § 24. King, *Life of Locke*, p. 122.

⁴) II. 28. 2 note. Gov. II. 12.

men. This makes men drunkards and sober, thieves and honest, and robbers themselves true to one another." He ridicules those who make custom serve for reason, and complains to Collins that "to be rational is so glorious a thing; that twolegged creatures generally content themselves with the title".¹⁾ According to Locke, moral distinctions rest not upon the arbitrary will of the Deity; not upon the will of the Leviathan, not upon human custom and fashion. Moral distinctions rest in eternal and immutable law; a law which neither God, nor the state nor public opinion can alter. On this question Locke stands in line with Culverwel, Cumberland, Cudworth and Clarke.

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L (1) IV. *Natural Law.* We have seen that Locke places the conception of God and the nature of virtue in very close relations. His idea of God is his idea of virtue, and the nature of the one is the nature of the other. God, from his nature, can will only that which is best. Thus, when Locke speaks of the will or commands of God, he has in view that which is in essence the best, and in its nature unchangeable. "But", says Locke, "we may know that virtue is conformity to the law of God, which is the true and only measure of virtue", we may know that virtue is that "which is, in its own nature, right and good", we may know that virtue is the best worship of God, and yet be far from knowing what the true principles of virtue are. We must "prove a law", we must show how "God hath declared His will and law". We must show that there are certain rules, certain dictates, which it is His will all men should conform their actions to, and that this will of His is sufficiently promulgated, and made known to all mankind. Locke argues that this requirement cannot be met by either "the Mosaic or Evangelical law of God. For neither of those, as I take it, was given to mankind; which is a term, which in my sense, includes all men. It is plain that the

¹⁾ King, Life of Locke. p. 109. Education § 164. Letters to Collins, Jan. 24 and Feb. 28. 1704.

Mosaical law was not given to mankind, for it was 'Hear, O Israel', and I never yet met with any one who said the laws of Moses were the laws of mankind, and as for the revealed will of God in the New Testament, which was a revelation made to the children of men 2000 years after Moses, and 4000 years after the Creation, how that can be called a law given to mankind is hard to conceive, unless that men born before the time of the Gospel were no part of mankind, or the Gospel was revealed before it was revealed."¹⁾ Locke is far from making Revelation the source of his moral precepts. This would contradict his conception of man and the first certainty of the demonstrative reason, by postulating for man an unsocial, irrational, immoral nature, as well as atheism of the reason.²⁾ The faculty which must prove this law is the reason. Instead of fixing upon revelation as the source of our knowledge of the principles of virtue, he fixes upon natural reason. "Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to man that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties." (IV. 19. 4.) This expression of the eternal reason in the nature and through the experiences of humanity, reveals moral principles, and makes known a natural law among men.

The conception of a law of nature, comprehending all morality, public and private, having God for its author, and the common or natural reason for its interpreter, appears with Heraclitus. For him, "the only piece of real wisdom is to know that principle which by itself will govern everything on every occasion".³⁾ This principle is the universal and divine reason which is participated in by man, and, in him, is the criterion of truth. That which appears common to all, is true and certain. "Understanding is common to

¹⁾ King, Life of Locke, p. 178.

²⁾ King, Life of Locke, p. 312—313. I. 3; 12.

³⁾ Diog. Laert. IX. 2.

all. When we speak with reason, we must hold fast to that which is common, even as a city holds fast to the law, yea, and far more strongly; for all human laws are fixed by one law, that of God, which prevails wherever it will, and is sufficient for all, and in all prevailing."¹) These ideas, represented by Heraclitus were taken up by later philosophers, and finally, by the Stoics and Roman lawyers; by the one, raised into a system of philosophy, by the other, into a system of law. Thus it is that Stoicism and Roman law have played a most important part in the history of moral and political philosophy. It was among the Roman lawyers that *jus naturale* and *lex naturalis* received a full exposition under the term *jus gentium*. This term denoted those principles of justice which were common both to Rome and her conquered peoples, and which Rome made use of in administering justice in and among her colonies. The lawyers entertained the belief that the *jus gentium* was the foundation of all positive law; that it was indeed the lost code of nature, and that in building their laws upon it and following its outlines, they were restoring a type, from which law had only departed to deteriorate. As in Greece, so in Rome, this law was regarded as being so clear and universal in its principles that it came to be regarded as divine law.²) This conception of a law eternal and divine, superior

¹) Stob. Serm. III. 84. Ueberweg-Heinze. I. 52. Sext. Emp. Adv. M. VII. 129—133. Similar views were common among Greek philosophers and poets. "Auf den Willen der Götter wurden bei den Griechen, wie überall auch die allgemein anerkannten sittlichen Gebote zurückgeführt, und die Unverletzlichkeit derselben mit dem Glauben an die vergeltende Gerechtigkeit der Götter begründet." Zeller: Grundriss, p. 22.

²) Cicero makes the law of nature and the law of nations identical, "*Lege naturae id est gentium*." De Off. I. 23. see Dante; De Monarchia II. 2. Jeremy Taylor. Duct. Dub. II. I; 1. Cumberland, De Leg. Nat. V. I. Ahrens, Cours de droit naturel. I. 1. says, "The philosophy of law, or natural law, is the science which discourses of the first principles of right, conceived by reason, and founded on the nature of man, considered in itself, and in its relations to the universal order of things." The Roman law is elaborated in M. Demangeat's Cours de Droit romain. Aristotle

to all political societies, and the measure of all true government, a law binding upon men as rational beings, finds its most illustrious exponent in Cicero. "Law", says Cicero, "did not begin to be when it was put into writing, but when it arose, that is to say, at the same moment with the mind of God!" (De Leg. II. 4.) He defines law as "the highest reason implanted in nature, which commands those things which ought to be done, and prohibits the reverse".¹⁾ When we remember that the works of Cicero were more prized and recommended by Locke than those of any other author, we may suppose that Locke's views on natural law were in general accord with those of Tully. And this we find to be the case, although Locke differs with Cicero on many questions of civil government, and gives to the truth contained in "the law of nature" a more rational statement.

"I would not be misunderstood," says Locke, "as if, because I deny an innate law, I thought there were none but positive laws. *There is a great deal of difference between an innate law and a law of nature*; between something printed on our minds in their very original, and something we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties. And I think they equally forsake the truth, who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature, i. e. without the help of positive revelation." (I. 3; 13. Gov. II. 6.) "This unchangeable rule of right and wrong, which God hath established", is fundamental, "there being nothing that so distinctly secures and advances the general good of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws which he hath set them, and nothing that breeds such mischief

defines natural law as "that which has every where the same force". Nic. Eth. V. 10. Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, I. 1. 10. An excellent historical and critical exposition of the principles which lie at the foundation of the doctrine of the Law of Nature, is given by Dr. Max Heinze, "Die Lehre vom Logos in der Griechischen Philosophie".

¹⁾ De Leg. I. 6. comp. Rep., Bk. III.

and confusion as the neglect of them." (II. 28. 2.) Natural law, according to Locke, is the expression of the eternal reason and goodwill, in the life and experiences of humanity. It is evident that Locke is here proceeding upon principles which have commonly been regarded as most foreign to his system. The natural and rational conception of right and wrong, of merit and demerit, and of duty, are announced with as much composure as by the most radical Intuitionist. Locke continues, "There is no nation of men who do not acknowledge right and wrong in men's actions, as well as truth and falsehood in their sayings, no people who do not distinguish between virtue and vice; some kind of morality is to be found everywhere received. Even when politics, societies, and magistrates are silent, men yet are under some laws to which they owe obedience. Were there no human law, nor punishment, nor obligation of civil and divine sanctions, there would be distinct notions of virtues and vices."¹) Locke finds, "even in the corruption of manners, the true boundary of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, pretty well preserved. So that even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute. Whatever is lovely, whatever is of good report, if there be any virtue and if there be any praise, think on these things." (Phil. 4. 8. II. 28; II.) There is, in Locke's view, a secret apprehension among men of another rule of action than that given by priests and lawyers, and he regards "the great failure of both priests and lawyers to be that they failed to grasp these common notions and derive them from God, and argue them as the commands of the great God of heaven and earth." Thus, with Locke, the laws of nature are the laws of God as apprehended by the natural faculties, or, more logically expressed, they are laws discovered by the human reason and attributed to God as their necessary author and

¹) King, Life of Locke, p. 308—9.

support. They do not place man under necessity as do physical laws but under moral obligation.

V. *Principles of Natural Morality.* What are these laws of nature, these principles of morality, that are eternal and unchangeable rules of conduct, and are grasped by right reason? In answering this question, we must distinguish between Locke's doctrine of duties and his doctrine of rights. According to him, duties are the foundation of rights. The latter will be noticed in the chapter on Institutional Ethics. Here we have to do only with the principles of duty, the laws binding upon right reason in the various human relations.

Piety towards God is one of the most natural and fundamental elements in morality. As atheism is a violation of the rational nature of man, so the belief in God, love and reverence to God, are not only rules of right reason, but, as principles, sufficient to preserve in man a true sense of religion and morality. Not to love and reverence the "Author and Maker of all things, from whom we receive all our good, who loves us and gives us all things", appears to Locke unnatural.

The rule of Prudence is a natural suggestion of the reason. That all the powers or faculties with which the individual is endowed, should be regarded as trusts to be preserved and enlarged, is a principle of common sense. He who acts contrary to this rule, not only acts against right reason, but "will never be happy in himself, nor useful to others". Locke holds that rational creatures are under obligations to develop the physical, mental and social powers. No man has a right to destroy his own life or liberty. The capital phrase of his "Thoughts concerning Education," is, "Mens sana in corpore sano." "Our main care," he says, "should be about the inside, yet the clay cottage is not to be neglected." Prudence also turns attention to reputation. No man, wisely, may be unmindful of what others think of him. Locke bases this upon practical and moral grounds. "Esteem and reputation are a sort of moral strength, whereby

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a man is able to do, as it were, by an augmented force, that which others, of equal natural parts and natural power, cannot do without it." Locke complains that writers on prudence too often over emphasize convenience, thus, losing sight of virtue, fail to keep clear from the borders of dishonesty.¹⁾

The rule of Benevolence is, with Locke, a law of nature. It is suggested in the conditions under which Locke has represented prudence. "The fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, every one is commissioned by the law of nature to do good." Locke places the greatest emphasis upon this law of benevolence. "Truly, if the preservation of all mankind, as much as in him lies, were every one's persuasion, as it is every one's duty, and the true principle to regulate our religion, politics, and morality by, the world would be much quieter and better natured than it is." This doctrine is fundamental to his entire system, and we find it expressed in every form, from self-regard through the most refined sentiment to the baldest form of obligation. Locke's benevolence has an egoistic tinge which arises, from his conception of the union of Virtue and Happiness. With Locke, morality is something to be practised by the men of this world, and he failed to rise to the refinement of eliminating the personal element. He thus presents the matter in his *Thoughts concerning Education*. "Covetousness, and the desire of having in our possession, and under our dominion, more than we have need of, being the root of all evil, should be early and carefully weeded out, and the contrary quality of a readiness to impart to others, implanted. Let the child sensibly perceive that the kindness he shows to others is no ill husbandry for himself, but that it brings a return of kindness, both from those that receive it, and those who look on. Thus may be settled the habit of being kind, liberal, and civil to others." Locke palliates this

¹⁾ King, *Life of Locke*. 97. 293. Gov. II. 6. Education §§ 1. 61. Letter to Richard King. August 25. 1703. Works IV. 639.

presentation by saying that the first actions of children are guided more by self-love than by reason and reflection. His presentation is more agreeable in the following passage. "The perfumes I smelt yesterday now no more affect me with pleasure, but the good turn I did yesterday, a year, seven years since, continues still to please and delight me as often as I reflect on it," and again, "every one, according to what way Providence has placed him, is bound to labor for the public good, as far as he is able, or else he has no right to eat."¹⁾

The law of Equity is founded on the natural equality of men. "Reason teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, the workmanship and property of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker, no one ought to harm another in his life, liberty, and possessions."²⁾ Locke agrees with the "judicious Hooker" that this equality of man by nature is a foundation of mutual love and obligation among men, and a source from whence may be derived the great maxims

¹⁾ Third letter on Tol.ch.II. Gov.II.4.5.182.183. Education, 110.116. King. Life of Locke, 307. Locke to Molyneux. Jan 19. 1694.

²⁾ Throughout his work Locke attaches great importance to the 'Unity of the Human Race'. His theory is substantiated by the most learned Anthropologists. Dr. Theo. Waitz: *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, says, "we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that there are no specific differences among mankind with regard to their psychical life". Eng. Tr. p. 327. J. C. Pritchard: *Natural History of Man*, Vol. II. 714. says, "we are enabled to draw confidently the conclusion that all human races are of one species and of one family". M. de Qatrefages; "The Human Species" p. 88. testifies to the same conclusion, "These human groups, however different they may be, or appear to be, are races of one and the same species, and not distinct species." The doctrine of natural freedom and equality was made the foundation of the American Declaration of Independence. "There cannot be any question", says Maine, "that to the assumption of a Law Natural we owe the doctrine of the fundamental equality of human beings. . . . The Roman juris consults of the Antonine era lay down that omnes homines natura aequales sunt"¹⁾ Ancient Law. p. 92.

Curtis, Locke's Ethical Philosophy.

of justice and charity. Truth, keeping of contracts, love, sympathy, equity, belong to men as men. The violation of this principle of equity, is iniquity. "It is always a sin in any man of estate to let his brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty. As justice gives every man a title to the product of his honest industry, and the fair acquisitions of his ancestors descended to him, so charity gives every man a title to so much of another's plenty as will keep him from extreme want, when he has no means to subsist otherwise; and a man can no more justly make use of another's necessity to force him to become his vassal, by withholding that relief God requires him to afford to the wants of his brother, than he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to his obedience and with a dagger at his throat offer him death or slavery." Equity is a sacred principle with Locke in his *Thoughts concerning Education*. "The least slip in this great social virtue is to be taken notice of, and, if there be an occasion of it, severely rebuked." Every effort is to be brought to the support of equity, as injustice is in danger of ending in "downright hardened dishonesty".¹⁾

Law of Love. If we look for a comprehensive, regulative principle of human conduct, Locke refers us to "that most unshaken rule of morality, and foundation of all social virtue . . . that one should do as he would be done unto". This rule, though not innate, is, with Locke, an imperative of right reason. Thus, "a part of the eternal and immutable law, is, that a man should forgive, not only his children, but his enemies, upon their repentance, asking pardon and amendment." (*Works* III. 83.) In speaking of "fundamental virtues", Locke declares; "Our Saviour's great rule, that we should love our neighbour as ourselves, is such a fundamental truth for the regulating of human society, that I think by that alone, one might without difficulty determine all the cases and doubts in social morality." In his fragment, "Of Ethics

¹⁾ Gov. II. 5. 6. I. 42. Education §§ 110. 131. 132.

in General", Locke holds that the law, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, is a comprehensive principle, and that "the relations of our actions to it, i. e. the agreement or disagreement of any thing we do, with that rule, is as easy and clearly known as any other relation". This Law of Love is a law of right reason, a law of God, and thus as moral imperative; and actions, "as they agree or disagree with this law, so are they good or bad, virtues or vices". This rule, is regarded strictly as a law of nature, of God, of right reason, and as obligatory at all times and every where. "Love to God, and charity to ourselves and neighbours are, at all times, indispensably necessary." This fundamental rule is to regulate not only our affections and conduct, but also our language. "Do not hear yourself say to another what you would not have another hear from him."¹) It is in this sense that Locke's definition of virtue is to be understood. "Virtue, as in its obligation it is the will of God, discerned by natural reason, and thus has the force of a law, so, in the matter of it, it is nothing else but doing of good, either to one's-self or others, and the contrary there unto, vice, is nothing else but doing of harm."²)

It is evident that the above principles are not bare suppositions of what ought to be, nor cold declarations of what is, in human society. They are, to Locke, laws that are grasped by the rational nature of man, and objectified by right reason as principles of conduct. They rest fundamentally upon his conception of man as a sociable and rational being, and his conception of God as infinite Wis-

¹) H. U. I. 3; 4. C. U. Sec. 43. King. Life of Locke. 312. 313. 90. 111. 286. Had Locke carried out his project of a system of ethics on mathematical principles, he would probably have derived his table of virtues from some form of the Golden Rule as a common principle. He makes no further attempt than is here indicated, but, as we have seen, takes up his principles of virtue out of common sense or the law of nature.

²) Extract from Common place book. 1661. King, Life of Locke. p. 292.

dom, Power, and Goodness.¹⁾ Locke believes that natural reason discovers a moral code apart from the assistance of revelation, and he goes beyond Cicero and Grotius by supposing that this code may be made out with mathematical certainty; that a science of ethics is possible.²⁾

VI. *The possibility of a science of ethics.* Locke illustrates his supposition by two striking examples. "It has been generally taken for granted", he says, "that mathematics alone are capable of demonstrative certainty, but to have such an agreement or disagreement as may intuitively be perceived, being, as I imagine, not the privilege of the ideas of number, extension, and figure alone, it may possibly be the want of due method and application in us, and not of sufficient evidence in things, that demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of knowledge," (IV. 2; 9.) Locke would apply his method of certainty, which he also regards as the mathematical method, to the questions of morals. The illustration which is adduced, involves the fundamental certainties of his intuitive and demonstrative reason, enlarged into concepts, and made the premises of synthetic judgments.

"The idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on

¹⁾ We are reminded here of Locke's examination of Lord Herberts innate principles. I. 3. 15. These principles are, (1.) *Esse aliquod supremum numen.* (2.) *Numen illud coli debere.* (3.) *Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam esse rationem cultus divini.* (4.) *Resipiscendum esse a peccatis.* (5.) *Dari praeium vel poenam post hanc vitam transactam.* Locke remarks: "I allow these to be clear truths, and such as, if rightly explained, a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his consent to: yet I think he is far from proving them innate impressions 'in foro interiori descriptae.'" The difference between Herbert and Locke is this: Herbert held these principles as innate, "in foro interiori descriptae" whilst Locke held that although the power of the mind which grasps these principles is innate, the principles themselves are not in the mind antecedent to experience and the activity of the intellectual powers.

²⁾ I. 3; 1. III. 2; 16. IV. 3; 18. IV. 4; 6—9. IV. 12; 8. III. 11. 17. IV. 2. 9. III. 5. 12. Works I, 576. These are the chief references to his supposition of a mathematical morality.

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whom we depend, and the idea of ourselves, as understanding rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty; and rules of action, as might place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration." (IV. 3; 18.) Here are two ideas that are "clear in us": the idea of God as infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, and the idea of man as an understanding, rational being, the creation and property of God. From these two ideas one "will certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and obey God as that the sun shines when he sees it. For he that hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind, and will but move his thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and dependent is under obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is certain to find that three, four, and seven, are less than fifteen." (IV. 13; 3.) In this way Locke deduces the proposition; It is the duty of every rational creature to obey God. Such a proposition is as evident as any proposition in mathematics. This is moral knowledge in that an authority is indicated, and if we accept Locke's code of natural law as argued up to God, as its author, then we not only have whom to obey, but what to do. As a matter of fact, the whole of Locke's natural code falls under the ideas contained in the above two premises. And admitting these premises to be incontestably true, or hypothetically assumable, we cannot deny that morality is a science of mathematical certainty, take what view of mathematics we may.¹⁾ Although Locke holds that he has proved the truth of these two premises, he does not liken them to mathematical axioms. What he holds, is, that the principles derived from these two premises are mathematically derived, and, as derived, are certain as any mathematical demonstration.

¹⁾ J. Stuart Mill: System of Logic. Book II. ch. 5. maintains the hypothetical character of mathematical axioms. But Locke regards mathematics as a pure product of the Intellect as is evident from IV. 4; 6—7.

Locke presents the supposition in another form. "All our complex ideas, except those of substances, bring archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of any thing, but themselves are considered as the archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded but as they are conformable to them; so that we cannot but be infallibly certain that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is real, and reaches things themselves, it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas; and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement, by the intervention of other ideas or mediums, our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and so adequate and complete ideas; all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them, will produce real knowledge, as well as the mathematical figures." Locke gives two illustrations of this procedure. "Where there is no property, there is no injustice", is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid. The consideration of the two complex ideas contained in the words property and injustice, establish the truth of the proposition. For the idea of property being the right to anything; and the idea to which the name injustice is given, being the invasion or violation of that right; it is evident that these ideas being thus established, and these names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this proposition to be true as that a \triangle is equal to two right angles. Again, "no government allows absolute liberty": the idea of government being the establishment of society upon certain rules or laws, which require conformity to them; and the idea of absolute liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases, I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition, as of any in the mathematics.¹⁾

¹⁾ IV. 4; 5—7. IV. 3; 18. IV. 12; 6—8. IV. 17; 4. Works I. 495.

The second form given above cannot be identified with the first. The two forms represent two different applications of Locke's method, the first furnishing synthetical, or new knowledge, the second analytical, or tests of the validity of propositions.¹⁾ The difference between the two aspects of the same subject, is this; whereas the first gives the data from which moral truths or rules of action may be deduced, the second furnishes a test of moral truths or rules of action already at hand. They both agree in the method of aiming at certainty or true knowledge, viz, by perception of agreement or disagreement of ideas; but the one is deduction, the other, induction. The one starts with two ideas, and makes the synthetical judgment; we ought to obey God; the other starts with the proposition, where there is no property there is no injustice, and by analysis establishes the truth of the proposition. These two illustrations suggest to us all that Locke has to offer for a constructive science of ethics.

Locke is by no means blind to the difficulties in the way of an exact science of ethics. In stating these hindrances he seems to remove the foundations of his supposition. (III. 2; 15.) *First*, while mathematics has a universal sign language in its figures and diagrams; moral philosophy is obliged to use words which are neither precise nor invariable in their significations. Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of ideas in the mind, and are not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their significations. Thus, when ideas are the same in two men, the words which represent these ideas may vary, so that disputations come to be more in words than in ideas. The rule of propriety is utterly incapable of establishing

¹⁾ "We can know the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty; the one is, of those trifling propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive; and secondly, we can know the truth and so may be certain, in propositions which affirm something of another which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it: . . . this is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive, real knowledge." IV. 8. 8.

But the first triangle could not be drawn because of no idea because of no sensory experience. a substance. Or is a triangle a complex idea or not a simple idea

the use and signification of language for any other purpose than conversation. It cannot adjust and establish them for philosophical discourse.¹⁾ *Secondly*, moral ideas are more complex than those of the figures ordinarily used in mathematics. This complexity not only makes the language more uncertain, but the mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations, through long deductions, which involve the intervention of several other complex ideas, to show the agreement or disagreement of the remote ones. Moreover, the names of mixed modes are of such uncertainty in their signification that they not only often excite in the mind of the hearer a different idea from that in the mind of the speaker, but may be, in the speaker, different to-day from what they will be to-morrow. (IV. 3; 19. III. 9; 6.) *Thirdly*, Locke notices a more practical difficulty in the way of a science of ethics, arising from the self-interests and prejudices of men. While mathematics has to do with quantities, ethics has to do with conduct in all the relations of life. Locke holds that a science of ethics "is not to be expected while the desire of esteem, riches, or power, makes men espouse the well endowed opinions of fashion, and then seeks arguments either to make good their beauty, or to cover their deformity. Whilst the parties of men cram their tenets down all men's throats whom they can get into their power, without permitting them to examine their truth or falsehood, and will not let truth have fair play in the world, nor men the liberty to search after it, what improvement can be expected of this kind". (IV. 3; 20.) These three difficulties, of language, of the nature of moral ideas, and of the stress of policy and prejudice in human relations, constitute the main obstacles to a science of ethics which is to resemble that of mathematics. Yet Locke holds to his original supposition. "Confident I am, that if men would, in the same method, and with the same indifferency, search after moral, as they do after mathematical truths, they

¹⁾ III. 9; 6; 8. IV. 3; 19.

would find them to have a stronger connection one with another, and a more necessary consequence from our clear and distinct ideas, and to come nearer perfect demonstration than is commonly imagined."

The last analysis of Locke's position on this mooted question may be indicated in two points; *First*, the demonstrability of ethics is a possibility, not of the present, but of the future. That it remained, at the last, only as a supposition with Locke is evident, not only from the Essay, but from his correspondence. Molyneux begged him to carry out his suggestion, and Locke replied that he was doubtful as to his ability, but would, at his "first leisure, employ some thoughts that way". Later, he writes, "I every now and then lay aside some materials for it, as they occasionally occur in the roving of my mind". But Locke finally dismisses the subject by saying that he must employ the little time and strength he has in other researches, wherein he finds himself more in the dark. So far as we can discover, Locke held that the only hope of a scientific morality is in making words as definite and universal in their signification as are mathematical diagrams and figures. Rigid definition, and a universal philosophic language would do much towards a scientific treatment of ethics. He turns towards Algebra with some expectation of assistance. "What methods Algebra, or something of that kind, may hereafter suggest, to remove other difficulties, it is not easy to foretell." Here his position seems to be much the same as that of Leibniz and Kant.¹⁾ *Secondly*, Locke maintained that prac-

Dangerous
if possible
no O.W.
Holmes
flexibility
Rigidity of
justice on
precedent
and dogma

¹⁾ See letters from Molyneux to Locke. Aug. 27. 1692. Dec. 22. 1692. Mar. 2. 1693. Sept. 16. 1693. Letters from Locke to Molyneux. Sept. 20. 1692. Jan. 19. 1694. March 30. 1696. H. U. IV. 3; 19—20. III. 9; 6. 8. Cumberland "De Legibus Naturae" etc. ch. I. §§ 7—8. II. 3. holds that the verities of morality may be known as certainly as those of mathematics, and, IV. 4, according to the method of Algebra. Leibniz, in his "Nouveaux Essais", says to Locke, "Je crois que vous avez raison, Monsieur, et je suis disposé depuis longtemps à me mettre endeavour d'accomplir vos predictions." Erdmann's Ed. p. 382. Kant saw a

tical morality would not be much served even if its principles were made out with mathematical certainty. Thus, he writes to Molyneux, "Did the world want a rule, I confess there could be no work so necessary, nor so commendable". (Mar. 30. 1696.) Locke maintains that if the principles of morality were made out by mathematical demonstration, the vast majority of men would not be able to understand the demonstration and its force any more than they are able to understand and appreciate the *Principia* of Newton. He even maintains that men are better acquainted with moral truth through reason, common sense, and revelation, than they are with mathematics. Not only so, but "the greatest part of mankind want leisure or capacity for demonstration; nor can carry a train of proofs, which in that way they must always depend upon for conviction, and cannot be required to consent to, till they see the demonstration. . . . You may as soon hope to have all the day-laborers and tradesmen, the spinsters and dairymaids, perfect mathematicians, as to have them perfect in ethics in this way." (Works III. 91.) Locke nowhere intimates that demonstrative ethics would be of any practical value and, handing the problem on to the future, falls back upon the morality of right reason, "the candle of the Lord set up by Himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish". (IV. 3; 20.)

VII. *The Sanctions of Morality.* We have seen that the moral lawgiver is God, and that His law is like unto Himself; eternal and immutable wisdom, power, and goodness. We have also seen how the reason of man grasps this law of human conduct in the form of a law of nature, and how Locke made the attempt to bring the whole of

prospect of applying mathematics to metaphysics, when analysis has helped us to clear and definite conceptions. Works, Ed., Rosenkranz. I. 97. The need of some assistance in philosophy from the mathematical method is expressed in Fischer's "Grundriss des Systems der Phil. als Bestimmungslehre".

morality within the sphere of science, apart from the assistance of revelation. While Locke by no means surrenders his supposition that morality may be established as a science, he does not find in human life, with its disturbing factors, a sufficient basis for the enforcement of morality. Yet Locke moves steadily upon the assumption that the main principles of morality are evident to right reason, or easily discernible by common sense. Here he differs from the Socratic view that "knowledge is virtue", holding with Aristotle that virtue is not, in its essence, knowing but doing. He differs radically from the Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, which proceeds upon the assumption that men would practise the precepts of morality if they were only acquainted with them; that doing would follow knowing in logical sequence. None of the Roman Emperors was more illiterate than Trajan, none more learned than Nero. Locke does not disparage knowledge; "I think learning a great help to well disposed minds; but yet it must be confessed also, that in others not so disposed, it helps them only to be more foolish or worse men." (Ed. §. 147.) To bare knowledge, in itself, Locke does not attach the slightest ethical importance. Knowledge is neither wisdom nor virtue. "I imagine you would think him a very foolish fellow that should not value a virtuous or wise man infinitely before a great scholar."¹⁾ Without encroaching upon the function of knowledge in ethics, or overlooking the confusion in the doctrines of moralists, Locke holds that men are much clearer about the principles of ethics than about the force of their sanctions or imperatives. Thus we have in Locke's work a more satisfactory and explicit treatment of the sanctions of morality than in any modern English moralist. While he recognised that natural law, grasped by the reason, contains in itself a sufficient sanction for men of right reason, he was not content with a moral system made only for those who did not need it, but had in view all mankind, and recognised only that code

note this for
7 reading
Tom Jones

¹⁾ King, Life of Locke, p. 90.

that had a sanction and a practical force for all classes and conditions of men. "The end and use of morality being to direct our lives, and by showing us what actions are good, and what bad, prepare us to do the one and avoid the other; those that pretend to teach morals mistake their business, and become only language masters when they do not do this: when they teach us to talk and dispute and call actions by the names they prescribe, when they do not show the inferments that may draw us to virtue, and deter us from vice."¹⁾ Reason, according to Locke, finds the Law-giver, and grasps, by the light of nature, the cardinal, principles of morality. Reason argues these principles up to God, and makes them, like Him, eternal and immutable. But what does reason say of the "inferments that draw to virtue, and deter from vice", what content does it give to such terms as duty, right, and obligation? Immortality, rewards, and punishments are suggested to the reason by our constitutions and by analogies. But natural reason does not lay an obligation upon itself of sufficient weight to insure what ought to be done against the encroachments of what we would like to do. Men applaud the "Golden Rule", and freely accord it the validity of a mathematical axiom without any corresponding conviction that its violation will be attended with punishment. Such considerations led Locke to show that the *Christian Revelation* supports rational and real sanctions of morality.

"Revelation", says Locke, "is natural reason, enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God."²⁾ Speaking of Locke and Wolff, Pfeiderer says, "Locke also considers a supernatural revelation to be possible, and to have actually taken place in Christianity, but he insists as strongly as Wolff does, and even more logically, that this

¹⁾ King's Life of Locke. 310.

²⁾ IV. 19; 4. 14. IV. 17; 23. IV. 18; 5.

revelation must not in anyway contradict the natural revelation given us by God in our reason.”¹⁾ Locke maintains that we have such a revelation in Christianity, and puts the question, “What advantage have we by Jesus Christ?” He enumerates this advantage in five points, which at once embody the substance of his religious views, and suggest the bearing of Christianity upon ethics.²⁾ *First*, although the knowledge of God was always in the world, the world made little use of its reason. Reason “speaking ever so clearly to the wise and virtuous, had never authority enough to prevail on the multitude.” But Christ made known the one invisible and true God with such evidence and energy, that Polytheism and idolatry were obliged to give way to Monotheism. “We see, that since our Saviour’s time, the belief of one God has prevailed and spread itself over the face of the earth.” *Secondly*, “A clear knowledge of their duty was wanting to mankind.” Here Locke becomes eloquent in his descriptions of moral philosophy and its influence in the world before Christ. The body of “the law of nature” is not entire; the moral rules of the philosophers are not complete; priests taught ritualism instead of virtue; there was no comprehensive moral system. “But such a body of ethics, proved to be the law of nature, and teaching all the duties of life; I think nobody will say the world had before our Saviour’s time.” Locke argues here that “there is a law of nature”, that this law depends upon “principles of reason, self evident in themselves, and the clear and evident deductions from the same; and that Christ was the first to give us this code all entire as a law; no more, no less, than, what was contained in, and had the obligation of that law”. This perfect code, says Locke was given by revelation, but it is conformable to reason, Reason and revelation are one; “the reason *is* natural revelation, . . . : revelation *is* natural reason enlarged”. (IV. 19; 4.) Locke

¹⁾ The Philos. of Religion. Vol. I. p. 114.

²⁾ The Reasonableness of Christianity. Works III. 84—89.

2nd ✓ repudiates the theory of his countrymen Occam, Scotus and Bacon, that reason and revelation are two *truths*, though antagonistic, and maintains that truth is one in essence, and indivisible.¹⁾ *Thirdly*, the outward forms of worshipping the Deity wanted a reformation. Ritualism was thought the principal part, if not the whole of religion. Our Saviour supplanted "the numerous huddle of pompous fantastical, cumbersome ceremonies with a plain spiritual and suitable worship. . . . Praises and prayers humbly offered up to the Deity, was the worship he now demanded, and in these, every one was to look after his own heart, and to know that it was that alone that God had regard to, and accepted." Locke's individualism and inner laws of reason appear in religion, as in government. *Fourthly*, "Another great advantage received by our Saviour, is, the great encouragement he brought to a pious and virtuous life." Men spend much time in praising virtue, but very little time in practising her principles. Before our Saviour's time the doctrine of a future state though it was not wholly hid, yet it was not clearly known to the world; the rewards were doubtful and at a distance, the evidence and security were imperfect. But Christ brought life and immortality to light, He opened the future to the eyes of men, "He threw into the scale of virtue an exceeding and immortal weight of glory", He showed that virtue and true happiness were really one, and that in faithfully following what right reason approves and praises, lies the only course of rational conduct. Here is something "solid and powerful to move men. . . . Upon this foundation, and this only, morality stands firm. . . . This makes it more than a name, a substantial good, worth all our aims and endeavors." Locke held that immortality, a truth of

¹⁾ The position of Reid is the same as that of Locke. "Corruptions in religion and in morals had spread so wide among mankind and were so confirmed by custom, as to require a light from Heaven to correct them. Revelation was not intended to supersede, but to aid the use of our natural faculties." Works III. 380.

nature half hidden to man through his corruption, is a positive demand of morality. "When the belief of another life leaves a man, virtue seldom stays with him. . . . For if there be no prospect beyond the grave, the inference is certainly right, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die'. The rewards and punishments of another life, which the Almighty has established with enforcements of his law, are of weight enough to determine their choice against whatever pleasure or pain this life can show, when the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility, of which nobody can make any doubt."¹) *Fifthly*, "to these I must add one advantage more by Jesus Christ, and that is, the promise of assistance. If we do what we can, He will give us His Spirit to help us to do what and how we should."

In view of the above, and what has already been noticed in II. 4., the place of revelation in the ethical system of Locke is not difficult to determine. The revelation in Jesus Christ deepens, strengthens, and vivifies in all men those eternal principles of right and wrong which the natural reason is able to grasp, but not fully to appropriate. This revelation, in Locke's view, is a bringing into full light and recognition that which already was, but which had been partially lost through "the corruption of manners". Christ was the only true moral philosopher. He alone is the true teacher who brings the whole law into the light, who interprets the whole law, in language and in life, who connects all its parts, and impresses the whole upon the consciousness of man. If we ask whether God gives the whole code of conduct through the "light of nature" or through revelation, Locke answers, through both. In speaking of moral law, he says, "I mean that law which God hath set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of reason, or by the voice of revelation." (II. 28; 8.) The law thus promulgated is one and the same law. If we ask,

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¹) King, Life of Locke. p. 160. H. U. II. 21; 25, 21; 70.

✓ which is prior, Locke holds uniformly to the light of nature, as mankind were in existence before Moses and the New Testament, and before anything was revealed to them. Revelation is not the law of nature, but a second revelation of the law of nature, a promulgation of "morality which is the proper concern and business of all mankind".

The moral law is rational, and is executed through rewards and punishments. As rational, it appeals to the wise man, and men of right reason follow it simply because it is in harmony with their higher nature, and carries with it the imperative of truth, as well as true happiness. He will agree with Locke, that it is "every man's duty to be just, whether there be any such thing as a just man in the world or no".¹⁾ Both he and Locke would agree with Aristippos, that "the manner of the life of the wise would experience no change, though all existing laws were abrogated". Locke by no means excludes disinterested conduct from his moral scheme. He makes it the objective point of all morality. The truly rational man will always conform his conduct to moral rules without regard to rewards and punishments. On the other hand, rewards and punishments do not infringe upon rational morality, as it cannot be conceived that it is irrational to punish immoral acts, or that the end of morality is theory of morality and not moral conduct. No philosopher of his century expressed more confidence in human nature than Locke; none advocated with more earnestness than he, a high place for individual honor in all the concerns of practical life. (Ed. §§ 54. 56.) But he was too close an observer of men not to be convinced that morality, to have any practical effect upon the rank and file of life, must have a more practical sanction than that of merely being rational. Thus he remarks, ✓ "Reason, speaking, ever so clearly to the wise and virtuous, had never authority enough to prevail on the multitude

¹⁾ King, Life of Locke. p. 122.

(Works III. 85.), and again, "fear of punishment often does what virtue should do". (Fox Bourne, II. 322.) That which has moral authority over the multitudes is the doctrine of immortality with future rewards and punishments. This we may know by revelation, and it is not contradictory to reason. Locke's general position here is not different from that of Aristotle (Nic. Eth. X. 8.) where he argues that practise, not speculation, is the end of ethical enquiry, and that while reason is sufficient for the virtuous, penalties must be relied upon for influencing the great majority of men. But Locke holds that by a right conduct of the understanding, by a correct system of education, the number of those who order their lives by the principles of virtue, irrespective of rewards and punishments, may be mightily increased.

Chapter IV.

The Ethical Life.

I. *Happiness and virtue.* Locke has treated extensively of the ethical end, its possibility for man, and the method of its attainment. "Nature, I confess, has put into man a desire of happiness, and an aversion to misery; these indeed are innate practical principles, which, as practical principles ought, do continue constantly to operate, and influence all our actions without ceasing; these may be observed in all persons and in all ages, steady and universal; but these are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impressions of truth on the understanding. I deny not that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men, and that from the very first instances of sense and perception there are some things that are grateful and others unwelcome to them: some things that they incline to and others that they fly, but this makes nothing for innate character on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge,

regulating our practise." ¹⁾ It is evident from this statement that pleasure and pain, though regarded as innate practical principles, are excluded, in Locke's view, from "the principles of knowledge, regulating our practise"; they are only "inclinations of the appetite". They are the common properties of all sensitive beings. Thus, pleasure and pain, in Locke's scheme, are indescribable and indefinable, known only by experience, and are relegated to the department of simple ideas. ²⁾ But 'pleasure and pain' give Locke an opportunity of discussing the question of happiness inductively, beginning with the most common and universal phenomena of all sensible bodies. All life struggles towards happiness men and brutes alike seek to avoid pain and win pleasure. "Things are good, or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good, or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us, or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good." The passions are simple modes of pleasure and pain resulting from various considerations of good and evil. Locke allows no division of mental and bodily pleasure and pain, but speaks of them together as being derived solely from sensation and reflection. (H. U. II. 20.) All this, as we have remarked, is common to the whole animal kingdom, and is, mainly, foreign to Locke's ethical speculation. *Reason* is the great differential between man and the animal kingdom, and that power alone, which is concerned with moral relations, and determines wherein true happiness consists. Here Locke takes the position which Plato announced in his Laws, viz, "Pleasure and Pain are two fountains set flowing by nature, and according to the degree of prudence and moderation with which men draw

¹⁾ I. 3; 3. It is seen in such passages as this how Locke guards himself continually against any overture to the defenders of innate ideas.

²⁾ II. 20; 1. III. 4. 5. 7. 11.

from them, men are happy or otherwise". The only idea which reason takes up out of the sphere of pleasure and pain, is the idea of Happiness, and it remains for the reason to make the idea moral.

Concerning the value of happiness as an end there can be no question. "The highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness . . . But", says Locke, "if we aim directly at happiness, we shall miss it . . . I must have a care I mistake not, for if I prefer a short pleasure to a lasting one, it is plain I cross my own happiness". Both 'Scripture' and reason condemn men, not for seeking pleasure, but for preferring momentary pleasures to permanent ones. We are to watch and examine that we be not deceived by present pleasures. On the question of "true and solid happiness", Locke takes his stand on clean rational grounds, as expressed in his code of natural law or right reason. Here the ethical end is happiness. Where he makes Physics, Ethics and Logic the divisions of philosophy, he defines Ethics to be "the seeking out of those rules and measures of human actions which lead to happiness and the means to practise them. The end of this is not bare speculation, and the knowledge of truth; but right, and a conduct suitable to it". In his "Thoughts concerning Education", the ethical end is virtue; but happiness and virtue, according to Locke, are one. "For God, having by an inseparable connection, joined virtue and public happiness together; and made the practise thereof necessary to the preservation of society, and visibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do; it is no wonder, that every one should not only allow, but recommend and magnify these rules to others, from whose observance of them, he is sure to reap an advantage to himself. He may, out of interest, as well as conviction, cry up that for sacred, which, if once trampled on and profaned, he himself cannot be safe nor secure."¹⁾ The joining of true and

¹⁾ King, Life of Locke. Pp. 308. 116. H. U. I. 3; 6.

solid virtue and happiness, interest and conviction, in the workings of a true ethical system, is, with Locke, one of the demands of right reason, as well as the true expression of his principles of prudence and benevolence. Moreover, the assumption of a moral government by Infinite Wisdom and Goodness harmonizes Virtue and Happiness, by placing Happiness in the practise of Virtue, and in the discharge of duty. "Even in this life", says Locke, "all things rightly considered, the virtuous man is the happiest, and the wicked have the worst part". Add to this the bare possibilities of a future life, and the virtuous man alone can be called happy. (II. 20; 70.) If we ask what is the ethical end, Locke would certainly answer, Virtue; virtue not barely as the science of happiness, but as involving happiness. This is the answer given in his "Thoughts concerning Education", and the only one which his ethical system will allow. Virtue is the science and practise of duty. The practise of virtue is indispensable to happiness, whether public or private. While he who follows the precepts of virtue can make no mistake, and will always be the happiest and most useful member of society, he who pursues immediate happiness not only misses it through errors of judgment, but is in a good way to find misery instead. Happiness must be defined in the terms of virtue. [Virtue is the highest good;] conduct in harmony with nature or right reason in the Stoical sense. Conformity to the law of God, which is comprehended in, Do unto others as you would that men should do unto you, this is virtue, this is happiness, and this is law. Rational prudence and benevolence can never conflict with public or private happiness, without losing the element of rationality, which is only another form of saying that eternal and immutable principles of virtue cannot annihilate themselves. If we ask Locke what the individual is to do in a supposed or an apparent conflict between his own happiness and that of the public; he would tell us that the lower must give way to the higher, that it is irrational that the evident interests

of the many should be sacrificed to the apparent interests of the one.¹⁾ This brings us to the fundamental question of virtue, or "true and solid happiness".

II. *The antinomy between Freedom and Necessity.*
If, thus far, we have rightly understood Locke, his ethical system is not "plunging down the slope of motives into the chasm of necessity", as Professor Webb supposes, but rather, moving in the open plain of rational self government. It is in this plane alone that ethics are possible, for, says Locke, "Moral actions are only those that depend upon the choice of an understanding and free agent". The understanding and free agent which Locke here contemplates, and which is held in view throughout, is not the will, but the man. Locke's view of morality in its relation to freedom finds its echo in Mr. Sidgwick's definition of "ethics as the science or study of what ought to be, so far as this depends upon the voluntary actions of individuals". But he who adopts the terminology of what ought to be, as do Locke and all intuitionists, must develop a doctrine of an understanding and free agent, or fall back upon the terminology of what must be, and encamp with Hobbes and Spinoza, and Miss Martineau who says. "I feel that I am as completely the result of my own nature, and compelled to do what I do, as the needle to point to the north, or the puppet to move according as the string is pulled." "The doctrine of necessity, whether supported by theological, philosophical, or scientific considerations", says Dr. Hartley, "has a tendency to abate all resentment against men. Since all they do against us is by appointment of God, it is rebellion against Him to be offended with them". The feeling of Miss Martineau, and the conclusion of Dr. Hartley are supported by Mr. Buckle, who teaches that all is inflexible necessity, that criminals are in no way responsible for their crimes, and that ethics have no place in the progress of

¹⁾ King, Life of Locke. 308. 116. H. U. 1. 3. 6.

society.¹⁾ Although the entire question is clouded with metaphysical speculations and dubious terminology, it practically presents two phases; man is either an understanding and free agent morally responsible for his personal conduct, or, he is like the puppet, unable to do other than what he does, being governed by a fatal, irresistible necessity. If the latter view is correct, it is difficult to find any rational ground for the existence of ethics and jurisprudence or to make any reply to the transgressor who declares the criminal law to be in itself criminal, and himself innocent. So far as regulative or corrective institutions have any rational grounds for their existence they are comprehended in the nature of man as an understanding and free agent. This seems to be the point of view from which Locke regarded the question of freedom. With him, the question is one between liberty and necessity. His ethical doctrine must fall under one of these two terms. (II. 21; 71, 8.) This is in agreement with his definition, and also with his charge against the doctrine of occasional causes, as presented by Mr. Morris: "This is the hypothesis", says Locke, "that clears doubts and brings us at last to the religion of Hobbes and Spinoza, by revolving all, even the thoughts and will of men, into an irresistible fatal necessity."

Although Locke uniformly proceeds upon the assumption of moral freedom and responsibility, he is fully alive to the metaphysical difficulties which lie at the bottom of the two conflicting views which have so perplexed morality and divinity, "the parts of knowledge that men are most concerned to be clear in". Locke's most significant expression upon this subject is found in one of his letters to Molyneux. "If you will argue for, or against liberty from consequences, I will not undertake to answer you. For I own freely to

¹⁾ King, *Life of Locke*. 310. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics", p. 4. 3d. ed. Quar. Rev. Vol. 195. p. 161. Hartley, "Observations on Man" conclusion of Part. I. Buckle: *Hist. of Civ.* Vol. I. 9. and 163. Locke, *Works* IV. 577.

you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our Maker, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most firmly assent to; and therefore I have long left off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion; that if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it." Again, he remarks, "God having revealed that there shall be a day of judgment, I think that foundation enough to conclude men are free enough to be made answerable for their actions, and to receive according to what they have done; though how man is a free agent, surpasses my explication and comprehension." Here is a veritable antinomy as old as Solomon and the Stoics. "A man's heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps." It is the old conflict between the speculative and practical reason; between metaphysics and common sense.¹⁾ Locke cannot make his theology and physics agree with what he finds in his own consciousness; in the evident demands of morality and in the rational prospect of a future judgment declared by Revelation. But it is clear that Locke holds to both his theology and his morality: he holds as strongly to human freedom as to Divine omnipotence and omniscience, and to the principle of causality. He places himself on the side of freedom though he could see no metaphysical ground for it. Like the Stoics, he holds to moral freedom, in spite of his inability to answer all the objections that might be raised against it. His difficulties are simply metaphysical, and in this aspect he abandons the question of speculative

¹⁾ Locke to Molyneux. Jan. 20. 1693. Works IV. 278. I. 770 H. U. Epistle to the Reader. This antinomy was first clearly stated and discussed by the Stoics. See Heinze: Die Lehre vom Logos. pp. 153—172.

harmony with the remark that he would "be glad to get some light upon the subject". But he holds that the dilemma of the speculative reason is relieved by the practical reason. Locke's constant appeal is to experience and common sense. It is here that he constructs an argument for liberty, in harmony with his system, by placing it in a power of the mind to rule over desires on the one hand, and the will on the other.

III. *Doctrine of Freedom.* We have seen that pleasure and pain are, with Locke, "innate practical principles", operating continually in all sensitive organisms, and that the passions or desires being simple modes of pleasure and pain are indefinable. That which moves desire is happiness, and in all mere sensitive beings desire tends to pass directly into conduct, carrying all before it. In unreasoning, non-reflecting beings the desire determines both mind and will, in its effort for present happiness. But Locke holds that happiness may be true or false, and that he who is guided by passion or desire generally falls upon the latter, and thus entails upon himself misery and disappointment. This mode of conduct does not belong to rational beings; here is no room for morality, no ground for the doctrine of "an understanding and free agent". The whole question, with Locke, resolves itself into rational choice, "a forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation and restraint of our passions, so that our understandings may be free to examine, and reason unbiassed give its judgment. On this, a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends; it is in this that we should employ our chief care and endeavours." (II. 21; 53.)

As on the question of moral distinctions Locke endeavored to avoid their association with the absolute will of the Deity, so, on the question of moral freedom he attempts to escape the Serbonian Bog known as the "Freedom of the Will". "We find in ourselves", says Locke, "a power to begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or

preference of the mind ordering. This power of ordering which the mind has, is called the Will." (II. 21; 5.) Although Locke admits that the terms power, ability, and faculty, are synonymous, he objects to the term "faculties", as misleading one into thinking of real beings or distinct agents in the soul which perform the actions of the understanding and volition. It is an occasion for wrangling and obscurity to speak of the will as a commanding and superior faculty of the soul, or, as determining the inferior faculties. But, we ask, is the will free? "I think the question is not proper", says Locke, "whether the will be free, but whether the man be free." The question is unreasonable, because unintelligible. The phrase "freedom of the Will" is altogether improper, because freedom and will are both powers of mind "and to ask whether the will has freedom, is to ask whether one power has another power, one ability another ability. It is as insignificant to ask whether a man's will be free, as to ask whether his sleep be swift or his virtue square; liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue. Will is nothing but the power of preferring to do, or not to do, while Liberty is the power of doing or not doing that which is preferred by the mind, or a power to act, or not to act, according as the mind directs." The ideas of liberty and necessity arise from the consideration of the extent of the power of the mind over the actions of the man. The two powers, will and liberty, belong to the man, they can be attributed only to a person. By "person", Locke understands a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places. It is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit, and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of law, and of happiness and misery. Here, in the person, all questions center, all powers have their rise. The question of liberty is not a question of the will, but of the man. If we ask what determines the will, Locke replies, "The true and proper answer, is, the mind". If

this were not so, man would not be an understanding and free agent.¹⁾

Locke dismisses the phrase "freedom of will" as idle and meaningless, holding the will to be but a power of the mind, and determined by the rational reflecting person. But what determines the mind? Is the person free? "Concerning a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raised this further question, whether a man be free to will? which I think is what is meant, when it is disputed whether the will be free." In the second edition of his essay Locke changes "the greatest apparent good" for "desire or uneasiness", as that which works most constantly upon the mind to set it on action. But this is a change of phraseology without a change of position, for Locke still holds that the object of uneasiness is happiness or absent good. We are cautioned against confounding will and desire. "It is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind, and consequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire." But Locke confuses his discussion by making a concession to popular phraseology. "Uneasiness", he remarks "is the great motive which works upon the mind to put it in action, which, for shortness sake we will call determining of the will." (II. 21; 29.) What is here done for "shortness sake", must be kept in mind for consistency's sake. Locke has already maintained, on the one hand, that the mind determines the will, and is

¹⁾ II. 21; 5. 8. 14—16, 21, 27, 71, II. 27; 9. 26. C. U. Sec I, "The will itself, how absolute and uncontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the understanding." Cousin is indignant with Locke's position. Locke a donc supprimé la liberté en la refusant à la volonté, et la cherchant ou dans la pensée ou dans la force motrice; il la détruit, et il croit avoir détruit la question même de la liberté. Mais la croyance du genre humain proteste contre l'abolition de la question. Philosophie de Lockc. p. 380. The absurdities of M. Cousin's criticism of Locke have been well handled by Henry Rogers, John Locke, his Character and Philosophy. Edinburgh Review. April 1853. p. 383—454, and Thos. E. Webb, The Intellectualism of Locke. Dublin. 1857.

about to maintain, on the other hand, that the mind has the power of ruling over and determining all motives, all uneasiness, all desire. There is confusion, but no contradiction arising from what he does for shortness' sake. "Although desire bring nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good, absent good may be looked on and considered without desire." (II. 21. 31.) The thought of Locke upon the subject seems to be comprehended in the following passage. "There being in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting, and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action; and so it does for the most part, but not always. For the mind having in the most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty a man has: and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and the faults which we run into, in the conduct of our lives and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due examination. To prevent this, we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is, as I think, improperly, called free will." (II. 21. 47.) Liberty, then, rests in a power of the person to suspend his desires, check the passions, examine all motives with reference to a standard, and determine the will to rational conduct. Here is at once the foundation of freedom, virtue, and happiness; this gives a rational basis to morality and jurisprudence by fixing responsibility in the rational nature of man. Locke holds to this position consistently throughout the entire range of his writings. It is a vital principle in his "Thoughts concerning Education". "The great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a

man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what reason dictates as best, though the appetite lean the other way. He who does not do this, wants the true principle of virtue and industry, and is in danger of never being good for anything. This is not always easy to do, I own, but I am not enquiring the easy way to opinion, but the right way to truth, which they must follow who will deal plainly with their own understandings and their own souls. . . . Nor let anyone say he cannot govern his passions, nor hinder them from breaking out and carrying him into action, for what he can do before a prince or a great man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will." Locke thus sums up his thought on the question. "Though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably in us, yet the satisfaction of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient action, till we have maturely examined whether the particular offered good we then desire, make a part of our real happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The result of our judgment, upon examination, is what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free, if his will were determined by anything but his own desire, guided by his own judgment. This, in short, is what I think of this matter."¹)

What, then, is this liberty of Locke's? Is it liberty at all? Locke does not call it a liberty of indifference or of self suspense, but regards it as the liberty of self-determination. This is the appellation given where he is showing

¹) "Thoughts concerning Education", §§ 33. 31. 38. 45. 136. "Conduct of the Understanding", Sec. 11. 12, 35. H. U. II. 21; 53. 56. Locke to Molyneux. Aug. 23. 1693. Works IV. 292. Letter to Limbourg. July 19. 1701. Lionel S. Beale, one of the foremost physiologists of the present age, says, "It cannot be too distinctly stated that the strictest temperance and purity is as much in accordance with physiological as moral law, and that the yielding to desire, appetite, and passion, is no more to be justified upon physiological and physical than upon moral and religious grounds." The Moral Question. p. 47.

the relations of punishment, freedom, and responsibility. (IV. 17; 4.) And this accords with his position throughout, for liberty belongs not to will, but to man, to the rational man alone. One "could not be free if his will were determined by anything, but his own desire guided by his own judgment." (II. 21; 71.) 'As every rational man has the power of suspending his desires to examine the good and evil as far as the weight of the question requires, and make his judgment, volition, and conduct harmonize with right reason, he is an understanding and free agent. . . . For though his will be always determined by that which is judged good by his understanding, yet it excuses him not; because, by a too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil; . . . The eternal law and nature of things must not be altered to comply with his ill ordered choice.' (II. 21; 56.) "It is not a fault, but the perfection of our nature to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair examination." (II. 21; 47.) "Is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon the man's self? If to break loose from the conduct of reason be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only free men; but yet, I think, that nobody would choose to be mad for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already." (II. 21; 50.) Locke allows a large place for the rational exercise of the imagination in his doctrine of happiness and liberty. In judging of the good or the evil of what we are about to do, and in the choosing of a remote good as an end to be pursued, the future, as well as the immediate present, is to be within our view. Good intention cannot alter the effects of a false judgment. He only is truly rational who projects his examination into the future along the line of proposed action, to seek the results of such conduct. Immediate and remote consequences are to be considered in the examination. "Objects near our view are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size that are more remote; yet that which is future will certainly come to be

present." (II. 21; 63.) Such is Locke's doctrine of liberty; such is the support which he furnishes to his proposition; "Moral actions are only those which depend upon the choice of an understanding and free agent". This is neither the argument of the sensualists nor of the necessitarians. Neither the one nor the other can interpose an umpire of such moment between desire and action. These phases of thought must maintain some such position as that held by Hume; "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them".¹⁾ But Locke's position is diametrically opposed to this; that which Hume makes slave, Locke makes ruler, and that which Hume makes ruler, Locke makes slave. Locke's position here, is that of Plato and Kant. "Reason is given as the governor of the will, by its sway to constitute it good", or, taking the words of Locke himself, "The freedom of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law, by which he is to govern himself". (Gov. II. 63.)

IV. *Doctrine of Education*: Locke's doctrine of education has an intimate relation with his theory of happiness, virtue, and freedom. The ethical end, and the subjective possibility of its realization, are supplemented by the means to be employed in its attainment. Locke's theory of education is based on his theory of virtue. His fundamental thought concerning virtue, happiness, freedom and education, is definitely expressed. "Every man", he says "must some day or other be trusted to himself, and his own conduct; and he that is a good, a virtuous, and an able man, must be made so within. For he that hath not a mastery over his own inclinations, he that knows not how to resist the importunity of present pleasure and pain, for the sake of what reason tells him is fit to be done, wants the true principle of virtue and industry, and is in danger never to be good for anything". (Ed. §§ 42. 45.)

¹⁾ Treatise of Human nature. II. 3; 3. compare. III. 1; 1.

When Locke places true and solid happiness as well as true and rational liberty in the power of the person to rule over his desires and determine his will to rational ends, he opens up to education a definite and important mission. The need of a rational system of education was forced upon Locke, not only by his own moral and political theory, but by the wretched condition into which education had fallen in his day. Locke's view of the prevailing education is almost as dismal as Hobbes' view of human nature. The bare communication of knowledge and the logic of the schools had no moral value. It was supposed that manners could be corrected by Logic; "The remedy reached not the evil but became a part of it". Education, instead of forming men, deformed them. "By ignoring the true and rational foundations of virtue, happiness, and liberty, it comes to pass that we see men abandon themselves to the most brutish, vile, irrational, exorbitant actions, during the whole current of a wild or dissolute life, without any check, or the least appearance of any reflection". Children are not taught to reflect, their minds are not duly opened; they are from infancy let loose to sensual pleasures until they lose the use and exercise of reflection. They come to manhood as servants, not of their rational, but of their animal natures. Careless parents, and negligent inspectors of the education of children, have much to answer for in these cases. Thus men come to love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil, or they applaud virtue with all men of right reason, while they themselves follow the vicious and irrational. "Fashion, and the common opinion having settled wrong notions, and education and custom ill habits, the just values of things are misplaced, and the palates of men corrupted." But can such a general condition of society be remedied? Can a nation return to the principles of virtue which are those of right reason? Locke answers in the affirmative. "Bad systems may be supplanted by good systems; bad habits by good habits. Pains should be taken to rectify abuses; and contrary habits change our

pleasures, and give a relish to that which is necessary or conducive to our happiness. This, every one must confess he can do, and when happiness is lost and misery overtakes him, he will confess that he did amiss in neglecting it, and condemn himself for it." The general principle upon which Locke argues is the same as that accredited to Pythagoras; "Choose that course of action which is best, and custom will soon render it the most agreeable." The reverse of this principle is what Locke attacks.¹⁾

The purpose of the publication of his "Thoughts concerning Education", is clearly indicated. Recognising the prevalence of the early corruption of youth, and how the errors of education propagate themselves through all the parts and stations of life, Locke makes his special appeal to the higher classes, and for this reason; "if those of that rank are once set right, they will quickly bring all the rest into order". "It is a shame", he says, "for those that have time and the means to attain knowledge, to want any helps or assistance for the improvement of the understanding that are to be got."²⁾ Locke had a profound faith in the power of moral earnestness. "Believe it", he says, "the labours of not many persons of understanding, diligence, and disinterestedness, backed by the laws, may stem the current of the most potent wickedness." (Fox Bourne. II. 321.) He endeavors to impress upon all, that the education of children is so much the duty and concern of parents, and the welfare and prosperity of the nation is so dependent upon it, that it becomes the duty of each to set his helping hand

¹⁾ Education §§ 42. 45. King, Life of Locke, p. 356. 360, Additions intended to have been made to the Essay concerning Human Understanding. II. 21. Compare II. 21; 69. and C. U. Sec. I.

²⁾ C. U. XII. For a stronger statement see Essay concerning Human Understanding. IV. 20; 6. The common objection that 'Locke was interested in the education of Gentlemen only, must be dismissed. In 1697 he addressed a remarkable document to the English Government on founding working schools for the children of the poor. This, he thought would aid in stemming the rising tide of pauperism and immorality. Locke urged his scheme in behalf of religion, morality and industry. Fox Bourne. II. 383.

to promote every where that way of training the youth that is likeliest to produce virtuous, useful, and able men in their distinct callings. "Every gentleman may be supposed to desire for his son these four things, Virtue, Wisdom, Breeding, and Learning." These, according to Locke, are placed in their order of value, and represent the results which he hoped might be attained by education. The simplest elements of virtue, are piety, truth, and good nature. Here virtue takes its true position in Locke's system: "I place virtue as the first and most necessary of those endowments that belong to a man or a gentleman, as absolutely requisite to make him valued and beloved by others, acceptable or tolerable to himself. Without that, I think he will be happy neither in this nor the other world. As the foundation of this, there ought very early to be imprinted on his mind a true notion of God. . . . T'is Virtue then, direct virtue", says Locke, "which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in Education. All other considerations and accomplishments should give way and be postponed to this". Here we come upon ground already discussed under the conception of a law of man's rational nature. The whole force of Locke's work on education is to fix the principles of morality in the minds and lives of the young. Piety, prudence, benevolence, equity, and love, are the five principles upon which Locke's education and instruction center, and which he seeks to develop and strengthen in the mind. Locke differs radically from Bacon, and all who hold that the main purpose of education is instruction or information. He takes his stand upon the Socratic basis, and maintains that the chief purpose in education is the training and discipline of the mind. To make a whole man, developed in all his parts, fitted for self-control, "loving all the forms of virtue", this is the aim of Locke's education. The leading thought of Locke's system, is of the man, not of the scholar, education before instruction, utility conditioned by virtue and wisdom. Thus Locke replies to the Earl of Peterborough, "I must beg

leave to own that I differ from your Lordship in what you propose; your Lordship would have a thorough scholar, and I think it not much matter whether he be a great scholar or no; if he but understand Latin well, and have a general scheme of the sciences, I think that enough; but I would have him well bred, well tempered, a man that having been conversant with the world and amongst men, would have great application in observing the humor and genius of your son, and omit nothing that might help to form his mind, and dispose him to virtue, knowledge, and industry. This I look upon as the great business of a tutor; this is putting life into his pupil, which, when he has got, masters of all kinds are easily to be had."¹) Locke's conception of Education as the development of the powers of the understanding is in strict consistency with his theory of knowledge as the mind's perception of the agreement or disagreement of its ideas, and bears with special force upon his theory of judgment. It is the percipient mind that is to be educated and developed in all its powers. It is the mind that is to determine all, and this again is in harmony with his doctrine of freedom. Therefore the main thing in education is an increase of the powers and activity of the mind, not an enlargement of its possessions. It is to this end that Locke attaches great value to the study of mathematics.

V. *Education as a means to Virtue and Happiness as ends.* "To make a man virtuous", says Locke, "three

¹) "Thoughts concerning Education". Dedication and §§ 134—6. 70. 45. 75. 90. Conduct of the Understanding. Sec. XIX. XII. VII. XX. King, Life of Locke. p. 4. compare Ed. §§ 75. 147. The following quotation fairly represents the misrepresentation which Locke has received at the hands of many of his critics. In speaking of Alexander Bain M. Compayré says; "For him, as for Locke, there are not, properly speaking, intellectual forces independent of the facts which succeed one another in the consciousness. Consequently there is not an education of the faculties. . . . For Mr. Bain, as for Locke, the best education is that which places items of knowledge side by side in the mind, which accumulates facts there, but not that which seeks to enkindle in the soul a flame of intelligence". Hist. of Pedagogy. p. 561. Eng. Tr.

things are necessary. 1st. Natural parts and disposition. 2d. Precepts and Instruction. 3d. Use and Practise, which is able better to correct the first, and improve the latter. (King, *Life of Locke* p. 116.) This appears to be a correct division of Locke's Thoughts concerning Education.

The first division, "*Natural parts and disposition*", introduces the question of the place of education in morals. The extraordinary power which the Jesuits attributed to education was taken up, generally, by the philosophers of the seventeenth century. Bacon essentially endorsed their method and conceded their claims. In his *Novum Organon* Lib. I. Aphor. CXXII, he says of his own method "Our method of scientific discovery almost equalizes intellects, and does not leave much to their peculiar excellence, since it accomplishes everything by means of most sure rules and demonstrations". Descartes seems to have a double ground for equalising the intellectual world. In his "*Discours sur la Methode*", Part I, he holds that "the power of judging aright, and of distinguishing truth from error, which is, properly, what is called good sense or reason, is, by nature, equal in all men. In the "*Règles pour la direction de l'Esprit*", Cousin's Ed. Vol. XI, 248, we read, "Now, throughout this treatise, we shall endeavor to trace with accuracy and to smooth the road which shall conduct man to the discovery of truth, so that the most ordinary mind, provided it is profoundly penetrated with this method, shall see that truth is no more denied to it than to any other, and that if it is ignorant of anything it is from no want either of sense or capacity". Comenius, in the *Pansophiae Prodomus*, is equally sanguine concerning his own method. "Therefore", he says "after many workings and tossings of my thoughts, by reducing everything to the immoveable laws of nature, I lighted upon my *Didactica Magna*, which shows the art of readily and solidly teaching all men all things". But Leibniz, according to M. Compayré, (*Hist. of Ped.* p. 136), caps the climax of enthusiasm, "Give me for a few years the direction of education, and I agree to trans-

form the world". So far as we have observed, Locke has been regarded as among those who overestimate the power and value of education, by making it omnipotent in shaping knowledge and conduct. But, in appealing to Locke himself we find that this judgment must undergo important modifications. As in his *Essay*, Locke starts out with expressions apparently out of harmony with other parts of his work, so here, in the first paragraphs of his *Thoughts concerning Education*, we find a position seemingly inconsistent with its later development. Wherein, upon last analysis, consists the difference between men. Is it in natural parts and disposition, or in education? If education can account for the differences among men, we may depend upon education for the elimination of them. Locke seems to maintain this doctrine in the following positions. "Men's happiness, or misery, is for the most part, of their own making." "I confess there are some men's constitutions of body and mind so vigorous and so well framed by nature that they need not much assistance from others; but by the strength of their natural genius they are, from their cradles, carried towards what is excellent, and, by the privilege of this happy constitution, are able to do wonders. But examples of this kind are but few; and I think I may say of all the men one meets with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education. 'Tis that which makes the great difference in mankind. I imagine the minds of children as easily turned this way or that way as water itself, and a little child is only as white paper or wax to be moulded and fashioned as one pleases. Thus the difference found in the manners and abilities of men is owing more to their education than to anything else."¹⁾ This seems to overrule natural parts and disposition as a first consideration in education. But Locke none the less emphasizes the necessity of taking account of the great differences in the natural parts and

¹⁾ Education. §§ 1. 2. 32. 217. H. U. II. 21; 69.

dispositions of children. "We must grant that there will be children found of all tempers, some are confident, others modest, tractable, or obstinate, curious or careless, quick or slow. There are not more differences in men's faces, and the outward lineaments of their bodies, than there are in the makes and tempers of their minds. The peculiar physiognomy of the mind is most discernible in children, and its natural make and prevailing inclinations are to be considered. We must not hope wholly to change their original tempers without spoiling them. . . . God has stamped certain characters upon men's minds, which, like their shapes, may perhaps be a little mended; but can hardly be totally altered and transformed into the contrary. But of this be sure, after all is done, the bias will always hang on that side that nature first placed it." Locke does not think of virtue, wisdom and breeding as artificial elements inculcated into the mind of the young. These parts and dispositions are in the mind as innate powers, to be developed by exercise. Here Locke differs from Comenius, who declared, "Now it is certain that there is nothing in the understanding that was not first in the senses. Consequently, children need examples and things which they can see. Our effort should be to correctly represent objects to the senses."¹) Comenius encamps with Bacon, Locke with the Greeks, yet there is no moral difference between Locke and Comenius, as both aim at producing the virtuous man. The root difference is, that while Comenius is inclined to make virtue an addition by education, Locke, like Pestalozzi, finds the seeds of virtue in the soul, and would arrange the conditions under which they are to unfold, and to reach their end.²) There is no conflict between these two views. Locke is dogmatic, neither in his claims for education nor for nature. He is simply recognizing the true places of the two great powers which operate in the formation of character; natural parts and disposition, on the one hand, and education, in

¹) Compayré Hist. of Ped. p. 133. Eng. Trans.

²) Education. §§ 87. 101. 102. 66.

its broadest sense, on the other. There are these two points of view, and both are to be recognised. If we examine Locke carefully on the natural differences of men we shall find them to be relatively unimportant by nature, and that education, used in its broadest sense, explains most of the variations. In this he agrees with Descartes. But Locke has no such faith in education or method as that expressed by Leibniz. Locke centers his faith in education primarily in this; man is endowed with a power of acting according to the dictates of right reason, and a correct system of education will have as an end the preservation, development, and enthronement of this power in man, through precept and practise. The result of Locke's thought upon this question of relative values is well expressed in the following. "Among men of equal education there is a great inequality of parts, and the woods of America as well as the schools of Athens produce men of several abilities in the same kind. Though this be so, yet I imagine most men come very short of what they might attain unto in their several degrees, by a neglect of their understandings. . . . The difference so observable in men's understandings and parts does not arise so much from the natural faculties as acquired habits. . . . Nature gives us but the seeds, education must do the rest."¹)

Precepts and Instruction. It would be irrelevant to the work in hand to enter upon an analysis of Locke's scheme of instruction, or to catalogue the subject-matter of teaching. So much as immediately concerns our subject has been given. (II. 5.) The scheme of virtue which Locke presents in his five rules is faithfully adhered to and enforced in his educational system. All children are to learn by heart the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, the Ten Commandments and the Catechism. After this, the remaining moral rules of the Bible may be learned. (Ed. § 159.) "The gentleman's proper calling, is, the service of his country, and so is most properly concerned in moral and political knowledge; and thus the

¹) Conduct of the Understanding. Secs. II. IV. VI.

studies which more immediately belong to his calling are those which treat of virtues and vices, of civil society and the arts of government, and will take in also law and history." (Works IV. 600.) We may notice here what has often been regarded as a serious defect in Locke's system of education. We refer to the meagre value which Locke placed upon poetry and music. Mr. St. John complains that Locke "knows nothing of that visionary sweetness which descends like dew through the periods of Plato, and literally ravishes the imagination".¹⁾ The poetic vein is to be suppressed. "It is very seldom seen that any one discovers mines of gold or silver in Parnassus. It is a pleasant air, but a barren soil." (Ed. § 174.) Of music, Locke says "It wastes so much of a young man's time to gain but a moderate skill in it, and engages often in such odd company, that amongst all those things that ever came into the list of accomplishments I think I may give it the last place". (Ed. § 197.) Fénelon condemned music because it "furnishes diversions that are poisonous". While we recognize that Locke's ethics, like his system of education, upon which he depended largely for practical support, does not give a leading place to the emotions, we believe that the chilliness of his system has been overrated. It is to be remembered that in his doctrine of virtue the law of love is the vital principle, and that while Locke develops this law through the intellectual nature of man, the rational sphere of sentiment is preserved, while sentimentalism is rigidly excluded. We may also notice that although Shakespeare and Milton belong to the century of Locke, this century was not the century of Shakespeare and Milton. It was an age of petty rhymers, of political satires and lampoons; an age in which Dryden, Cowley, Waller and Butler were the most conspicuous of their class. Nor was music in a better condition in this period. Poetry and music occupy a very different position in England to-day than in the seventeenth century.

¹⁾ Locke's Philosophical Works Edited by St. John. Vol. I. p. 19.

It is not to be overlooked that in the paragraph which counsels death to the poetic vein, Locke recommends reading "the excellent Greek and Roman poets". In his "Thoughts concerning Reading and Study" he takes the same ground with Plato, Aristotle and Quintilian, commending the reading of poetical writings, especially dramatic, if they be free from profanity, obscenity, and what corrupts good manners. (Works IV. 604.)

Use and Practise. These are fundamental terms in practical education. Through them we come to habit, the stronghold of the moral life of man. The use which Locke makes of habit is to establish the subjective principle of all virtue. What is this principle? Locke replies, "The great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this: That a man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what reason directs, as best, though the appetite lean the other way." (Ed. 333. 338.) This, as we have seen, is to be gained in part by a development of the intellectual nature. But here Locke brings in a new power, the power of habit, which is to assist to the same end. "Habits work more constantly, and with greater facility than reason, which when we have most need of it, is seldom fairly consulted, and more rarely obeyed." (Ed. 110.) Habits, then, are prescribed by the rational mind in self defence; a result of the knowledge which a man has of himself; a device for the preservation of liberty and happiness. The principles of virtue are to be made habits woven into the very principles of one's nature. (Ed. 142.) These principles of conduct which are to be made habits by exercise, extend to the whole man, and include all that is necessary to insure his true happiness and freedom in life. "We are born with faculties and powers capable of almost anything, such at least as would carry us farther than can be easily imagined, but it is only the exercise of these powers that gives us ability and skill in anything, and leads us towards perfection. Witness the legs of a dancing master, the fingers of a musi-

cian, the astonishing actions of rope dancers and tumblers. As with the body, so with the mind, practise makes it what it is. It is practise alone that brings the powers of the mind, as well as those of the body, to their perfection." (C. U. IV.) True education consists in repressing the evil, and stimulating the virtuous tendencies of the child's nature. The latter are to be drawn out into the principles of virtue, and by exercise fixed into habits of thought and conduct. How is all this to be accomplished? We must keep children to the practise of those principles which are to become habits, by kind words and gentle admonitions, rather than by harsh rebukes and chidings. Care must also be taken not to endeavor to settle too many habits at once, and so perfect none (Ed. 66.) But it is to example and authority that Locke looks for the wise direction of education. Of all the ways whereby children are to be instructed and their manners formed, the easiest and most efficacious is example. Nothing sinks so gently and so deep into men's minds. Children are good observers, and fair reasoners. They are never to be given deceitful and eluding answers. They easily perceive when they are slighted or deceived, and quickly learn the trick of neglect, dissimulation, and falsehood. Truth should never be encroached upon. "They are travellers newly arrived in a strange country, of which they know nothing; we should therefore make conscience not to mislead them. . . . This is not alone for children, but is to be made use of so long as the child is under tuition. Character, and common sense are the first requisites in a teacher. Encourage curiosity and enquiry. . . . Curiosity in children is but an appetite after knowledge, the great instrument nature has provided to remove that ignorance which they were born with."¹⁾ Character furnishes a basis of authority. In its last analysis character is true authority, for it alone gives rise to reverence in the minds of children. The two elements of reverence are love and fear, "the great principles whereby one may always have hold upon the child to turn his mind

¹⁾ Education. §§ 82. 118. 120. 131. 152. 122.

to the ways of virtue and honor." Love is to be the comprehensive and controlling principle in education. The father is to be the companion of his children, and make them sensible of his care and love. Teachers are to be thoroughly devoted to their work and pupils, making their interest felt. Locke abolishes the rod from education, declaring that "such a slavish discipline makes a slavish temper." Punishment is to be held as a last resort, and, even as such, is of doubtful value. To govern a child by corporal pleasure and pain is immoral. Locke is indignant with this method. "What is it, to govern his actions, and direct his conduct by such motives as these? What is it, I say, but to cherish that principle in him which it is our business to root out and destroy. To make a good, a wise, and a virtuous man, it is fit he should learn to cross his appetite, and deny his inclination, whenever his *reason* advises the contrary and his duty requires it". In this way Locke points out how parents and teachers lay the foundations of those future vices which cannot be avoided but by curbing desires and accustoming children early to submit to reason. Corporal rewards and punishments are to give place to esteem and disgrace, a sense of honour, out of which come courage and fortitude, "the quiet possession of a man's self, and an undisturbed doing his duty, whatever evil besets or danger lies in his way."¹⁾

Chapter V.

Institutional Ethics.²⁾

I. The centre of Locke's institutional theory is found in his two Essays on Government. These Essays are in reply to the patriarchal theory of Filmer, and the absolute

¹⁾ Education. §§ 56—58. 99. 48. 50. 100. 115. 119.

²⁾ "The Constitution of Carolina", 1669, is not here considered. The points of disagreement between it and Locke's political essays are so numerous and striking as to suggest that Locke's part in its composition was simply that of an amanuensis. That Locke's political and religious views

theory of Hobbes. Locke opposes Filmer and Hobbes in two different ways, first by showing their theories to be both unreasonable and unhistorical; secondly, by constructing a theory of government upon the cardinal principles of freedom and equality. His conception of politics is thus expressed, "True politics I look on as a *part of moral philosophy*, which is nothing but the art of conducting men right in society, and supporting a community among its neighbours".¹⁾ He agrees with Augustine that whatever is just, equitable, and truly obligatory in the *lex temporalis*, or civil law, is that part of *lex aeterna*, or ethics, which, for the public good, is enforced by penalties. Thus the state is itself, under law eternal. It is an institution of trust, not an absolutism. By acting against, or refusing to act with *lex aeterna*, it annihilates itself. "Hence, it is evident," says Locke, "that absolute monarchy, which by some

underwent a violent change, or even an important modification, after the year 1660, is untenable in view of his "Reflections on the Roman Commonwealth", 1660, and "Essay on Toleration 1666. In the "Constitution of Carolina", Articles 23. 62. 68. 70. 72. 78. 79. 80. 77. and 55. are more or less in conflict with his political doctrine. The entire document is cramped and impractical.

¹⁾ King, Life of Locke, p. 8. It is noticeable that Locke holds with Plato and Aristotle that politics are but a branch of ethics. It is often held that "Aristotle made the capital advance of separating ethics from politics"; so says F. Pollock in his History of the Science of Politics, p. 7. But this is certainly a two-fold error. First, the separation of ethics and politics may be regarded as a retreat, rather than as an advance. Secondly, Aristotle by no means allowed the separation of ethics and politics. Zeller says, "er hält an der Verbindung der Ethik mit der Politik". (Grund. d. Gesch. d. Griech. Phil. p. 26.) Aristotle is in essential agreement with Plato in making ethics the foundation of politics. J. C. Bluntschli is certainly right in saying, "Machiavelli was the first to separate politics from morals, and to proclaim political practise independent of moral prescription". (Lalor's Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Art. Politics.) It is difficult to understand how, according to common sense, a separation of politics and ethics is to be effected, for, as Professor Sidgwick remarks, "We cannot determine what government ought to do, without considering what private persons may be expected to do, and what they may be expected to do, will, to some extent at least, depend on what it is thought to be their duty to do." (Princip. of Polit. Econ. 2d. Ed. p. 583.

men is accounted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society; and so can be no form of civil government at all."

II. *The state of nature.* Locke's doctrine of the state of nature stands in striking contrast to that of Hobbes. It is a state, not of fear, but of peace, of equality, and of liberty. Freedom and equality are cardinal principles in Locke's political philosophy. The social life of man is placed in the foreground. God made man a social being, and put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination, to drive him into society, as well, as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy society. Men are the workmanship and the servants of a common Master who is infinitely wise. They are furnished with common faculties, and sharing one community of nature they are all equal. Locke explains that by his doctrine of equality he has respect only to the jurisdiction of one man over another, and that every man has an equal right to his freedom. Children are not born in this state of equality, but they are born to it.¹⁾

"But", says Locke, "the state of nature is not a state of license; the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind that no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions." This law of reason is no limitation of personal liberty, for "law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitation, as the direction of a free intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no further than is for the public good. That ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. So that, however it may be mistaken, the

¹⁾ Gov. II. 5. 6. 77. 54—55. H. U. III. 1; 1. "Kein Mensch wird 'frei geboren', sondern nur mit einer Anlage zur Freiheit, diese Anlage will aber entwickelt sein. Jene Kenntniss und Achtung des Gesetzes, jene Selbstbeherrschung welche die wahre Freiheit bedingen, sind nie ohne Mühe, selten ohne Fehlgriffe, und stets nur durch Übung zu erlangen." Roscher, Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, p. 163.

end of law is, not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom". If this law teaches that God gave the earth to man, and that in the beginning the goods of the earth were common to all, it also teaches that every man is under obligations to assist every other man so far as his own safety is not involved. In the state of nature, all having equal rights and equal duties, what one may do lawfully, every one has a right to do. (Gov. II. 6. 57.)

| A state of war arises, when one, transgressing the law of nature, thereby declares himself to live by another rule than that of common reason and equality/ In this case, and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and to be the executor of the law of nature. He who violently threatens one's life or invades one's property, puts himself into a state of war, acts by another rule than that of reason, and may be killed as a wild beast. Whether one is in a state of nature, or a member of political society, if there is no opportunity to appeal to a common judge, he has a right to execute the law of nature upon those who put themselves in a state of war against him. Locke is careful to emphasize the distinction between the state of nature and the state of war. "They are", he says, "as distinct as a state of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction." (Gov. II. 8. 16—19.) Locke's view of human nature and the state of nature does homage to the Golden Age of the Greeks, and the Paradise of the Book of Genesis.

It is in this connection that the strength of Locke's "Natural Law" fully reveals itself, and it is here that the overestimate becomes most apparent. It is maintained by Locke that the law of nature is so evident and universal that a system of punishment may be built directly upon it, and that the violation of one of its precepts is equal to a violation of positive law. "The law of nature is as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and studier of that law as the positive laws of commonwealths, nay, pos-

sibly plainer, as much as reason is easier to be understood than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men put into words." (Gov. II. 12.) In speaking of "that great law of nature; Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by him shall man's blood be shed", Locke remarks, "Cain was so fully convinced that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his brother he cried out, 'Every one that findeth me shall slay me', so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind". (Gov. II. 11.) In such passages as these Locke advocates a doctrine hardly distinguishable from that which he so strenuously opposes in the first book of his Essay concerning Human Understanding. The force of Locke's reasoning in this connection is not easily resisted, nor has political philosophy ever succeeded in explaining away the hypothesis of a state and law of nature antecedent to the positive laws of civil society. The separation of legal and illegal from right and wrong, is a separation in words, not in fundamental ideas, and the crotchet of the lawyers that in instituting government and laws right and wrong are created and defined is as pure a piece of artifice as was ever nursed by the Ancient Priesthood. "The law of nature" is by no means an idle phrase with Locke. He would apply its principles rigidly to the problems of life, and establish through it the institution of property, independent of any action of the state. It is in the state of nature, and under the laws of nature that property has its origin, and property rights are defined.

III. *Doctrine of property.* Property in things is founded in Labor. Every man by nature has property in his own person, and a right to life and liberty within the law of nature. Property rights are inherent in persons. God gave the earth to man in common, and commanded labour. Subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion over it, are joined together; labour is man's only title to the earth. The labour of his body, the work of his hands, are his. Whatsoever he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in he hath mixed his labour with,

and joined it to something of his own, and thereby makes it his property, and excludes the rights of others therein, where there is enough and as good left for others. (II. 27.) This evidently does not mean that there was an original community of property, for, in the Lockean sense, property has no existence antecedent to its acquisition by human labor. In Locke's view, bare occupation gives no title to property. Labour alone can give the title. "He who with the power to labour, finds himself upon the earth, has thereby no right to anything upon the earth except through labour." But, if labor gives property rights, it also gives property limits. "As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property." (II. 32. 38.) "It is easy to understand", says Locke, "how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common things of nature, and how the spending of it upon one's uses bound it." (II. 51.) Property in things is limited by use, or the capacity of the individual as a social and intellectual being. Locke lays great stress upon the loss and robbery implied in waste. Nature has set the measure of property by the extent of men's labour and the conveniences of life. (II. 36.) He holds that if this is observed, the rights of individuals cannot conflict, as the labor and necessities of each can demand but a small fraction of the whole. With Locke, labor is not only the foundation of property rights, and the measure of rightful possession, it is also the source of all values. "It is not strange that the property of labour should be able to overbalance the community of land, for it is labour, indeed, that puts the difference of value on everything. . . . Consider the difference between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common without any husbandry upon it, and one will find that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the lives of men, nine tenths are the effects

of labour. For whatever bread is worth more than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk than leaves, skins, or moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property." (II. 40. 45.)

But man may not hold property in man. Slavery is excluded by the law of nature. No man may dispose of his freedom to another, nor subject another to his own absolute will. "Slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that it is hardly to be conceived that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it." (Gov. I. 1.) Locke was the first Englishman who struck directly at the foundations of slavery, and it is noteworthy that his spirit of argument was taken up more than one hundred years later in abolishing property in man in the British Empire.

Locke finds in the natural limitations of property rights, by labor and use, a place for the origin of money, and the extension of personal possessions beyond personal needs. The cardinal evil with Locke is in allowing anything to go to waste, or to be uselessly expended. He who barter plums that would soon rot for nuts which would last for a year, or the nuts for a piece of metall, or a shell, or a diamond, invades not the rights of others, nor wastes the common bounty. The exceeding of the bounds of just property do not lie in the largeness of one's possessions, but in the perishing of anything uselessly in it. Thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life. (II. 46. 47.) Thus men, finding out something which had the value and use of money among their neighbours, began at once to enlarge their possessions. In

this way, measured for the most part by labor, was tacitly recognized, and in this recognition was also included, the inequality of possessions both in land and goods.

The next stage in the development of the doctrine of property involves its transmission. The social relations, in a state of nature, are those between man and wife, parent and child, master and servant. The duties and rights are here prescribed by the law of nature. Locke objects to Filmer's term, "paternal power", and substitutes for it "parental power", declaring that the father, according to reason and the positive law of God, has no more right over the children than the mother. Children are to honor both father and mother as parents by whom they were begotten, nurtured, and defended. By their dependence upon their parents, and the right they have to be maintained and provided for by the parents, children have a right of inheritance to the property of their parents. It is natural law that all the children share equally in the inheritance. Locke attacks the law of primogeniture, which still obtains in England. The first-born has not a sole or peculiar right by any law of God and nature, the younger children having an equal title with him, founded on the right that they all have to maintenance, support, and comfort from their parents, and on nothing else. On the other hand, if a son die without issue, the father has a right in nature to possess his goods, and inherit his estate.¹⁾

In natural law, unjust force or conquest gives no right, places the conquered under no moral obligation. No promise, obtained by force or fraud is binding. "Who doubts, but the Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of that country, may justly cast off the Turkish yoke, which they have so long groaned under, whenever they have an opportunity to do it." Locke argues that in a case of just war, though the power of the conqueror extends to absolute possession over the persons of those who

¹⁾ Gov. I. 88. 95. 62. II. 190.

Curtis, Locke's Ethical Philosophy.

put themselves in a state of war, it does not extend beyond these persons to their estates. The reason is, that the innocent are not to be made to suffer with the guilty. A violent father may forfeit his own life, but that does not involve his children in his guilt or destruction. The case comes to this; "The conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received; the children have a title to their father's estate for subsistence, the wife also may have a title either by labour or compact. What must be done in this case? I answer, the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as may be, should be preserved, it follows that if there be not enough fully to satisfy both, viz, for the conquerors, losses, and the children's maintenance, he that hath and to spare, must remit something of his full satisfaction, and give way to the pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to perish without it." (Gov. II. 176. 186—192. 207.)

In the year 1776, two events brought Locke's political doctrines into prominence. The one was the founding of the American Republic upon the cardinal principles of freedom, equality, and inalienable rights; the other was the publication of the "Wealth of Nations", which made the doctrine of Labor its basal principle, and demanded, in the interests of all, the free economic action of each. Hallam, (Lit. of Eu. IV. 371.), says, "the chapter on property would be sufficient, if all Locke's other writings had perished, to leave him a high name in philosophy". Hobbes had indeed suggested that labor is the foundation of property, but Locke was the first to place the doctrine in a clear light.¹⁾ It

¹⁾ De Cive XIII. 14. Lev. II. 24. "plenty dependeth, next to God's favour, merely on the labor and industrie of men". See also Roscher: Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie. 18te Auflage. p. 110. Note (6). Sir William Petty: "On Taxes", 1679, says, "Labor is the father and active principle of wealth, as lands are the mother. Land and labor together are the sources of all wealth". Roscher says of Locke, "Er ist der Gegner alles volkswirtschaftlichen Aberglaubens! Während aber die meisten früheren Nationalökonomien nur ganz einzelne, praktische Fragen erörterten, warf sich

has been questioned by James Mill whether Adam Smith had as correct an understanding of the doctrine as did Locke, and M'Culloch asserts, "he all but established the fundamental principle which lies at the bottom of the science of wealth". While Grotius and Pufendorf based property upon occupation, Locke held that labor only, gives a just title. Later, Montesquieu and Bentham declared property to be a creation of civil law, failing to distinguish between the creation of a thing and its protection. Locke declared the whole institution of property to be antecedent to, and independent of, civil society, and that civil law can no more create property than it can create a loaf of bread, land or labor. While holding that it is the function of government to protect property, he holds that government is so far from originating property, that it is itself the creation of property and for property. If civil law can create property, and property rights, then it can dispense with them, can deprive individuals of them with the same freedom that it created them. "Private property is goods acquired by virtue of the laws: the law alone constitutes property", cried Mirabeau to the Constituent Assembly, and Robespierre echoed, "Property is the right that each citizen has to the enjoyment of that portion of goods guaranteed to him by the laws". But this was corrected by the Constitutional Assembly, in 1793, in the famous Declaration of Rights, which propounds the rational guarantee of property, as well as a just recognition of its existence, independent of civil society. Article 16 declares, "The right of property is the right belonging to every citizen of using and disposing as he likes of his goods, his revenues, of the fruits of his labor and his industry", and Article 19, "No one shall be deprived of the

Locke mit besonderem Interesse auf die allgemeinsten theoretischen Grundlagen der Wissenschaft, auf diejenigen Theile der Nationalökonomie, welche zunächst an das Gebiet der Psychologie angrenzen, und er behandelt sie mit überraschender Vollständigkeit. Locke ist der früheste grosse Systematiker der Volkswirtschaft, und insofern ein würdiger Vorläufer von Adam Smith." Zur Gesch. der englischen Volkswirtschaftslehre. p. 93.

least portion of his property without his consent, except when public necessity, legally proven, evidently demands it, and then only on condition of just compensation previously made". This is Locke's doctrine. It rests upon a two-fold basis, first, that every man has property in his person and faculties, and secondly, that every man has property in the product of his faculties, whether mental or physical. Such rights, every legitimate government must guarantee. The ethical force of Locke's doctrine of property is also two-fold; first, property rights are natural rights, moral rights which are not to be interfered with by government, secondly, that these property rights are conditioned only by the positive duties which each man owes to every other man, as man.

- IV. *Doctrine of the State.* "Political power I take to be the right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good." (II. 3.) Locke, here, uses the term *property* in a broad sense. "Lives, liberties, and estates, I call by the general name property." (II. 123.) Thus Locke holds that government has no other end than the preservation of property. (II. 94.) The only reason for leaving the state of nature and entering into political society, is, for the mutual preservation of life, liberty, and estates. (II. 123—131.) The extent of the functions of government under this definition may be seen by a reference to Locke's "Poor Law Reform Bill". The increase of pauperism during the seven barren years, 1692—99, demanded relief. "The cause of this increase in pauperism", says Locke, "is neither scarcity of provisions, nor want of employment, but the relaxation of discipline, and the corruption of manners. The first step in assisting the poor ought to be a restraint of their debauchery by the suppression of superfluous brandy shops and unnescessary alehouses". Locke here strikes at the root

evil in society, and the main cause of pauperism. He considers the suppression of any traffic which becomes a public evil, whether it be a brandy shop, or a monopoly, within the jurisdiction of the state. "Enjoyers of monopolies", he says, "are no better than harpies and horse-leeches (i. e.), devourers of the people's properties, and ravishers of their liberties." Locke would extend the functions of government as far as his definition of property and the end *salus populi suprema lex*, demand.¹⁾ We have seen that in a state of nature every one has a right to punish the breach of its law. The state of nature is a sort of Theocracy, as each man is to execute the law as he is answerable to the Judge of all men. Locke says, "I easily grant that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature, which must certainly be great." But he maintains that "a state of nature is preferable to absolute monarchy, where one man has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases". (II. 13. 21.) In reply to the question, when was there ever such a state of nature, Locke has several answers, and finally affirms that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so till, by their own consent, they make themselves members of some politic society. (II. 15.)

The origin of every legitimate political society, according

¹⁾ Fox Bourne. *Life of Locke*. II. 378. 319. Locke's contribution to Political Science, so far as we know, has not received special treatment. If he anticipated Adam Smith in the true doctrine of wealth, he also anticipated Bentham by announcing the correct nature of interest. The moral bearings of political questions, were carefully estimated by Locke. Take, for instance, the question of establishing the rate of interest by law. Locke declares such an attempt both fruitless and demoralizing. You may as rationally hope to set a fixed rate upon the hire of houses or ships, as of money. Such a measure is immoral, because it refuses to the borrower the right of protecting his property, and encourages perjury in the lender. As an illustration of the vicious results of unjust interference on the part of government in free contract and exchange, Locke cites the remark of a member of an honest, sober class of men, "God forbid that a custom-house oath should be a sin." *Works* II. 48.

to Locke, is by compact.¹⁾ Every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic, under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every-one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it. (II. 97.) The difference between the compact of Hobbes and of Locke is the difference between absolute monarchy and popular government. It is the object of Locke to preserve the individual; that of Hobbes to extinguish him. On the other hand, Locke differs as widely from the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau, which endeavors to extend the will of the majority to the actual will of all, a doctrine which Locke repudiated, and is, as Locke remarks, "like Cato's coming into the theatre only to go out again." "Chacun se donnant à tous, ne se donne à personne," said Rousseau. Not so, said Locke. For the consent of the majority, shall, in reason, be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual. (II. 98.) It is a capital error to associate the compact of Locke with that of either Hobbes or Rousseau. Locke did not confuse the law of nature with the Contract Relation, as did Rousseau, nor did he fall into the error of Hobbes, by maintaining that law had

¹⁾ In treating of the family, Locke shows how, from the authority of fathers, different forms of monarchy might naturally arise. Parents are under an obligation to preserve, nourish and educate their children, and children are under obligations to honor their parents. "We are born free, as we are born rational, not that we have actually the exercise of either. Age, which brings one, brings with it the other, too. And thus we see how natural freedom, and subjection to parents, may consist together, and are both founded on the same principle." Locke also recognizes the strong hold the father has upon his children through his power of distributing his property as he pleases. „Thus, the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change, become the politic monarchs of them too; and as they chanced to live long and leave able and worthy heirs, for several successions, or otherwise; so they laid the foundations for hereditary or elective kingdoms under several constitutions or manners, according as chance, continuance, or occasions happened to mould them." Locke finds here a sort of compact. "Thus it was easy and almost natural for children, by a tacit and scarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father's authority and government." Gov. II. 55. 56.

its origin in contract. He combats both these theories by maintaining that Contract is the beginning of Political Society, and that the positive laws of political society are only so far just as they conform to natural laws, which are in their nature eternal and immutable. In matter of fact, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau represent three distinct theories, while that of Locke alone, is undogmatic, and guarded by many judicious observations. Hobbes founds his entire system upon a contract, without giving any reason why man, as man, should keep the contract, or any contract. There is absolutely no basis in human nature given by Hobbes, for either his Natural Law or his Leviathan. "Government", says Locke, "is everywhere antecedent to records, and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation of civil society. But to deny a state of nature is like denying that the armies of Salmanasser and Xerxes were ever children because we hear little of them till they were men, and embodied in armies." The point upon which Locke here insists, is this; That which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of free men capable, of a majority, to unite, and incorporate into a society. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could, give a beginning to any lawful government in the world. (II. 29.) "As far as we have any light from history", says Locke, "we have a right to conclude that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people." He argues his position at length, illustrating from Israel, Rome, Venice, Peru, Mexico, and the North American Indians.¹⁾ Locke's

¹⁾ The doctrine maintained by Locke on the origin of civil society, the position of the family, and the nature of contract, is, in substance supported by Sir Henry Maine, in his "Early Law and Customs", chap. VII. on the family side, and in his "Ancient Law", chap V. on the contract side. Both Locke and Maine agree, that the verdict of a careful investigation of history, is, that "It is Contract", which lies at the foundation of civil society, and that all "social order arises from the free agreement of Individuals". "Neither Ancient Law, nor any other source of evidence", says Maine, "discloses to us society entirely destitute of the conception

doctrine of contract is not that mechanical and unhistoric form that is so often credited to him. He argues it on the grounds of history and reason. Locke assumes a state of nature as a necessary postulate for political speculation, and he argues that men in this state are rational and social, free and equal beings. He also maintains that antecedent to the institution of political society and the framing of its code, there existed these same powers potentially in man; that a natural code is given in the natural reason of man to govern his conduct, and that no institution of civil society can lawfully disturb, or be framed apart from this natural and eternal code, but must, in reason and in justice, be founded upon it. The principles which fall under this view are few and simple, and although they are the basal elements in any civil society, and the regulative principles of all just legislation, they leave room for the greatest diversity of form, as they manifest themselves in different times and peoples. Civil governments have their origin and existence only in the human will, they are the products of men, and like all human products they may be well or ill constructed.

The constitution of government, as given by Locke, differs radically from that of Hobbes on the one hand, and Rousseau on the other. The government is placed in the hands of the majority, and its divisions are three-fold. This three-fold division of government, hinted at by Aristotle, but generally credited to Montesquieu, was worked out for modern politics by Locke. That this division of political power stands in strict consistency with his doctrine of the state of nature, and is suggested by it, is evident from the following passage. "In the state of nature there are many things wanting. *Firstly*, there wants an established, settled,

of Contract." Ancient Law. p. 312. It is strange that Locke should be regarded as in harmony with those who make the origins of religion, law and language, artificial and arbitrary. He declares; "Languages were made not by rules of art; but by accident and the common use of the people." Ed. 168. Religion, language and law are natural, not artificial products.

known law, *secondly*, a known and indifferent judge. *Thirdly*, there often wants a power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution." (II. 124. 126.) Here we have the prospect of the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive functions of Government. Let us notice also, that Locke declares these to be the conditions of the full protection of the lives, liberties, and estates of the citizens of a commonwealth, and that Chapter VII of his second Essay on Government bears the title, "Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Commonwealth." The legislative is the supreme power. The people alone can appoint the form of the Commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands it shall be. (II. 141.) The executive and federative powers are ministerial, and subordinate to the legislative. (II. 153.) But the legislative or supreme power is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws, or abroad, to prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure the community from inroad or invasion. (II. 131.) The power of the legislative is limited in every commonwealth, and in every form of government by the appointing society, and the laws of God and nature. The laws of commonwealths are only so far right as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted. (II. 12.) The legislature is to govern equitably by promulgated, established laws, which are designed for no other end than the good of the people. It must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people, or transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have placed it. (II. 142.) The executive and federative powers, although subordinate to the legislative, are distinct powers with different functions. Though these two powers be distinct in themselves, they

are hardly to be separated absolutely in practise, inasmuch as both rest ultimately upon the force of the community for their exercise, and because an absolute separation might, under certain circumstances, cause disorder and ruin. There must be a basis of harmony, as well as of responsibility, and these are found in society at large and in the common good. (II. 145—148.) But in all moderate and well framed governments the legislative and executive powers must be in distinct hands. (II. 159. 151. 152.)

The dissolution of government occurs whenever the ends of government are betrayed by those to whom these trusts have been committed. When a prince sets up his own arbitrary will in the place of the laws, hinders the work of the legislature, changes electors or ways of election, brings the people into subjection to a foreign power, neglects or abandons his duty, or, when the legislative acts contrary to its trusts, there real government ends, and the people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative and appointing a new executive. Who are to be the judges of these breaches of trust? Locke replies; *the people*. To the objection that this would make governments of short duration, and lay a ferment for rebellion, Locke replies that the effect is quite the contrary. "People are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest." In view of the history of governments the trouble is, to remedy abuses when they are publicly known, and an occasion is offered for their correction. In such a supposition Locke has been justified by the subsequent history of his country, where many of the abuses, such as those touching parliamentary reform, representation, laws, finances, and racial disabilities, have been only partly adjusted in the present century. Bacon was no visionary when he thought he saw, "Nolumus leges Angliae mutari, imprinted in the hearts of all the people". (Advice to Villars. II. 2.) Locke continues his defence, smiting Hobbism with vigorous blows. "When a people are made miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill-usage of arbitrary power, cry

up their governors as much as you will for sons of Jupiter, let them be sacred and divine, descended or authorized from heaven, give them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people, generally ill-treated and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them." (II. 224.) In support of this, Locke makes an appeal to the histories of all sorts of government. So far from being a cause of ferment and rebellion, this doctrine of the right of resistance is the greatest preventative of it, since it holds princes and legislators to their duty, as the people have always the power of deposing them and electing their successors. The question whether civil disorders oftenest arise from the wantonness and disobedience of the people, or from the insolence of rulers, desiring to get and exercise absolute power over their people, Locke leaves to impartial history to determine. But Locke does not view civil questions solely from the stand-point of the people. Government, in its various departments, is not to be interfered with in the discharge of its duty. The person or faction which invades the rights of just governments or seeks to overthrow them is to be regarded as "the common enemy and pest of mankind, and is to be treated accordingly". Considering, especially the histories of England, France, and the United States, we may concur in the judgment of Blakey that no treatise ancient or modern, has had so great an influence on civilized states.¹⁾

V. *Doctrine of Punishment.* Locke's doctrine of punishment, both in the state of nature and in political society, is, "each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like".²⁾ Here Locke is in harmony with the best thought on the subject. The ends of

¹⁾ History of Political Literature. Vol. II. 170.

²⁾ Gov. II. 12. Compare, King. Life of Locke. 302. 303.

punishment are, the reformation of the criminal, and the preservation of others from the commission of crime. But, in Book II. 28; 8—29 of his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Locke has entered into the philosophy of punishment in such a way that his doctrine of Personal Identity has been often classed among the vagaries of metaphysicians. M. Cousin, as usual, thinks Locke is annihilating the foundations of morality.¹⁾ Locke's treatment of the subject is certainly far from being luminous, but his main thought seems sufficiently clear. It has been generally overlooked that Locke is here speaking of the moral personality, and discussing it under the general subject of relations. The essence of his doctrine is contained in this; "punishment is annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness", by which Locke means that the only moral object of reward and punishment is a conscious personality. But what is the relation between consciousness and personality? The answer to this question will give Locke's position. "Person", says Locke, "is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, as the same thinking thing, in different times and places, which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking". (II. 27; 9.) Again, and in this lies the real force of his position, "Person is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit, and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law". (II. 27; 6.) "Person", is to be taken strictly in a forensic sense, as indicating that element in man which constitutes him a moral, responsible being, amenable to law. It is that which appropriates actions and their merit, that which makes man a true object of rewards and punishments. How an unconscious being can be a responsible subject of moral or civil law, and an object of rewards and punishments for actions committed, of which he has no knowledge, we, with Locke, fail to understand. But notice the cautious application which Locke

¹⁾ "Philosophie de Locke". p. 144—149.

makes of his doctrine. "For though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did, yet human judicatures justly punish him, because the fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of, but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him." (II. 27; 22.) Locke afterwards explains that drunkenness being a voluntary defect, want of consciousness ought not to be presented in favor of the drunkard; but frenzy and insanity being involuntary, and misfortunes, not faults, have a right to that plea when they are real. All that human justice can do, says Locke, is to distinguish between what is real and what is counterfeit in such cases.¹⁾ Locke's position on the question is that of rational Jurisprudence. "Human laws do not punish the mad-man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the mad-man did." (II. 27. 13.) Thus we find in the German Penal Code; "An act is not punishable, when the person, at the time of doing it, was in a state of unconsciousness or disease of mind by which a free determination of the will was excluded." The same position is maintained by Dr. Mandsley, in his "Responsibility in Mental Disease". (3d. Ed. p. 110.) This seems to be the substance of Locke's doctrine of personal identity. Considering the place in which it appears, the use of *person* as a mere forensic term, and the application which Locke makes of his theory, it seems strange that it should ever have been regarded as any other than a legal or moral doctrine of responsibility.

VI. *Doctrine of the Church.* According to Locke, religion, like politics, is a part of ethics. "Moral philosophy in my sense", he says, "comprehends religion too, or a man's whole duty". Christ is, to Locke, not only the greatest moral

¹⁾ Letters, Locke to Molyneux. Dec. 23. 1693. May 26. 1694.

philosopher the world has known, but also the greatest religious teacher. Locke finds in Him morality and religion made one. "Jesus Christ, bringing by revelation from heaven the true religion to mankind, reunited these two again, religion and morality, as the inseparable parts of the worship of God."¹⁾ We have already referred to Locke's Theology and Christology in our chapter on the foundations of Ethics. Here we need only speak of the Church as an institution. Locke tells us that the proper matter of the laws of this society are of three sorts, *credenda*, *cultus religiosus*, and *moralia*.²⁾

Credenda, or matters of faith and opinion, which terminate in the understanding, are affairs of private judgment. Each one has the supreme and absolute authority of judging for himself.³⁾ Christ appealed to individuals, not to Churches. We have the example of Christ, the Scriptures, and Reason; thus each individual is responsible for his own opinions respecting Christianity. Reason and faith are not to be separated. Hume remarks, "Locke seems to have been the first Christian who ventured openly to assert that faith was nothing but a species of reason, that religion was only a branch of philosophy, and that a chain of arguments similar to that which established any truth in politics, morals, and physics, was always employed in discovering all the principles of theology, natural and revealed."⁴⁾ Locke holds there is nothing in Christianity contrary to reason, although there are some things above reason, such as the resurrection of the dead. Concerning miracles, Locke does not deny that God can, or hath, performed them, but he holds, that reason must be the judge of what is a miracle, and what not; that miracles are to be judged by the doctrine, and not the doctrine by the miracles, and that 'it will always

¹⁾ King, Life of Locke. pp. 107. 5. 287.

²⁾ King, Life of Locke. p. 301.

³⁾ Letter on Toleration. I. Letter to Collins. Oct. 1. 1703. to R. King. Sept. 27. 1704.

⁴⁾ Treatise of Human Nature. Vol. II. §88. Ed. by Green.

be a great miracle that God should alter the course of natural things, to overthrow the principles of knowledge and understanding in a man, by setting up anything to be received by him as a truth to which his own reason cannot assent.¹⁾ "Had God intended that none but the learned scribe, the disputer or wise of this world should be Christians, or be saved, their religion should have been prepared for them, filled with speculations and niceties, obscure terms and abstract notions." Articles of faith should be few, and comprehensive. Many articles of faith create heresies and schisms in the Church, and end in the ruin of religion; if schisms and heresies were traced up to their original causes, it would be found that they have sprung chiefly from multiplying articles of faith, and narrowing the bottom of religion by clogging it with creeds, and catechisms, and endless niceties.²⁾ The purpose of Locke's "Reasonableness of Christianity" seems to be two-fold. *First*, to shew that the entire system is a rational system, as against the Deism of Herbert, Hobbes, and Blount. *Secondly*, to show what constitutes a rational and saving faith, as against the interminable catechisms and creeds of the various sects. The question of Justification is reduced to this. "Faith only, and inward sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God. . . . All who believe that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah, the Son of God, are saved."³⁾ This belief involves, or assumes, repentance. The heathen may be saved by repentance and by following the light or law of nature. Without faith, repentance, and obedience, there is no salvation. We do not know that Locke was ever branded as an Atheist, but Mr. Edwards, one of Locke's critics, thought a Socinian an Atheist, or one that favors the cause of Atheism, and that Locke was "all over Socinianized". Kuno Fischer comes

¹⁾ Fox Bourne, Life of Locke. I. 463—464. This appears to be the text of Hume's Essay on Miracles.

²⁾ Essay concerning Toleration. Fox Bourne, Life of Locke. I. 168.

³⁾ First Letter concerning Toleration.

almost as near giving Locke the character of a Materialist and Deist. "In der Psychologie wird er nahezu ein Materialist; in der Theologie ein Deist. Er legt dort den Keim der materialistischen Seelenlehre, den die französische Philosophie aufnimmt, er bildet hier den Baconischen Deismus fort, und eröffnet die Reihe der englischen Deisten." (Franz Baco. p. 418.) The materialism of Locke hangs upon a very slender thread. His position is thus stated by himself; "Though it be most highly probable that the soul is immaterial, yet, upon my principles, it cannot be demonstrated; because it is not impossible to God's omnipotency, if he pleases, to bestow upon some parcels of matter, disposed as he sees fit, the faculty of thinking."¹⁾ Locke maintains that "All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without philosophical proof of the soul's immateriality". He denies to philosophy the right to dogmatize on the essence of the soul, unless it can furnish evidence that produces knowledge. "We know there is something in us that has the power to think, but we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what kind of substance the Almighty has been pleased to give that power."²⁾ Materialism, with Locke, is not so much as a probability. Of his Deism little need be said. The only ground for the charge, is, that he maintained the Reasonableness of Christianity.³⁾ Deism, in England, took its rise in Hobbes and Herbert, and was placed in open antagonism to Christianity

¹⁾ Works I. 758. H. U. IV. 3. 6. II. 23. 15.

²⁾ H. U. II. 1. 10. II. 23. 5. II. 27. 27.

³⁾ Tholuck remarks that the English and Hollandish Aufklärung shows the following fundamental ideas. 1. Der gesunde Menschenverstand (die Vernunft), die höchste Norm der Entscheidung in Glaubenssachen. 2. Die natürliche Religion, der wesentliche Inhalt aller Religionen, auch der christlichen. 3. Die Moral, der wesentliche Inhalt der natürlichen Religion. 4. Die Schrift, eine historische, unzuverlässige Quelle, und die Inspiration der Schrift eine grundlose Voraussetzung. (Gesch. des Rationalismus. Erste Abtheilung, p. 98.) In our view Locke holds to the first three points, but rejects and combats the last, which is really the distinguishing feature of Deism.

by Charles Blount. The five innate principles of Herbert, which were taken up by Blount and others to show the uselessness of Christianity, if contrasted with Locke's five principles, which show the usefulness of Christianity, will place the matter in the clearest light. Moreover, it is to be remarked, that the arguments and the method with which Locke assailed the Deism of the seventeenth century, were taken up by Bishop Butler with great effect in the Deistic controversy of the eighteenth century. Butler settled the Deistic controversy, says Mill, by proving conclusively that whatever arguments are used against the Scriptures as a Divine Revelation, applied still more sharply against the Deists, or, that the difficulties of Deism were greater than those of Christianity.¹⁾ If we remember that the vital issue in the Deistic controversy was respecting the reasonableness of Christianity, we may easily estimate the contribution of Locke from his Essay on this subject. Yet, to deny that much of Locke's writing stimulated the movement, would be to overlook a part, at least, of his service to a truly rational religious belief.

Cultus religiosus. Locke's polity is as simple as his creed. Hobbes pleaded for his Leviathan that there was nothing in it against Episcopacy. In the work of Locke there is nothing for Episcopacy. In his "Defence of Nonconformity", Locke reviews the pretensions of the Church of England as voiced by Stillingfleet in 1680. Locke denies the right to coin opinions into truth, and make them current by authority; he holds that Anabaptists and Quakers have as much Divine authority as the Church of England, and he shows, by a review of Ecclesiastical history that the polity and ritualism of the Established Church have no foundation in the times of the Apostles and Evangelists.²⁾ No man is born a member of any Church. He is always at liberty to quietly withdraw from any communion into which

¹⁾ Autobiography. p. 38—40.

²⁾ King, Life of Locke. 346—358.

Curtis, Locke's Ethical Philosophy.

he has entered. A Church is defined to be "a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such a manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls." (1st Tol.) A Church is not instituted for the exercising of an external pomp, nor for the obtaining of ecclesiastical dominion, nor for the exercising of compulsive force, but for the regulating of men's lives according to the rules of virtue or piety. Yet the Church must have a government, or certain rules, to regulate the society. The making of these rules belongs to the members of the Church itself. Locke endorses the Independent or Congregational system of government, and limits the authority of the Church to the enforcement of the few simple rules which are necessary to preserve the life and peace of this society. The execution of these laws may be delegated to a few of the oldest, wisest, and most upright men in the society. Any member of the Society who, after repeated admonitions, continues to violate its rules, may be expelled from the communion. "This, I think, is the whole end, latitude, and extent of ecclesiastical power and religious society."¹) The separation of Church and State is absolute. The only possible ground of the interference of the State in matters of religion, is, when public peace and order are assailed. A religion that teaches immorality, slavery of mind and body, opposes itself to the public good, to the foundations of society and religion, and must be regulated by the people in the interests of all. That a Church should ever become a persecuting power, or even a civil power, is contrary to the teaching of Christ. Locke has written upon these questions with tiresome fullness. Logically expressed, the sum of his argument against persecutions, is this; "Grant that innocent error in religious matters is possible; grant that a man is bound to speak the truth as to his religious beliefs; it follows that perse-

¹) King, *Life of Locke*. p. 301.

cution implies punishment of men for an action which the punisher admits to be virtuous." Locke would abolish persecution from both civil and ecclesiastical polity. According to his view it has no place whatever among rational beings. The jurisdiction of a State extends no further than the preservation of the lives, liberties, and estates of its citizens, through the working of a rational system of prosecution and punishment of crimes and misdemeanors.

Moralia, or the right management of our actions in respect to ourselves and others, is the third and most important function of the Church. Locke's ethical conception of religion was early developed. In his "Reflections on the Roman Commonwealth", written not later than 1660, he admires the wisdom of Numa, who prevented all factions and divisions in the Church by the institution of only two articles of faith; the first, that the Gods were the authors of all good to mankind; and the second, that to merit this good the Gods were to be worshipped, in which worship, the chief of all was to be innocent, good, and just¹) As morality is the proper concern and business of all mankind, so is it of the Church in particular. Here the interest of Church and State are one. 'A good life, in which consists, not the least part of religion and true piety, concerns also the civil government, and in it lies the safety, both of men's souls, and of the commonwealth. The practise of principles which influence the will and manners of men, are best stated in the Gospel of Christ, and it is the mission of His Church to follow its Master by promulgating and practising these principles'. Locke does not reduce religion to ethics, but raises ethics to the dignity and obligation of a religion which is at once rational and beneficial to all. "The Christian religion which we profess", says Locke, "is not a rational science to furnish speculation to the brain, or discourse to the tongue, but a rule of righteousness to influence our lives. We hold it to be an indispensable duty for all

¹) Fox Bourne, Life of Locke. Vol. I. p. 149.

Christians to maintain love and charity in the diversity of contrary opinions. We each of us think it our duty to propagate the doctrine and practise of universal good will and obedience, in all places and on all occasions, as God shall give us opportunity."¹) With Locke, both religion and morality center in the one imperative principle, love. "Love of man, and love of truth for truth's sake, are the roots which support all true religion and morality." Thus, in the "Rules of a Society for improvement in useful knowledge, and for the promoting of Truth and Christian Charity", the conditions of membership are affirmative answers to the following; "Whether he loves all men, of what profession or religion soever. Whether he thinks no person ought to be harmed in his body, name or goods, for mere speculative opinions, or his external way of worship. Whether he loves and seeks truth for truth's sake, and will endeavour impartially to find and receive it himself, and to communicate it to others." With Locke, religion is a reasonable and practical matter, and the Church an organisation of earnest religious men, practising and promulgating the precepts of Christianity. The aim of the Church is, to realise the kingdom of God among men as it is manifested in the person and doctrine of Jesus Christ. His creed was Christocentric, and he followed it through his long life with unswerving devotion. He saw in Christ, the Saviour of men, and he strove to draw attention from the pompous and empty ritualism, the narrow and exclusive doctrines of the Church of England, to Him "who went about doing good", and whose gospel, unhampered by ecclesiastical trappings, is the wisdom and power of God.

¹) „Idea of a Pure Christian Community." King, *Life of Locke*. 276—278. "I lay it down as a principle of Christianity, that the right and only way to saving orthodoxy, is the sincere and steady purpose of a good life" p. 284.

Chapter VI.

Conclusion.

I. Locke's system has been charged with glaring contradictions and his institutionalism with ultra-individualism. We have endeavored to point out some misconceptions of Locke's doctrine on which such charges rest, and to indicate the trend of his thought on the main questions of ethics. His Essay has been called 'the Philosopher's Bible'. This is true, not only in the sense that subsequent philosophy has been very largely drawn from it, but also, that the most divergent and extraordinary theories have claimed its support. That Locke's terminology is often obscure, that his phraseology is sometimes misleading, that the division of his work is not strictly systematic and that he now and then introduces matter apparently irrelevant to his main positions, we think no one can deny. But such blemishes are by no means peculiar to the work of Locke. They belong to all great speculative systems, or at least are accredited to them by those who feel and know more or less than their authors. Locke's genius was, not of system and dogmatism like that of Hobbes and Kant, but of observation and investigation like that of Aristotle and Bacon. It has often been remarked that no philosopher since Aristotle has made and recorded so many valuable observations, or given so great a stimulus to human thought. But more remarkable still seem the diversity of his gifts, and the many departments of knowledge in which he gained distinction. As a philosopher, represented by his Essay concerning Human Understanding, he stands in the foremost rank of the few who are recognised as master minds. As an Educationalist, both practical and theoretical, his position is not less eminent and influential. As a Theologian, his numerous works on religion give him a high place, and his commentaries on the Epist-

les of Paul, though Watts represents Locke in Heaven repenting of his work, were regarded by Bishop Law as introducing a new method, by which Biblical Science was greatly advanced. As a Physician, he won the highest praise of the "great Sydenham", who dedicated to Locke his work on the "History and Cure of Acute Diseases". He was consulted by the King, and he saved the life of the first Lord Shaftesbury, by performing a difficult operation. As a Political Economist, he anticipated Adam Smith, and advanced the science, then in its cradle, more than any other writer of his century. As a Financier his writings upon money won the highest praise from Leibniz, and another declares: "He cleared the subject of trade and commerce, and the uses of money, from mystery". In 1695 he was foremost in placing the credit and coinage of England upon a solid basis, and in saving the country from grave troubles. As a Publicist, his second Treatise of Government probably had more influence on succeeding political history than any other one work. This, in connection with his labor on the Act of Toleration of 1689, and against the Censorship of the Press, places him in the foremost rank of the defenders of political liberty. As a Philologist, "the immortal third book" of his Essay gives him the title, "father of the modern science of language". Indeed, there was scarcely any department of life and knowledge to which Locke did not contribute. He was one of the founders of the Royal Society; one of the original proprietors of the Bank of England, and for twenty four years Commissioner of Appeals. Perhaps no philosopher could more truly say, "*Humani nil a me alienum puto*".

In this diversity of gifts and services we discover a unity of thought and purpose. The same consistency may be claimed for his ethical doctrines that all recognize in his life, although it would be hard to give a satisfactory solution to all difficulties presented in his writings. As with the Stoics, there is a certain fondness of placing opposites over against each other. But if we take Ueberweg's advice

concerning Aristotle's principle of Excluded Middle to avoid confusing the terms *contrary* and *contradictory*, the contradictions in Locke's system, for the most part at least, disappear. It would be difficult to give a Key to Locke's entire system, but we may suggest that a correct understanding of his *Individualism* reveals the unity of his moral teaching. Q
Locke is undoubtedly correct in finding the unit of society, and consequently of all sociology, in the Individual rather than in the Family. In this he places his system squarely upon a psychological basis, first of all giving attention to the nature and limitations of the human mind. In the individual is contained, potentially, all institutionalism. Man is a rational, social, religious and political being. School and Family, Church and State, are the institutional expressions of human nature and are not artificial products. Locke views man in these different relations, but never allows one to forget that they are only various aspects of one and the same subject and are all comprehended in one moral system. Here he may be compared with the Stoics, and be contrasted with Adam Smith, who, taking the same comprehensive view of moral philosophy developed a political system of selfishness, apparently in conflict with his ethical system of sympathy. But these results are merely statical. As in the analysis of human nature we come upon the kernel which contains potentially all institutionalism, so we come upon that thought which alone is able to unify and vitalize all. The concept of God is the moral dynamic in human society. In God, Locke finds with the Stoics the *λόγοι συνεκτατικοί*. He regards the thought of God as a natural, formal, necessary and transcendental principle at the root of human nature and institutions, and consistently declares that the denial of it dissolves all. This fundamental certainty of the reason, alone gives a sufficient explanation and sanction to the principles of morality.

The objections urged against Locke's Individualism, are for the most part removed by his psychological standpoint, and particularly by his doctrine of education which he every-

where considers of primary importance to national welfare, the object of education being to make the individual a moral force in society. The chief weakness of modern democracy, is, that it has no sound, vigorous, educational system at its basis. The constant danger in the rule of all, is, that none is able to rule himself. The moral and intellectual training which Locke placed at the bottom of his institutionalism, has been left, in most cases, to take care of itself, while an effort has been made to realize his superstructure apart from its natural and necessary foundations. Locke, like Fichte, looked for the moral regeneration of his country, primarily, neither through politics nor religion, but through education.

II. To trace the influence of Locke on the ethical philosophy since his time would be to write the greater part of the history of English ethics for the last two hundred years. We can here only indicate two or three directions that were taken by ethical speculation immediately succeeding Locke. Locke's relation to Utilitarian and Associational Ethics is not so close as has generally been supposed. Locke did not advance a step beyond Hobbes in the Association theory. His exposition of this phenomenon of the mind is perhaps inferior to that given by Hobbes. Locke regards Association as a "disease of the mind", and a fruitful source of mistake and error. "By this one easy and unheeded miscarriage of the understanding, sandy and loose foundations become infallible principles, that will not suffer themselves to be touched or questioned; such unnatural connections become by custom as natural to the mind as sun and light." Locke sees nothing more in the association of ideas than the confusion of ideas which fills men's "heads with false views, and their reasonings with false consequences".¹⁾ According to Locke, one might as well

¹⁾ Conduct of the Understanding, Sec. XLI. H. U. II. 33. Louis Ferri. "La Psychologie de l'Association depuis Hobbes jusqu'à nos jours" holds that "Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley made little advance on Aristotle

explore Bedlam, for laws of the sound mind, as the phenomena of the Association of ideas. Nor does Locke appear to make any use of principles peculiar to Evolutional ethics, although he anticipates Darwinian views by holding that the boundaries of species are not immovable; that nature does not keep the supposed and real species distinct and entire but occasionally produces objects which fall into no recognized class.¹⁾

With regard to Utilitarianism it is difficult to define Locke's position, simply because it is hard to say just what is Utilitarianism. The general end, happiness, Locke accepts, but he insists on defining happiness in the terms of virtue. The gross egoistic hedonism of Hobbes, and the basing of moral distinctions on the utility of actions to produce happiness, Locke sharply repudiates. It is well known that Paley drew very largely upon Locke in constructing his system. But so far as he is Utilitarian, he leaves Locke, and anticipates Bentham, whose moral theory is the farthest removed from that of Locke. On the other hand, when Paley says, "Virtue is doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness", he makes a concession to scholastic forms, which Locke combatted. The form of Utilitarianism which Mill took up from Cumberland and made current, while it emphasized universal benevolence, and the greatest good of the greatest number involving the greatest good of the individual, made no advance upon the theories of Cumberland and Locke, and really failed to recognize the fundamental optimism which gives the strong support to the

and Augustine, and that Hartley and Hume are the real fathers of the modern doctrine". Although Locke was the first to invent the term "Association of Ideas", making it the title of one of his chapters, H. U. II. 33, he did not, as do all Associationalists or those who reduce all knowledge to experience, make the association of ideas the means of developing the higher powers, but, regarded it as a disease of the mind to be remedied.

¹⁾ H. U. III. 6; 23. 27. 30. 36. 9; II. 11; 24.

benevolent theory. Locke's connection with Utilitarianism is exceedingly meager, and to place him in its ranks, requires a very vigorous misinterpretation of his doctrine. In his discussions of natural laws and precepts, the appeal is never to utility, but always to the imperative rule of right, although Locke recognises that obedience to the rule of right involves happiness, public and private. Even Locke's essays on money, are based, not on utility, but on the abstract idea that robbery is wrong.

The fifth chapter of Professor Jodl's excellent "*Geschichte der Ethik*" bears the title: "Locke, and his opponents, Clarke and Shaftesbury". This seems to us to be an error, as neither Clarke nor Shaftesbury, so far as we know, defined his positions with relation to Locke, but, on the other hand, both argue, to a considerable extent, on the lines laid down by Locke. Although Shaftesbury, in one place, assails what he supposes to be Locke's doctrine of virtue, his assault, as we have shown, is quite unintelligible and misdirected.¹⁾ Both Clarke and Shaftesbury are to be classed with Locke as opponents of Hobbes. Clarke took up Locke's supposition of making ethics a science like that of mathematics, and carried the supposition into absurdities from which Locke is free. The lines followed show Clarke to be strongly under the influence of Locke, as viz, in the demonstration of the existence of God; reason as ethical faculty; the immutability of moral distinctions; the reasonableness of Christianity; the obligations of rules of righteousness, independent of rewards and punishments, Piety, Equity, Benevolence, and Sobriety. While Locke sums up all in the law of Love, Clarke comprehends them under the

¹⁾ In speaking of Locke's successors we do not mean to imply either that they were, or were not, consciously, his disciples, but that they worked, more or less, upon those lines which we conceive to have been laid down by Locke. We maintain that the objections urged against Locke by Butler on Identity, Shaftesbury on Virtue, and Price on Locke's failure to account for all our ideas by sensation and reflection, are objections which have no valid foundation, as we think we have shown.

principle of Equity. "Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable for another to do for me, that, by the same judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I, in the like case, should do for him." It is evident that this is no improvement upon what Locke had laid down in his principle of Love, while it introduces a difficulty which Locke escaped, viz, the difficulty contained in the words, "that I, in the like case, should do for him". This principle destroys itself, and demonstrative morality along with it, for until we are as much informed of the character and circumstances of another as we are of our own, however much we may applaud the rule as rational, or self evident, it remains a dead law in the code of practical morality. This constitutes one of Locke's objections to mathematical morality, and indicates a point where Locke demands the assistance of common sense, or practical judgment. In other main points Clarke stands in essential harmony with Locke. His "fitness and unfitness of the application of different things or different relations, one to another", fall under Locke's relations, and agreement or disagreement of ideas or propositions. He maintains, with Locke, that it is as natural, and morally speaking, as necessary, that the will should be determined in every action by the reason of the thing and the right of the case, as it is natural, and, absolutely speaking, necessary, that the understanding should submit to a demonstrative truth.

Dugald Stewart, in his "Dissertation", has associated Shaftesbury with Locke, and, we believe, with justice, at least in the main features of his practical philosophy. Certainly he showed the generous spirit and love of liberty of his master. The doctrines of a moral sense and benevolence were taken up by Shaftesbury with less vigor than they had been presented by More and Cumberland, while the system which is generally ascribed to him was first put in form by Hutcheson. The special service rendered by Shaftesbury was in the field of aesthetics. Although Shaftesbury seems to draw on More and Cumberland more abundantly

than on any other of his predecessors, he agrees with Locke on many important points. With Locke, he makes psychological experience the basis of ethics, and his psychology is not different from that of Locke, though, on the whole, less clear. For instance, where Locke recognises two classes of affections, natural and unnatural, Shaftesbury illogically makes three, natural, self, and unnatural affections, as if self affections were not natural. He more than agrees with Locke in the following statement, "The height of virtue must be owing to the belief of a God", but he fails to make any ethical use of this position in his doctrine of obligation, as does Locke. The result is, that while he agrees with Locke that happiness and virtue are one, and that there can be no conflict between self-interest and the public interest, his system presents no other obligation than self-interest, and no other end than individual happiness. Again, while languidly agreeing with Locke that moral distinctions have their foundations in nature; that the rational affections must triumph over the sensual, in order to virtue, and that moral principles may be mathematically demonstrated, he does not follow any one of these points with vigour. Shaftesbury's theory of conscience is the same as that presented by Locke. He makes no claim for an independent or distinct faculty. His "moral sense" is a reflex of experience which seems to correspond with Locke's moral or rational judgment, yet has less force as it receives no strength from the rational nature. But the Lockeian spirit broods upon the pages of Shaftesbury, and we find the latter in full agreement with the former in thinking that to love one another is the fulfilment of the moral law, the sum of all morality, the essence of religion, and the ground of all human advancement. Both see in future rewards and punishments inferior motives to a moral life, but a powerful means of arousing men from their lethargy, and, rightly understood, a reasonable stimulant to the hope and expectations of virtue. The political ethics of Shaftesbury, so far as he has suggested them, seem to be in strict agree-

ment with the views expressed in Locke's second Essay on Government, and he makes use of the arguments of Locke in combatting Hobbes.

In passing from Shaftesbury to Butler we enter a more vigorous, but a less delightful atmosphere. Butler begins where Locke began, holding it to be of prime importance to investigate the nature of man, and see for what it is adapted. Butler does not present a systematic psychology, but he seems to pursue the general scheme of Locke. His conception of man, like that of Locke and Shaftesbury, is the reverse of that of Hobbes, and he holds with Locke, against Shaftesbury, that the Reason is the sole umpire in every department of knowledge. Here Butler is far more confusing than Locke, as he speaks alternately of "Reason", "Conscience", "Principle of Reflection", and "Reflex Approbation", but his position is given almost in the words of Locke; "Reason is the only faculty which we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even Revelation itself." (Analogy II. 3.) He attempts, with Hobbes, Locke, and Clarke, to state one general principle which may be taken as a moral imperative. In his Sermon on *Self-Deceit* he holds that a constant check to self-partiality, and a rule of conduct, is found in the practical rule of our Saviour; whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do unto them. This rule should be made our way of thinking. The rule, he says, "consists of two parts. One is, to substitute another for yourself when you take a survey of any part of your behaviour, or consider what is proper, fit, and reasonable for you to do on any occasion; the other part is that you substitute yourself in the room of another, consider yourself as the person affected by such behaviour, or toward whom such an action is done, and then you would not only see, but likewise feel the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such an action or behaviour." Happiness is the only rational end, but this happiness may not be immediate, but mediate. Happiness results only when the rational end is attained. It is also

identical with virtue. Here again, Butler is a disciple of Locke. Professor Sidgwick well says, "The aim of his teaching is, not to induce men to choose duty rather than interest, but to convince them that there is no inconsistency between the two, that self-love and conscience lead to one and the same course of life."¹) Butler maintains in more chilly language than we find anywhere in Locke; "Though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to, and pursuit of, what is right and good, as such; yet when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least; not contrary to it."²) In the scheme of Butler, benevolence holds a small and cramped position compared to that of Locke. It is confined to the family circle, and does not go out to man as man. (*Dissertation.*) This diminution of benevolence, and the constant tendency to bring obligation to virtue to a level with self-interest, weakens his theory of virtue on the one hand, and subtracts from the value of conscience on the other. Butler agrees with Locke in holding there can be no conflict between conscience and self-interest, but differs radically, when, supposing a conflict, he holds that conscience will and ought, to give way to self-interest. (Sermon XI.) But he is firmly convinced, with Locke, that mankind is a community, that we all stand in a relation with each other, that there is a public end and interest of society which each particular is obliged to promote, is the sum of morals. (Sermon IX.)

The conflict between the moral reason and self-interest which appears in the writings of Clarke, Shaftesbury, and Butler, is recognised by Locke, but always as under wrong measures of good and evil, or wrong judgments. Locke allows no concession to self-interest as against virtue, and to eliminate the causes of conflict, he has characteristically

¹) The Methods of Ethics. 3d. Ed. p. 203.

²) Sermon XI, compare Analogy. I. 2.

sought out the remedy in a practical and effective method of education. If we ask Locke, How is it possible for a conflict to arise between conscience and self-interest, he would reply, only when the tastes and manners of men are corrupted and they do not follow their real interests, which are those of virtue. But neither Clarke, Shaftesbury, nor Butler, take up ethical questions with the same breadth and fullness as does Locke. Nor does Price, who, more than they, represents the general tenor of Locke's system. Price takes Lockian ground on psychology, and accepts Locke's position that we know immediately that some actions are good, and that others are evil, and that our conceptions of right and wrong, of fitness and unfitness, are immediate to common sense. He repudiates, with Locke, the doctrine that the moral sense is independent, or different from the reason and the judging power. "It is the intellect that examines and compares, and is capable of discerning general truths". (Review. p. 19.) The ethical end is happiness, and his general conception of God, with the relation of theology to ethics is essentially that of Locke. Such attributes of Deity as justice, veracity, and goodness, are cardinal principles of virtue, and right and wrong are distinctions eternal and immutable in their nature. (Review. p. 432. 440.) It is also maintained that future rewards and punishments are a demand of morality, or of the moral government of God. (Review. p. 453.) Reason is, with Price, the ethical faculty, but, as with Locke, comes to the place of practical reason, or common sense. From this point we need not advance, for here, we come, in the line of Locke's successors, directly upon Kant and the Scottish School. The latter drew largely upon Locke, indeed, the majority of its members were educated in the Lockean atmosphere. The former, Kant, stands upon German soil, yet perhaps, with both Scottish and English parentage. It is no part of our task to point out the relations of his ethical speculations to those of Locke however small or great they may be. Enough has been said to indicate our view as to the direction taken by

Locke's doctrine. No English moralist of the eighteenth century discussed the whole subject of ethics. The questions of moral obligation, freedom, and responsibility are scarcely touched upon. The century was involved in the Deistic controversy, and it evolved an enormous literature, which, so far as practical philosophy is concerned, might be lost with advantage. Remembering that Shaftesbury's "Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit" was first published in 1699, we may reasonably question whether a single ray of light, or step in advance, is shewn by the Eighteenth Century over the Seventeenth, previous to the writings of Hume and his critics. Hobbes, Culverwel, Cumberland, More, Cudworth, Locke, and Shaftesbury, represent a period in ethical speculation, which, for strength, diversity, and comprehensiveness has not yet been surpassed. That which the strongest men of that age recognised as the most necessary and practical direction for the observer, investigator, and thinker, is forcing itself upon the attention of our own age. "Das sittliche Problem", says Professor Wundt, "drängt sich heute immer mächtiger in den Vordergrund. Die Fragen über den Ursprung des Sittlichen, über das Verhältniss des Einzelnen zur Gemeinschaft, über die Bedeutung von Recht und Pflicht, sind als die wichtigsten Fragen der gegenwärtigen Philosophie anerkannt." (Rectoratsrede 1889, p. 47.) To these questions a score of philosophers have given answer. To these questions Locke gave answer. That man is a rational and social being, an understanding and free agent; that there is a Moral Government of the world evinced in power, wisdom, and goodness; that the reason, or rational power of the soul is the ethical faculty or criterion; that man has the ability to govern and subdue his desires and passions, and conform himself to the precepts of virtue; that virtue is formally comprehended in the Golden Rule, its essence love, and its fulfilment public and private happiness; that the nature of the moral law is eternal, unchangeable, one with God, and unalterable by any power in Heaven or on Earth; that it is the standard to which

both individuals and communities are to refer their actions and institutions; that its obligations spring primarily out of its reasonableness, and secondarily, out of its eternal nature, involving punishments and rewards, here and hereafter; that the first function of education is rational self-control, so that each may discharge his obligations as a member of society; that no government is just that does not aim at the "true and solid happiness" of all its peoples, and that no government is strong that does not serve the moral law, and regard its precepts as imperative, — these are some of the principles and propositions which Locke holds to have their origin in the rational and social nature of man, and their support in universal observation and experience.

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Life.

I was born in Westmoreland, N. Y., U. S. A., Oct. 19th. 1858; educated in Whitestown Seminary, Hamilton College, and Union Theological Seminary, 1873—1883; Pastor of the Dutch-Reformed Church at Hastings-on-Hudson, 1883—1885; married in 1884; Pastor of Beckwith Memorial Presbyterian Church, Cleveland, Ohio, 1885—April 1888, in which month I came to Leipzig and have since studied Philosophy under Professors Heinze and Wundt, Political Economy under Professors Roscher and Brentano, History under Professors Maurenbrecher and Arndt, and Pedagogy under Professor Masius.

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